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Alberta Decision on Knock-for-Knock Allocation of Liability in a Standard Form Drilling Contract

Wed, 07/15/2015 - 10:00am

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Alberta Decision on Knock-for-Knock Allocation of Liability in a Standard Form Drilling Contract

Case Commented On: Precision Drilling Canada Limited Partnership v Yangarra Resources Ltd, 2015 ABQB 433

This case involves the interpretation of a standard form drilling contract. Under that contract, said (at para 5) to be negotiated between the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, the drilling contractor (here Precision) and the oil and gas operator (here Yangarra) agreed to accept an allocation of risks and liabilities based essentially on ownership interests rather than fault. Thus, Article 10.1 of the contract, subject to some listed exceptions, provided that:

Precision shall at all times assume all of the risk of and be solely liable for any damage to, loss of, or destruction of Precision’s Surface Equipment, regardless of the negligence or other fault of Yangarra or howsoever arising and Precision specifically releases Yangarra in regard to any claims that Precision may otherwise have in regard thereto.

By the same token, Yangarra (Article 10.3 and 10.4) agreed to accept risks and provide an indemnity in relation to any downhole issues:

Yangarra shall at all times assume all of the risk of and be solely liable for …any loss, damage to or destruction of:

(ii) Yangarra’s equipment …

(iii) the hole, reservoir or any underground formation …

regardless of the negligence or other fault of Precision or howsoever arising, and Yangarra shall defend and indemnify Precision from and against any and all actions, claims, losses, costs, damages and expenses resulting therefrom and specifically releases Precision from any claims Yangarra may otherwise make in regard thereto.

Yangarra shall at all times during a drilling program assume all of the risk of and be solely liable for the cost of repairing and re-drilling a lost or damaged hole, including, without limitation, the cost of fishing operations, regardless of the negligence or other fault of Precision or howsoever arising, and Yangarra specifically releases Precision from any claims Yangarra may otherwise have in regard thereto;

(emphasis added by the Court)

Master Prowse refers to this (at para 15) as a “negotiated form of bilateral no fault arrangement” but it is more commonly referred to a “knock-for-knock” contract. While unlawful or contrary to public policy in some jurisdictions (because the provisions potentially diminish the incentive to take care) they are common in some sectors (e.g. the offshore oil and gas industry) as an efficient way of resolving disputes especially where multiple parties (and especially sub-contractors) might be involved.

In this particular case Yangarra hired Precision to drill a number of wells. The first well was drilled successfully. During the drilling of the second well the facts (or the facts as claimed by Yangarra, since the case came before Master Prowse on a motion by Precision for summary judgment and thus Master Prowse accepted Yangarra’s version of the facts in the event of any conflict) suggested that an employee of Precision wrongly added sulfamic acid to the drilling mud rather than caustic potash and that as a result the drill string and bit became stuck. The well was subsequently abandoned and some of Yangarra’s equipment was lost downhole. As a result a substitute well was required. Precision commenced that operation but was ultimately replaced by another contractor. Precision sued for monies owing for its work on the drilling of these three wells. It appears (at paras 16, 28 & 29) that Yangarra in turn sought to set-off by way of counter claim any amount owed by Yangarra by its own damages including not only the value of the lost equipment but also the cost of the replacement well ($2.5 million) and the cost incurred by fishing operations on the second well in an attempt to recover equipment ($720,000). Precision sought summary judgment on these assumed facts on the basis that under the contract Yangarra had assumed liability for all of these costs and was therefore not entitled to any set-off.

Master Prowse concluded that this was an appropriate case for summary judgment and made the order sought by Precision. In so ordering Master Prowse rejected a number of arguments brought to bear by Yangarra.

The first such argument appears to have been that Yangarra might be able to recover on the basis of some legal theory (at para 34) (e.g. unjust enrichment) that was not covered by the allocation of risk in the contract. Not so, said Master Prowse quoting Article 10.13 of the contract:

For greater clarity, Precision and Yangarra acknowledge and agree that:

(a) the purpose of this Article X [ten] is to allocate contractually between Precision and Yangarra certain of the risks, responsibilities and potential losses or liabilities associated with the operations and activities involved in drilling a well under a drilling program; and,

(b) such allocation shall prevail in the place and stead of any other allocation of risks, responsibilities, or potential losses or liabilities that might be made on the basis of the negligence or other fault of either party or howsoever arising or any other theory of legal liability and notwithstanding the breach or alleged breach by either party of any provision of the drilling program not included in this Article X [ten]

(emphasis added by the Court)

While the contract might not cover the intentional infliction of harm there was no evidence that that was the cause of the harm.

The second argument was that the contract should be interpreted in light of a presumption that neither party would release the other from liability for gross negligence. Master Prowse’s response to this was that while such a presumption might be appropriate (at para 40) in situations involving “inequality of sophistication or bargaining power” that was not this case:

[43] In my view, it is entirely sensible to contemplate Precision and Yangarra releasing each other from claims based on gross negligence.

[45] Perhaps it is because, over time, drilling companies and petroleum companies have found it cheaper in time and money to insure their property and waive subrogated claims against the other, rather than retaining the right to sue the other?

A third argument was that an interpretation of the contract which relieved Precision from liability would lead to an absurdity or an inconsistency in the overall construction of the contract insofar as Precision had also contracted to drill the well in a good and workmanlike manner. Master Prowse found no such absurdity:

[57] In my view, in the context of a bilateral no fault contract, the court should not presume that Yangarra’s releasing of Precision from some of the consequences of not drilling in a good and workmanlike manner is commercially absurd.

[58] It is important to note in this context that Precision’s breach of its promise to drill in a good and workmanlike manner does have meaningful legal consequences under the contract.

[59] Significantly, the contract expressly allows Yangarra to remove Precision from the site, and take over the operation of Precision’s drilling rig “in the event of a default by Precision in performing its obligations under a drilling program” (see article 8.1)

[60] As well, these parties have an ongoing commercial relationship pursuant to a Master Contract under which specific jobs are added from time to time. In addition to removing Precision from this specific job under article 8.1, presumably Yangarra could also cease adding new jobs for Precision under the Master Contract.

[61] In other words, the interpretation I have given to this contract does not render Precision’s promise to drill in a good and workmanlike manner meaningless. There are negative legal and commercial consequences to Precision for breaching its covenant.

Nor was Precision’s approach inconsistent with the overall structure of the contract (at paras 62 – 65).

Master Prowse also rejected Yangarra’s argument to the effect that the exemption from liability should only apply to third party claims – an argument founded on Justice Hunt’s judgment in Erehwon Explortion Limited v. Northstar Energy Corp., 1993 CanLII 7238 (AB QB), in relation to the CAPL operating procedure. Master Prowse rejected the analogy principally on the grounds that this contract dealt clearly and separately with both inter-party and third party claims.

Finally, Master Prose considered the decision in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4 (CanLII) with respect to exculpatory clauses, and in particular whether the clause in this case could be said to be unconscionable at the time the contract was made, and whether there might be public policy reasons for declining to enforce it. As for unconscionability, and given the usual informing considerations (grossly unfair, absence of legal advice, overwhelming imbalance in bargaining power, and vulnerability), Master Prowse wasted little time before ruling that the clause was not unconscionable. In particular stating (at para 88) “Since the no-fault provisions are bilateral, I do not believe them to be grossly unfair or improvident.”

It is evident from Master Prowse’s judgment that Yangarra mounted a very broad public policy attack on knock for knock provisions alleging that such clauses should not be permitted in the context of high risk activities since, absent liability for fault, those engaged in those activities would have no incentive to take care and, in this case (quoting from Yangarra’s brief at para 101) “safe drilling practices would be undermined.” Master Prowse gave four reasons for thinking that this overstated the case. First, and as already noted, there were (at para 104 & paras 58 – 61 quoted above) adverse contractual consequences for Precision. Second, there were reputational consequences for Precision (at para 105). And third, there was in any event a complex regulatory framework in place which offered further assurance that Precision would follow safe drilling practices (at paras 106 – 110). And finally

[112] We are not dealing with an inequality of bargaining positions here, where a commercially sophisticated entity is seeking to take advantage of a less sophisticated customer. We are dealing with an industry wide bilateral no fault contract, adopted by two very sophisticated parties.

This was an appropriate case for summary judgment. The principal issue was one of contractual interpretation and the contract was clear.

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The SGER Amendments and the New Treatment of Cogeneration

Tue, 07/14/2015 - 10:00am

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The SGER Amendments and the New Treatment of Cogeneration

Regulation Commented On: Specified Gas Emitters Amendment Regulation, Alta Reg 104/2015

In a previous post I reported on the Minister’s speech announcing a two-step procedure for developing a new climate change policy for Alberta. The first step involved changes to two of the key variables in the current Specified Gas Emitter Regulation (SGER), Alta Reg 139/2007 while the second step is the more comprehensive review to be conducted by Dr Andrew Leach to assess the full range of options for the management of greenhouse gas emissions in the province. At the time I wrote that post I had not examined the details of the amendments to the SGER to see what other changes (if any) were being proposed. This post picks up where the last left off.

Here is what I wrote in the previous post. The first paragraph offers a brief description of the SGER regime. The second paragraph describes the key changes to that regime.

The SGER imposes greenhouse gas emissions intensity reduction obligations (ultimately 12%) on regulated emitters (facilities that emit in excess of 100,000 tonnes of CO2e per year). A facility may achieve compliance in one of four ways: (1) meeting its target by producing its product with lower carbon inputs, (2) Alberta based offset credits (emission reductions over a business as usual scenario achieved by a non-regulated entity in accordance with an approved protocol), (3) emission performance credits (credits achieved by a regulated facility which beats its compliance target), or, (4) a contribution of $15 per tonne (for excess emissions over the compliance target) to the Climate Change and Emission Management Fund (the so-called compliance price).

The province will extend the SGER but will change two of the three key variables embedded in the regulation. While the amendments to the regulation have yet to be gazetted it appears that the regulation will be extended until the end of 2017. The coverage of the regulation will not change, i.e. the regulation will continue to apply only to emitters emitting more than 100,000 tonnes CO2e. However, both the ambition (or stringency) of the regulation and the compliance price will change. Thus, regulated emitters will be required to make emission intensity improvements of 15% in 2016 and 20% in 2017, and the compliance price will change to $20 per tonne in 2016 and $30 per tonne in 2017. The Minister estimates that these initiatives will reduce emissions by 13 megatonnes per year by 2017.

As one would expect, the amendments to the regulation implement the changes to the stringency requirement (new s.4). However no change to the regulation is needed to implement the new compliance prices because s. 8(2) of the SGER stipulates that this is to be effected by Ministerial Order rather than by Regulation:

The Minister may, by order, establish the amount of money that a person responsible must contribute to the Fund to obtain one fund credit equal to a one tonne reduction in emissions, expressed on a CO2e basis.

A moment’s reflection will confirm just how bizarre this is: one person gets to establish the marginal price of carbon in Alberta! While the reality no doubt is that the price of carbon is in fact a matter for cabinet, one wonders why such an important issue does not require an amendment to the regulation, if not an amendment to the governing legislation.

In addition to the changes to the stringency requirements, the amendments deal with two other matters, the treatment of cogeneration and the status of Ministerial guidance and standards, as well as some house-keeping issues.

The Treatment of Cogeneration

Cogeneration, also known as combined heat and power (CHP), is the simultaneous production of electricity and heat from a single fuel source. Cogeneration offers significant benefits over other forms of generation principally for efficiency reasons. The average global efficiency of traditional generators ranges between 35% and 37%. The most efficient turbines can bring efficiency close to 45% or 50%, but overall they remain significantly less efficient than cogeneration plants. Cogeneration allows 75% to 80% of fuel inputs, and up to 90% in the most efficient plants, to be converted into useful energy. Cogeneration does not, in itself, increase the power supply, but uses one fuel input to produce two outputs, i.e. heat and electricity. By making more efficient use of fuel inputs, cogeneration allows the same level of end-use energy demand to be met with fewer energy inputs. Thus, it reduces energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and other air pollutants. By locating close to load, cogeneration may also defer the need to construct new transmission and may reduce overall line losses.

According to the Alberta Electric System Operator’s 2014 Long-term Outlook, Alberta (as of the end of 2013) had an installed capacity of 4,250 MW of cogeneration (29% of the total installed generation capacity of MW 14,568) mostly in the oil sands sector (both mining and in situ operations). In situ operations require electricity for their operations and a large amount of steam. Steam can be produced through a stand-alone natural gas fired boiler or through cogeneration or some combination of the two. An in situ operator electing to construct cogeneration may size the generation to meet its steam needs or its electricity needs. If the project is sized to meet steam needs it will produce electricity considerably in excess of its requirements. This surplus must be exported to the Alberta grid. In this scenario oil sands operators will tend to pursue a strategy of bidding power into the pool at zero or close to zero to ensure dispatch (see Oil Sands Community Alliance, 2014 Oil Sands Co-generation and Connection Report, at 29 – 30). As such, cogeneration can provide lower emissions intensity base load to the system.

In sum, cogeneration offers considerable benefits to Alberta’s electricity system but it is not a panacea in the context of greenhouse gas emissions. To the extent that natural gas rather than biofuels remain the fuel of choice for cogeneration projects, cogeneration will still result in greenhouse gas emissions (unless captured and sequestered) although such emissions will be reduced when compared with stand-alone gas fired steam boilers and combined cycle gas generation each producing a single product.

The question for present purposes then is how the benefits of cogeneration are or should be recognized in the SGER scheme described above.

The Treatment of Cogeneration in the Pre-Amendment Version of SGER

The pre-amendment version of SGER said nothing whatsoever about cogeneration. As a result, any recognition of the greenhouse gas benefits of cogeneration had to be achieved within the general provisions of the regulations. It is not immediately obvious how this can be done and the resulting recognition was exceptionally opaque. While the offset scheme might offer the most obvious mechanism for accommodating cogeneration, this option will not generally be available, principally because a cogeneration facility will typically form an integrated part of an industrial facility which will itself be a regulated facility. A project can only qualify as an offset project if it is not part of a regulated facility (SGER, s 7). The whole purpose of the offset scheme is to create an incentive to reduce emissions over business as usual (BAU) in the unregulated sector.

The only other alternative was to recognize cogeneration facilities as capable of producing emissions performance credits (EPCs) and this indeed proved to be the Department’s chosen vehicle for recognizing the emission reduction opportunities associated with cogeneration. At the risk of oversimplifying, a regulated project with cogeneration can obtain EPCs based on the difference between deemed emissions and actual emissions. Deemed emissions are calculated by reference to each of the two products, steam and electricity. Deemed emissions for steam are calculated on the basis that in a BAU case the steam would have been produced by a gas fired boiler operating with an efficiency of 80%. Deemed emissions for electricity are calculated on the basis that electricity would otherwise have been produced by a combined cycle gas turbine with an emissions intensity of 0.418 tonnes CO2e/MWh. In addition, while the deemed baseline steam emissions were subject to the 2% per annum improved intensity requirements, the deemed emissions associated with electricity generation were not. All of this is (or at least was) achieved through technical guidance documents including Government of Alberta, Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource Development, Technical Guidance for Completing Specified Gas Compliance Reports, Version 7.0, January 2014, at s 4.3.

Critiques of the Pre-Amendment Treatment of Cogeneration Under SGER

There is a lively debate about the treatment that has been accorded to cogeneration under the SGER. For some there is a threshold question as to whether cogeneration should generate credits at all. For others the debate is more about the level of crediting extended to cogeneration – is it too generous, is it not generous enough? And finally, from a legal perspective, there is a question about the lack of transparency of the crediting rules for cogeneration.

The threshold question is generally framed in terms of additionality which is a concept more frequently associated with offsets rather than EPCs. The concept is relevant here because of the way in which cogeneration facilities generate credits. In order to qualify a project for offset credits the proponent of the project (or in Alberta the developer of the crediting protocol) must establish additionality. Additionality means that but for the availability of carbon credits the proponent would not have engaged in this particular emissions reduction activity. In this context this would mean that the project proponent would not install cogeneration but for the availability of credits but would instead produce steam in a gas fired boiler and purchase electricity from the grid. If, however, the proposed activity is BAU (i.e. the proponent would engage in it anyway) then it is inappropriate to award any carbon credits since to do so simply undermines the stringency of the targets that the regulated emitter must meet. While the SGER only refers to additionality in the context of offsets and not in the context of EPCs, it is evident that the deemed approach to the calculation of EPCs for cogeneration is conceptually similar to the treatment of offsets. Hence, in order to qualify for EPCs some argue that a proponent of a cogeneration project should have to meet an additionality test. It is possible that some projects (or projects of a certain size) would meet an additionality test while others would fail. For example, the electricity market price risks associated with sizing cogeneration to meet project steam needs might suggest that a proponent requires a carbon price incentive in order to make that investment, whereas the installation of cogeneration to meet project electricity needs might be nothing more than BAU.

Beyond the threshold question there is also a debate about the level of crediting extended to cogeneration. As noted above, the calculation of EPCs turns on the difference between deemed emissions and actual emissions; the higher the deemed emissions the more generous the crediting. On one side of this debate are those who argue that the 0.418 tonnes CO2e/MWh reference used to calculate EPCs provides only limited recognition of the efficiency benefits of cogeneration. The recognition is said to be limited because the Alberta power grid has an emission intensity that is significantly higher than 0.418 tonnes CO2e/MWh. This leads some to take the position that EPCs should be calculated based on the annual average Alberta power grid emission intensity (most recently stated by ESRD to be 0.88 CO2e/MWh) to recognize the grid displacement benefits of cogeneration. Still more favourable would be a deemed intensity factor based on the assumption that in situ cogeneration curtails coal generation. On the other hand, if cogeneration is actually curtailing generation from renewables then the deemed emissions intensity factor should be lower.

A final criticism is that whatever the merits of crediting for cogeneration the current scheme is far too opaque, especially when one considers the scale of crediting attributed to cogeneration projects. The following table produced by the Department (April 2015) documents the compliance cycle for regulated facilities.

Compliance Cycle Emissions Reductions
at Facility
(Mt CO2e)
Offset Credits Submitted
(Mt CO2e)
Recognition of Cogeneration
(Mt CO2e)
Total Reductions
(Mt CO2e)
Fund Payment
2007 (half year) 1.60 0.88 1.28 3.76 41.3 2008 1.35 2.68 2.58 6.61 85.4 2009 0.89 3.74 2.66 7.29 61.3 2010 1.02 3.85 2.55 7.43 67.4 2011 3.06 5.40 2.51 10.96 55.0 2012 1.20 3.20 3.41 7.80 87.7 2013 0.45 2.04 4.17 6.66 98.6 2014 5.01 2.55 3.11 10.66 83.4 Total 14.57 24.34 22.26 61.17 577.9

Note: Mt = Million Tonnes

Two features of the table are significant. The first is that “Recognition of Cogeneration” is accorded separate recognition on a par with offset credits and fund payments notwithstanding the fact that while these latter two categories are expressly recognized in the SGER there has (until this round of amendments) been no separate recognition in the SGER for cogeneration. Second, the table shows that the cumulative effect of recognizing EPCs associated with cogeneration is very similar in terms of scale to the crediting associated with all offset programs combined. With credits available at this scale, the availability of this crediting option arguably should be clearly articulated in the regulations themselves rather than in policy-level guidance documents. There are no doubt all sorts of reasons why offset projects have not generated more credits (including the low compliance price and the transaction costs associated with getting protocols approved and projects and credits registered) but the point here is simply that while the treatment of offsets under the SGER is completely transparent, the historical treatment of cogeneration is completely opaque.

The Treatment of Cogeneration in the Amendment

As noted above, prior to the amendment, a regulated facility could meet its net emissions intensity limit in one of four ways: actual efficiency gains, offset credits, EPCs and fund contributions. The amendments add one “additional” (see new s.6(1)) way of meeting the target: a “cogeneration compliance adjustment” (CCA) which is to be defined in the Standard for Completing Greenhouse Gas Compliance Reports. At the same time, the government has amended s.9 (dealing with EPCs) to add a subsection specifying the maximum number of EPCs that the Director can issue in any year. The formula specifies that the Director must subtract the facility’s CCA for that year. The inference is clear. Cogeneration projects associated with regulated facilities will no longer generate EPCs but instead what appears to be a much less fungible CCA. While we have yet to see the precise rules for calculating a facility’s CCA, such a CCA would appear to be conceptually different from EPCs, offset credits and fund credits. While s.10 of SGER states that these compliance tools are merely “revocable licences” and that nothing in the regulation “ensures or guarantees” the availability of offsets or EPCs, it would seem that the drafter intended that the CCA should not even have the status of a tradeable revocable licence. Thus it would seem that a CCA is not fungible and can only be used by the facility owner, and, on the face of it, only in that particular compliance year. Thus, while an EPC is tradeable, bankable and can be used in different compliance periods (even when the compliance cost changes), none of that would appear to be the case for a CCA. On the other hand, it should be noted that while the director may require (s.26 as am) the facility owner to take prescribed remedial action where problems are subsequently identified with respect to emissions offsets or EPCs, there is no corresponding authority with respect to CCAs.

In sum, the amendment has changed the arrangements for crediting the greenhouse gas benefits of cogeneration at both the formal and substantive levels. At the formal level, cogeneration earns express recognition in the SGER as a means for attaining compliance. This is clearly a step in the right direction in terms of both the rule of law and transparency. However, the SGER is not as clear as it could be with respect to the status of the new CCA and it is unclear why the new prescribed remedial action provision applies to offsets and EPCs but not CCAs. At the substantive level it appears that some steps have been taken to limit the benefits associated with cogeneration credits. While much will depend on the terms of the Standard my reading of the amendment suggests that the CCA will not be tradeable or bankable.

Clarification of the Status of Departmental Guidance

Sections 61 and 62 of the Climate Change and Emissions Management Act, SA 2003, c. C-16.7 provide as follows:

Adoption by reference

61(1) A regulation under this Act may adopt or incorporate in whole or in part or with modifications documents that set out standards, practices, codes, guidelines, objectives, methods or other rules of any government, organization or person, including, without limitation, any standards, practices, codes of practice, guidelines, objectives or methods developed by the Minister under section 62, as they read at a particular time or as amended or replaced from time to time relating to any matter in respect of which a regulation may be made under this Act.

(2) Subsection (1) applies to any standard, practice, code, guideline, objective, method or other rule that has been adopted or incorporated into a regulation before or after this section comes into force.

(3) Where a standard, practice, code, guideline, objective, method or other rule is adopted or incorporated by regulation under this Act, the Minister shall ensure that a copy of the standard, practice, code, guideline, objective, method or other rule is made available to a person on request.

Codes of practice, guidelines

62 The Minister may develop standards, practices, codes of practice, guidelines, objectives or methods relating to any matter in respect of which a regulation may be made under this Act.

The Department has issued a number of important technical guidance documents with respect to the interpretation and application of SGER. These documents include guidance as to the completion of baseline emission intensity applications, compliance reports and verification approaches. The SGER did make some reference to Ministerial guidelines issued under s.62 of the Act (see, for example, ss.7(2)(d), 8(3)(e) & 9(2)(e)) but there was perhaps some room for doubt about the precise status of these guidance documents. While any such doubts may not be completely resolved (since the Regulation still contains the above references) the Regulation has clarified the status of a number of standards (no longer referred to as Technical Guidance). Thus a new s.3.1 provides that

The following standards are adopted and form part of this Regulation:

(a) Standard for Completing Greenhouse Gas Baseline Emissions Intensity Applications;

(b) Standard for Completing Greenhouse Gas Compliance Reports;

(c) Standard for Greenhouse Gas Emission Offset Project Developers;

(d) Standard for Greenhouse Gas Verification.

And in each case the Standard is defined as the Standard “published by the department, as amended or replaced from time to time”.

The Period of Extension

The amendment extends the Regulation from June 30, 2015 to December 31, 2017. It remains to be seen whether the Regulation will be further extended after that or whether Dr. Leach’s review will result in more comprehensive changes to Alberta’s carbon management policies.

Some Final Thoughts

I have three final thoughts. The first relates to consultation, the second relates to market considerations, and the third relates to overall cogeneration policy.

As to the first, I think that these amendments bring about a significant change to the carbon treatment of cogeneration. I think that the more explicit and transparent treatment of cogeneration is a good step forward but I think that there is still a need for more light to be shed on the details. My comment relates to the degree of consultation that accompanied these changes. I simply do not know how broadly the Department consulted on these changes. Did it talk to industry? Did it talk to ENGOs? Did it consult them on the details like fungibility and “bankability”? Did it prepare an options paper? I don’t know the answer to any of the above. I can certainly say that there was no broad public consultation and no pros and cons options paper posted on the Department’s website. Indeed, the website still does not contain a link to the new “Standards” that are supposed to be incorporated in the regulations. Now I understand that this government has not been in office long (although I suspect much of the contents of this package pre-date the current administration) but I for one am hoping that this government might make public policy differently from its predecessors and that consultations will be supported by published and reasoned options papers or white papers.

Second, as Duff Harper recently observed in a Blakes Bulletin, the compliance options for regulated emitters on a go-forward basis will, in practical terms, be very limited. This is because the $15 per tonne compliance price has crippled the offset market; that price is simply too low, and by waiting to the bitter end of the drop-dead date for the SGER (and then extending the bitter end – twice) the previous administration failed to provide a concrete and positive signal to the market as to the future compliance price. The new administration has now sent that signal but it is too little and too late. Not much will happen in the next two years to produce lots more offsets for compliance purposes over that period. And the message that is being sent to possible offset developers after 2017 is equivocal. On the one hand the amendments will increase demand for offsets and raise the compliance price, but on the other hand there is no certainty more than two years out, given the more comprehensive review that Dr. Leach will lead, that the offset program will still be part of Alberta’s compliance scheme. Thus, while existing offset project owners may in a sense earn a windfall over the next two years, two years is insufficient time to bring on many more new offset projects. One result of this might be positive. Given limited compliance options regulated projects may actually invest in emissions intensity improvements – but again a two year signal hardly seems adequate as a basis for making significant capital investments. The other result, compliance through payments into the Fund, seems far more likely. But this may also mean that government will be led to (re)consider the purpose of the Fund given what will undoubtedly be significantly increased contributions. For more discussion of this see the paper by Beck and Wigle referenced in this earlier ABlawg post.

Finally, cogeneration is an important part of Alberta’s electricity mix and its importance is likely to grow for two reasons. First, oil sands projects will continue to need process heat and electricity as part of their extraction, processing and upgrading. These requirements can be most efficiently met by on-site cogeneration facilities which provide stream and electricity for the operation. Second, the efficiencies associated with cogeneration mean that there are also greenhouse gas mitigation advantages associated with this technology, especially when compared with stand-alone carbon-based generating facilities. Despite its importance it is fairly clear that Alberta does not have a coherent cogeneration policy. Instead, the province has a de facto position on cogeneration created by the interaction of a number of different policy documents and statutes including the Industrial Systems Policy Statement (1997), the Transmission Development Policy (2003), the Electric Utilities Act, SA 2003, c.E-5.1, the Hydro and Electric Energy Act, RSA 2000, c. H- 16 the Transmission Regulation, Alta Reg 86/2007 and the SGER and the technical guidance documents designed to implement SGER. Given the scale and importance of cogeneration to the province’s industrial sector, and indeed to the province generally, it is perhaps time that Alberta developed a clear and coherent policy on cogeneration.

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“Inspired by the Past, We Shape the Future”

Fri, 07/10/2015 - 10:00am

By: Maureen Duffy 

PDF Version: “Inspired by the Past, We Shape the Future”

Matter Commented On: Conference on “Interdisciplinary Approaches to Security in the Changing World,” and attacks by extremists on educational institutions, “Inspired by the Past, We Shape the Future”

Recent terrorist and/or militant incidents have focused on universities and schools, assumed, by some, to be a desirable target for extremists because of their symbolic value. Another motivation for such attacks may be that education itself is viewed as an antidote to the spread of extremism, and suppressing education may be seen as a means of gaining control over the population — a theory expressed by Malala Yousafzai, from Pakistan, who, at the age of 15, was shot in the face on a school bus for advocating for education for girls. She has famously called on the United Nations to send “books and pens, rather than tanks,” to parts of the world struggling with extremist violence. Military intervention and legal enactments may have some impact on extremism, but they can also often escalate the problem, rather than diminishing it, and they can give rise to new human-rights abuses. Education appears to be a much more promising tool in many cases, and that is likely why it is under attack.

A statement by the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack explains the societal costs of recent attacks on higher education around the world:

Attacks on higher education affect all levels of education. Students and professors who are silenced, forced to flee, or killed leave behind a weakened education system, reducing the quality of education overall. Primary and secondary schools depend on teachers trained in higher education institutions, and on research that informs pedagogy and teaching methods. Students aspiring to the next stage in their education find their opportunities abruptly curtailed. These attacks crack the basic foundation of a functioning society; a society’s loss of academic capital causes disruptions that can take generations to heal.

They note that, in Iraq, 460 professors, scientists, and administrators have been murdered since 2003. Others have been kidnapped, or their families threatened. Continuing to run institutions of higher education has proven difficult and dangerous as violence in the region continues.

Other examples of the onslaught on education are disturbingly easy to find. Boko Haram has been responsible for major attacks on schools in northeast Nigeria, including the high-profile kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls in Chibok and, some believe, an attack on the College of Agriculture. In Kenya, Somali militants killed 147 students and wounded many others at Garissa University.

In India, an attack on professors has recently been blamed on people associated with the local government in Kolkata. In Mexico, 43 students at the Raúl Isidro Burgos Rural Teachers’ College of Ayotzinapa disappeared and are presumed dead. The Dean of Islamic studies at Pakistan’s University of Karachi was killed, apparently because of a speech he gave, which caused him to be accused of blasphemy. The list of examples could easily continue.

According to an article in the New York Times, academics and students are being forced to seek refugee status at alarming rates. The Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS have greatly accelerated this problem in that region, which is where much of the international focus on anti-terrorism is currently directed. A report by the Scholars at Risk Network characterized attacks on higher education around the world as a crisis.

In response to reports of the burning of thousands of books in law, philosophy, science, and poetry by militants in Mosul, Iraq, a UNESCO representative said:

This destruction marks a new phase in the cultural cleansing perpetrated in regions controlled by armed extremists in Iraq … It adds to the systematic destruction of heritage and the persecution of minorities that seeks to wipe out the cultural diversity that is the soul of the Iraqi people … Burning books is an attack on the culture, knowledge and memory, as we witnessed in Timbuktu recently, with the burning of the manuscripts at the Ahmed Baba Centre. Such violence is evidence of a fanatical project, targeting both human lives and intellectual creation.

Many of these issues were discussed at a security conference I attended in June 2015, in Krakow, Poland, at Jagiellonian University. The conference brought together people from around the world, with the ultimate hope of enhancing understanding of these current, difficult issues on a more international level. I discussed legal enactments that Canada has undertaken to attempt to thwart threats from extremist groups, most notably ISIS. Examples, which I discussed at the conference, include Bill C-51 (now the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015), security certificates and citizenship stripping, and I talked about problems with these initiatives, both in terms of a lack of effectiveness and in terms of the cost incurred for individual human rights.

It is easy to find fault with governmental responses to terrorism/extremism. What is less easy, though, is to find solutions. While no one thing will solve the growing threat of extremism, one thing that could make a significant difference is education, and the history of Jagiellonian University vividly illustrates that point.

“Inspired By the Past”

It was fascinating to be discussing such forward-looking issues in a place so steeped in history. Jagiellonian University just celebrated its 650th anniversary, with the slogan “inspired by the past, we shape the future.” Aside from the ideas that came forward regarding security, the setting of this conference also served as a reminder of the very important role that universities have traditionally played, and continue to play, in overcoming extremism.

A blog post could not possibly include a comprehensive history of this remarkable university, but some of the highlights are impressive. It is the oldest university in Poland and one of the oldest in the world. Jagiellonian University was founded in 1364 by King Casimir III the Great. The Collegium Maius, the site where much of the conference was held, was established in the early 15th Century, after Queen (Saint) Jadwiga left a portion of her estate to the University.

I have posted a couple of pictures I took of the Collegium Maius.

Collegium Maius

The courtyard inside of Collegium Maius

Jagiellonian University has seen significant changes in its fortunes over the years. It flourished during the Renaissance and counts Nicolaus Copernicus among its esteemed graduates from that era. It then struggled to continue during the partitions of Poland, as the occupation forces threatened to close it down entirely, but it survived that period and flourished again.

In November 1939, the Nazis, who had invaded Poland two months earlier, arrested 184 professors from Jagiellonian University and other Krakow universities and sent them to a concentration camp. Called Sonderaktion Krakau, the incident began after the Gestapo called the unsuspecting professors to a meeting at Collegium Novum at Jagiellonian University, as a way of gathering people in one place, and then arrested and deported them. Some of the professors died in the camps, and the university was officially closed for the duration of the Occupation.

Public pressure from various places, including Nazi allies, led to some of the professors ultimately being released, basically those who were not Jewish and were over the age of 40. Some of those who were released participated in a secret re-opening of Jagiellonian University in 1942. This secret education continued through the Occupation, and approximately 800 students studied there during that time, including Karol Wojtyla, who later became Pope John Paul II.

The story of Jagiellonian University staying open in secret and at great risk was made especially poignant when I visited the Krakow Ghetto – famously portrayed in Schindler’s List – and the nearby Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camps, where conservative estimates suggest that two million people were murdered, often after being kept in barbaric conditions. It was against that backdrop, and after spending time in concentration camps themselves, that many of those professors risked their lives to continue the University’s educational mission. That resistance to an extremist attack on education took amazing courage and was truly heroic.

The University reopened after World War II, but the Communist Government was initially hostile to it, and much of the faculty research activity was suppressed. There were numerous student protests during the following years against the Government, again a courageous action on the part of the students in defense of higher education.

Jagiellonian University again survived that period of repression and is now home to approximately 50,000 students, describing its “timelessness and unwavering symbolism” as defining features. The University now sprawls across a significant portion of the city.

“We Shape the Future”

Although the notion of the “Ivory Tower” is often used in a pejorative way, the importance of universities as places where human knowledge is stored, created, advanced and disseminated cannot be overstated. Some threats to universities can be overt, such as the Nazi closing of Jagiellonian University, or recent, violent attacks on scholars around the world. Others may be more insidious, such as incursions on academic freedom, which can take many forms. The Scholars at Risk Network, in a report called “Free to Think,” identified a range of threats, not just including violent extremism, but incidents like firing of professors for views expressed or denying entry or exit visas to professors who have stated unpopular views.

One message that I took from this security conference was that, as the world faces an increasingly grim fight against extremists, the first, and potentially most effective, line of attack must be found in recognizing the critical importance of education in any free society. Education at all levels has value in its own right, aside from any practical impact it may have outside of the so-called “Ivory Tower.”

As extremists try to advance by attacking education, the world must attack extremism by advancing and protecting education. Extremists know this already, which is why so many educational institutions are under attack. Education is a critical tool if any inroads are to be made against current extremist threats around the world.

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Does a Privative Clause Completely Oust Judicial Review?

Thu, 07/09/2015 - 10:00am

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Does a Privative Clause Completely Oust Judicial Review?

Case Commented On: Green v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2015 ABQB 379

Green v Alberta Teachers’ Association is a short judgment by Justice T.D. Clackson in a judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the Alberta Teachers’ Association. A hearing committee organized under the bylaws of the Association found that Green had committed professional misconduct. Green appealed that decision to a 4 person appeal committee under the Association bylaws, and the appeal committee split 2 – 2 on whether to grant Green’s appeal. The tie vote resulted in the committee dismissing her appeal because of an Association bylaw that states the decision of a committee shall be by majority. Green sought judicial review on the grounds that it was procedurally unfair to lose her appeal on a tie or, alternatively, that the appeal committee’s decision was unreasonable for failing to follow an earlier Court of Appeal decision on point. Justice Clackson dismisses Green’s application, and in doing so he makes some interesting remarks on the application of privative clauses to judicial review.

Professional conduct hearings are governed by sections 81 to 93 of the Alberta Teachers’ Association general bylaw (here). The bylaw particularly relevant to this case is section 84(4) which states the decision of any committee shall be by majority of those participating in the decision. I could not find a provision in the Association’s bylaws which prescribe the number of committee members who sit in a hearing, but apparently from this case it is possible for an appeal committee to have an even number of members. The problem with this of course being the possibility of an even split amongst committee members and a failure to reach a majority decision.

The composition of a tribunal hearing committee can definitely form the basis of a procedural fairness claim under bias. For example, a committee member whose past activities give the appearance they are partial to a particular outcome in a hearing is one of the more common grounds under this area of judicial review (a leading Alberta case on improper bias is Alberta Securities Commission v Workum, 2010 ABCA 405). But I hadn’t come across a procedural fairness case where the problem was alleged to be an even number of hearing members and tie outcome. Justice Clackson notes the Court of Appeal had an opportunity to rule on this issue back in 1996 (Ostrensky v Crowsnest Pass (Municipality) Development Appeal Board, [1996] 181 AR 96), finding that the result did not breach procedural fairness.

One might argue the result here is unreasonable on the basis that bylaw 84(4) requires the appeal committee to make decisions by majority rule and that the committee has decided to dismiss Green’s appeal without a majority. However there is no reference to this sort of argument being made by the applicant here. Instead it appears Green argued the committee’s decision was unreasonable because it failed to follow Eggerston v Alberta Teachers Association, 2002 ABCA 262. In Eggerston the Court of Appeal set aside a finding of professional misconduct by the Association. The facts in Eggerston involve critical comments made by Eggerston – a teacher but also a parent of elementary school aged children – in a parent-teacher conference. The basis of her misconduct was criticizing the professional competence of other members of the Association in a non-confidential manner. The Court of Appeal set aside this finding on the basis that the rule ought not be read literally to prevent Eggerston from making such critical comments as a parent during the parent-teacher conference.

Unfortunately here Justice Clackson does not provide any details concerning Green’s misconduct. In light of Green’s argument that the committee acted unreasonably by not following Eggerston, we can surmise the facts are similar. Moreover it does appear the facts are similar since the appeal committee here split on whether Eggerston is distinguishable (at para 6). If the facts and law of this case are indeed similar to Eggerston – it does raise the increasingly interesting question of the extent to which a statutory tribunal is bound by earlier rulings even if the doctrine of stare decisis does not strictly apply in administrative law (For some discussion on this point see my recent ABlawg here).

Justice Clackson observes that since the time Eggerston was decided by the Court of Appeal the legislature added a privative clause in section 57 of the Teaching Profession Act, RSA 2000 c T-2 to protect Association decisions from judicial review. The applicable provisions are as follows:

57 (2) A decision made by a committee is final and binding on the parties in respect of whom the decision is made and, subject to subsection (3), shall not be questioned, reviewed or restrained by any proceeding in the nature of an application for judicial review or otherwise in any court.

(3)  On a question of jurisdiction only, a decision is reviewable on an application for judicial review of the decision.

(4)  An application referred to in subsection (3) for judicial review of a decision must be commenced within 15 days from the day the decision is made.

This is known as a ‘strong’ privative clause as opposed to a weak one, since it not only states the committee decision is final and binding it also purports to shield decisions from judicial review.

It is trite law in Canada that the presence or absence of a privative clause in legislation is not determinative of how much scrutiny a reviewing court should apply to a tribunal decision, but rather a factor in how much deference is owed in judicial review. Privative clauses are almost a given in statutes governing administrative tribunals these days, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that a privative clause cannot completely oust judicial review. The authority on this point is Crevier v Quebec, [1981] 2 SCR 220. However, a strong privative clause is typically regarded as an indication that more deference than not is owed by a reviewing court to the impugned administrative decision.

In this case I think Justice Clackson relies too heavily on the privative clause when he concludes his jurisdiction to consider whether the committee erred in distinguishing Eggerston is ousted by section 57. As Justice Clackson puts it (at para 13):

In this case, the real issue is nothing more than whether the tribunal made a reasonable decision. By refusing to apply a precedent because it reasoned the precedent to be distinguishable. In my view, my jurisdiction to consider that question is clearly ousted by the privative and preclusive clause in s. 57.

This appears to give section 57 a literal reading and purports to limit judicial review of a committee decision under the Teaching Profession Act to matters of jurisdiction only. This cannot be the correct outcome under current administrative law principles following Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 which generally state an administrative decision must be reasonable given the applicable law and facts. To put it another way – the question of whether this statutory committee properly distinguished the Court of Appeal’s decision in Eggertson must surely be within the jurisdiction of a reviewing court.

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First Nations Education Funding: The Case of Sloan & Marvin

Wed, 07/08/2015 - 10:00am

By: Elysa Hogg

PDF Version: First Nations Education Funding: The Case of Sloan & Marvin

Sloan and Marvin Miller are twin children with Down Syndrome and because of where they live, their government refuses to provide them with the special education support that they need to go to school.

This story does not take place in Apartheid South Africa, or the Jim Crow South – Sloan and Marvin live in Ontario.

It was estimated by the Mississaugas of New Credit First Nation, where Sloan and Marvin reside, that $80,000 a year would be needed for the Miller twins to receive the education that they need. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) denied a request for funding, and instead recommended that the Nation take the needed amount from their already insufficient $165,000 a year education budget. In June of 2009 the Mississaugas lodged a formal human rights complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission on behalf of Sloan and Marvin. The claim will be heard at the Tribunal sometime this year, but there has already been great speculation about the arguments both sides will raise.


Insufficient First Nations education funding has been on the political radar for some time. However, after the fallout from then-Assembly of First Nations Chief Shawn Atleo and the government’s unsuccessful attempt at educational reform in 2014 (see here) there has been no further attempt to modernize the governance of First Nations education. The governing legislation begins and ends with the outdated provisions of the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. Beyond allowing the Minister to “establish, operate and maintain schools for Indian children” (section 114(2)), to make regulations regarding “standards for buildings, equipment, teaching, education, inspection and discipline in connection with schools” and to “provide for the transportation of children to and from school” (section 115), the legislation deals primarily with mandatory attendance (sections 116-117). Meanwhile, students on reserve receive far fewer resources and support than their peers off reserve, as the Assembly of First Nations has documented.

While Sloan and Marvin’s case is especially troubling, underfunding of First Nations education in Canada is far from an isolated issue. As noted by James Anaya in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples (at para 18), the Federal government is generally responsible for funding education on reserves, which is then administered by First Nations governments. Exceptions to this general rule are British Columbia and Nova Scotia. In BC, on reserve education is coordinated through a province-wide authority and delivered and regulated by individual Nations. These Nations are provided with stable funding through a tripartite agreement with the provincial and federal governments. In Nova Scotia, many bands are self-governing in education due to an agreement made in 1997. In other provinces, off reserve schools are funded by provincial and territorial governments and administered by local school boards.

In early June, Perry Bellegarde, the current National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, called on the government to step up and meet its financial obligations to First Nations people after it was reported that the Canadian Government fell about $1 billion short in Aboriginal Affairs spending over five years. This shortfall is acutely felt in education, with off-reserve schools receiving significantly more funding than comparable ones on-reserve.

This means that if Sloan and Marvin lived on the North side of the road that separates the New Credit reserve and Haldimand County, they would be in a public school and would have their special education costs covered by the provincial government. Given the difference in outcome based on a geographical (and racial) determination, there is a strong argument to be made that the Miller twins are being provided an insufficient education due to systemic discrimination.

Discrimination Claim

Section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c C-H-6 (CHRA) prohibits discrimination by government bodies based on a number of protected grounds. It reads:

  1. It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods, services, facilities or accommodation customarily available to the general public:

(a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, service, facility or accommodation to any individual, or

(b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual, on a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The test for a prima facie finding of discrimination under section 5 was set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61, [2012] 3 SCR 360. The test in Moore requires complainants to show that: (1) they have a characteristic protected under the human rights legislation, (2) they have experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service in question, and (3) the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact (at para 33).

The application of this test in the case of under-funding for First Nations education would be as follows:

(1) Is there a Protected Ground?

Race and national or ethnic origin are protected grounds under section 2 of the CHRA. Given that underfunding of education on reserves primarily affects First Nations children, race or ethnic origin can form the basis for a section 5 claim. In the case of Sloan and Marvin, the ground of disability is also engaged by the lack of funding for their specific educational needs.

(2) Is there an Adverse Impact?

The inequality between the quality of off and on reserve education certainly creates an adverse impact. Currently, students who are attending public or private schools off reserve are receiving nearly 50 per cent more government funding than those attending on-reserve schools, as the Assembly of First Nations reports. There are over 100 school buildings on reserves nationwide that do not meet minimum safety guidelines in terms of physical facilities, let alone the necessary standard as effective places for learning (reported here). In addition to failing physical structures, children on reserve have limited to no access to modern technology or library support because most on reserve schools do not have gymnasiums, libraries or any computers (reported here).

Problems in secondary education may lead to problems in later education as well. The Centre for the Study of Living Standards reports that while the majority of Canada’s off reserve population aged 15 and over have a diploma, certificate or degree (76 per cent), some reserves have less than 10% of their population with some sort of completed tertiary education. Even further down the road, the adverse impacts are more severe. Only two reserves in 2006 had unemployment lower than the national average of 6.6 per cent, and the highest unemployment rate was 66.7 per cent, ten times the national average.

Lack of education funding is of course not solely to blame for the often-marginalized position of First Nations people in Canadian society, but it is certainly a factor that contributes to the lower health and employment achievements of First Nations people compared to the rest of the Canadian population.

(3) Is the Protected Characteristic a Factor in the Adverse Impact?

The final step in the Moore analysis requires the complainant to demonstrate that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. The claimant does not need to prove that the adverse effect was intentional (Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpson-Sears, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 1985 CanLII 18), merely that it happened at least partially because of the characteristic (Peel Law Association v Pieters, 2013 ONCA 396 at para 126). Even if the government did not explicitly set out to discriminate against First Nations children on reserve, the unequal funding between on and off reserve education still creates a prejudicial effect, an effect that can only be explained by racially determined policies that very likely run afoul of section 5(b) of the CHRA. And, as suggested earlier, disability is also a factor in the adverse impact experienced by children such as Sloan and Marvin.

The Federal Government’s Anticipated Response

The Federal government in responding to this complaint could argue that education funding is not “the provision of goods, services, facilities…” as contemplated by section 5. After all, the federal government does not actually educate anyone on reserve, it does not employ teachers or principals and does not build the schools, it only provides the money. This argument begins to fall apart though in light of sections 114-122 of the Indian Act. These provisions allow the Minister to enter into agreements for elementary and secondary school services to Indian children on reserve. These agreements, and the broad oversight powers of the federal government over First Nations education make it more likely than not that the funding itself can be seen as provision of a service.

If provision of a service is found to exist, then a government body responding to a CHRA discrimination claim faces two main tasks: first, to show that there is no prima facie case which must be answered, and second, if a prima facie claim is established, to show that there is a bona fide justification for the discrimination.

Refuting a Prima Facie Claim?

In light of the arguments raised above, it will be difficult for the government to defeat a finding that there is a prima facie claim of discrimination. However, there are several potential arguments it could adopt, based on the requirements of the Moore test: that there is no protected ground, no adverse impact, and that even if there are, the two are not linked.

In arguing against the presence of a protected ground, the government could try and reframe the issue not as discrimination against First Nations children, but merely as discrimination against children who happen to live in certain areas – which does not engage a protected ground. For example, children in poor inner city areas tend to have lower educational outcomes than wealthy suburban children (see e.g. here and here), and this has not been the subject of any human rights claims. However, it is the race and ethnicity of First Nations children that dictate where they live, such that they are marginalized by on-reserve education systems based on those grounds.

The next facet of the government’s case could attack the position that an adverse impact exists, and if it does, that it is caused by government action. While no one could seriously argue that First Nations children on reserve do not face significant challenges, there is a causation argument to be made. The Crown could put forward the case that adverse effects on aboriginal children are the result not of a lack of education funding but of systemic socio-economic problems within First Nations communities.

This argument was addressed in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, above. It noted that: “government representatives have attributed the gap in educational achievement in large measure to high levels of poverty, the historical context of residential schools, and systemic racism” (at para 17).

While forcing current education policy to take the blame for the effects of centuries of mistreatment is overstating the case, the Supreme Court has recently found (in the context of section 15 of the Charter) that “If the state conduct widens the gap between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of the society rather than narrowing it, then it is discriminatory” (Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] SCR 61 at para 332). This approach to discrimination is cited in the Memorandum of Fact and Law of the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society in a similar discrimination claim currently before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (at para 95). If the Tribunal chooses to import this reasoning, then this government argument is almost certain to fail.

Bona Fide Justification: Grismer Analysis

Once a prima facie case of discrimination is established the onus shifts to the defendant to prove (on a balance of probabilities) that the discriminatory standard had a bona fide and reasonable justification (CHRA s 15(1)(g)). The test from Grismer (British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868, 1999 CanLII 646) is the applicable test for this defence provision. There are three elements that must be proven (at para 20):

1. Did the defendant prove that it adopted the standard for a purpose or goal rationally connected to the function being performed?;

2. Did the defendant adopt the standard in good faith with an honest belief that it was necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose or goal?; and

3. Did the defendant prove that the standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose or goal?

The government justifications for claims of discrimination in education funding may be centered around the impracticality of providing additional funding outside of the Federal budget for education or special education. As mentioned earlier though, auditors’ reports have uncovered more than a billion dollars in unspent funds sitting in the coffers of Indian and Northern Affairs. Given this surplus, arguments around limited resources cannot get too far.


A successful claim would result in a remedy under the CHRA. Unfortunately, legislation such as the Indian Act cannot be changed through CHRA claims, as human rights commissions lack jurisdiction to make such an order. The appropriate remedies for this claim are found under section 53(2) of the CHRA, which includes an order for the “adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement”. It is through this remedy that First Nations communities could seek educational programs that are both well-funded and in keeping with their aspirations for a self-determined curriculum.

If the panel does find in favour of the complainants, then hopefully children such as Sloan and Marvin Miller will be able to access the resources that are readily available to other children, including those with disabilities, across Canada. The immediate impact that equalizing education funding can have is illustrated by an example from Manitoba.

The Waywayseecappo reserve school sits just five miles away from a provincially funded, off reserve school called Rossburn Collegiate. Despite the close proximity, a Waywayseecappo student received only $7,300 annually from the federal government while a Rossburn student receives $10,500 a year from the provincial government. Chief Clearsky of the Waywayseecappo band convinced the provincial and federal governments to let them join the local school board. In effect, the Waywayseecappo students became provincial students. As a result of this change, the Waywayseecappo students can access specialists who help with curriculum and special development, the Waywayseecappo teachers received anywhere from $13,000 to $18,000 more a year, and literacy and learning rates amongst on reserve children improved almost immediately.


While equalizing education funding between on and off reserve children will not solve all the disadvantages faced by First Nations children living on reserves, it could certainly help. Given the strong prima facie case of discrimination based on the Moore test, it seems likely that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal will rule in favour of the Mississaugas of New Credit First Nation. This could prove to be an important first step in making a high quality education accessible to all Canadian children.

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Supreme Court: EPA Should Have Considered Cost When Deciding Whether Mercury Limits for Power Plants Were Appropriate

Tue, 07/07/2015 - 10:00am

By: James Coleman

PDF Version: Supreme Court: EPA Should Have Considered Cost When Deciding Whether Mercury Limits for Power Plants Were Appropriate

Case Commented On: United States Supreme Court, Michigan v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (June 29, 2015)

On Monday the United States Supreme Court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) improperly refused to consider costs when determining whether it was “appropriate and necessary” to regulate mercury emissions from power plants under the Clean Air Act. Ultimately, the EPA may be able to keep the same rules after going back and explaining why the cost of the regulations is justified in the circumstances. But the decision is an important victory for advocates of cost-benefit analysis and those who think environmental agencies should pay more attention to the costs of regulation.

Section 112 of the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants from power plants if it finds “regulation is appropriate and necessary.” 42 U.S.C. §7412. The EPA said that regulation was “appropriate and necessary” even without considering costs because 1) power plant emissions posed risks to human health and the environment that were not eliminated by other provisions of the Clean Air Act and 2) there were controls available to reduce those dangerous emissions. So there was no need for the EPA to consider costs to make its initial decision to regulate, but it promised to consider costs when adopting the actual final regulations for power plants.

Although the EPA said it ignored costs when it made its initial decision to regulate, it still estimated the costs and benefits of the final rules that it adopted. The EPA estimated that its rules would cost power plants $9.6 billion dollars a year. The EPA couldn’t estimate all the possible benefits of limiting mercury emissions, but the little it could quantify came to about $5 million dollars a year—less than 0.1% of the cost of the rule. On the other hand, the EPA said that cleaning up mercury would have massive side benefits: it would lower sulfur dioxide emissions and these reductions would be worth between $37 and $90 billion per year. So if you counted these ancillary benefits, they far outweighed the costs of the EPA’s rule, but if you didn’t count them, the EPA’s rule imposed costs far in excess of its benefits.

Justice Scalia, writing for a 5-4 majority, held that the EPA must consider costs of regulation before making its initial decision to regulate, reasoning that “No regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.” The four dissenters agreed that, generally speaking, “an agency must take costs into account in some manner before imposing significant regulatory burdens” but agreed with EPA’s argument that the agency could consider those costs later, when adopting regulations for specific source categories.

The Supreme Court’s decision may not have much impact on mercury regulation. Power utilities are already complying with the mercury rules that the Court struck down in this case. And the case will now go back to the appellate court, which could decide to leave the rules in place while the agency rethinks whether these rules are “appropriate and necessary” factoring in the costs that they impose. The EPA already determined that the benefits of the rules far outweighed their costs if you consider ancillary benefits, so it will probably reach the same decision. On the other hand, the Court’s decision raises very important questions for the future.

First: Can agencies consider ancillary benefits? The Court left the question open, but at oral argument, some justices seemed to suspect it was inappropriate to consider the benefits associated with pollutants other than mercury. After all, if the other pollutants are the problem, why not adopt regulations aimed at the other pollutants? On the other hand, it has long been standard practice for agencies to consider ancillary or “co-benefits” of reducing pollutants other than the main target of regulation. If an agency is going to consider all the important costs of a regulation, why shouldn’t it consider all the important benefits? In some ways, the mercury rule may just be an outlier case because EPA estimated that the co-benefits of reducing sulfur dioxide were 10,000 times greater than the direct benefits of reducing mercury itself. But over half of the benefits of EPA’s Clean Power Plan come from co-benefits in reducing pollution other than greenhouse gases, so the question does have wider importance.

Second: How much cost-benefit analysis will the Court require for other regulations? Today’s decision may be seen as part of a trend that is making cost-benefit analysis a kind of default background principle for agency decision-making. Just fourteen years ago, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion for eight justices, holding that EPA could not consider the cost of regulation when the Clean Air Act demanded a standard at the level “requisite to protect the public health.” In that case, Justice Scalia explained that EPA could consider costs later when it implemented the standard. Last year, the Court held that EPA could consider the cost of emissions controls when it decided whether a State “contributed significantly” to air pollution in another state; Justice Scalia dissented. Now, the Court holds that EPA must consider the cost of regulation when it determines whether regulation is “appropriate and necessary.” Justice Scalia writes the opinion, and all justices agree that EPA must consider costs at some stage. Observing this trend, litigants will feel increasingly bold to demand that EPA consider the costs at each stage of adopting new environmental regulations.

This post originally appeared on James Coleman’s blog Energy Law Prof.

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Law Students, Legal Services, and Access to Justice

Thu, 07/02/2015 - 10:00am

By: Eleanor A. Carlson

PDF Version: Law Students, Legal Services, and Access to Justice

Legislation and Rules Commented On: Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8; Rules of the Law Society of Alberta; Law Society of Alberta Code of Conduct

In June, an ABlawg post reviewed the decision of R v Hanson, 2015 ABPC 118, written by Judge Gaschler. The judgment included an analysis of Calgary based court agent Emmerson Brando’s personal history, his ability to appear as agent on behalf of his client, and the factors that should be considered in making this decision. Judge Gaschler denied Mr. Brando’s leave to appear, finding that to do so would undermine the integrity of the justice system due in part to Mr. Brando’s criminal past as well as the deceptive information found on Mr. Brando’s website where he advertised his agent services (at paras 21 & 22). In their blog post (read the post here), Heather White and Sarah Burton discuss Judge Gaschler’s decision in relation to the unregulated nature of agents and paralegals in Alberta, access to justice, and the disparity in the quality of justice for the those who can afford lawyers and those with lower incomes who cannot. They conclude with the hope that Judge Gaschler’s decision will facilitate a conversation surrounding the regulation of agents in Alberta. In this post, I highlight an additional important player in the conversation surrounding the provision of legal services by non-lawyers and access to justice, the Alberta law student.

Legal Profession Act

Section 106(1) of the Legal Profession Act provides that only “active members” of the Law Society may practice as a “barrister and solicitor” as well as provide specific legal services. Section 106(2) provides an exception under which students may provide legal services “in respect of services permitted to be provided by that student by the rules that are provided in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the rules.” The exception, besides being abstruse, does not provide direction to any other specific rule within the Legal Profession Act that delineates the scope of the legal services that students are permitted to perform. Of note, this is not true of all the exceptions under section 106(2); for instance, the exception for students-at-law (i.e. articling students) directs us to another section within the Legal Profession Act.

Rules of the Law Society of Alberta

The Rules of the Law Society of Alberta provide the framework that specifies who has the authority to provide legal services in Alberta. Rule 81(1)(a) permits a law student enrolled in the faculty of law at a university in Alberta to provide legal services in the “student’s capacity as a member of a student legal services society” or in a “course of practical instruction approved by the faculty” if the student is under the supervision of an active member of the law society. At the University of Calgary, students who provide legal services with Student Legal Assistance fall into the former category and students who provide legal services through the Environmental Clinical course fall into the latter.

Rule 81(1)(b) permits a law student enrolled in a faculty of law at a university in Canada to provide legal services if the services are provided as an “employee of a society that provides legal services to indigent persons” and, again, the student is under the supervision of an active member of the law society. An Ontario law student who works during the summer at Calgary Legal Guidance, a non-profit society that provides legal services, would fall under this rule.

Rules 52 and 53: Authority to Provide Legal Services as a Student-At-Law

Rule 81 is silent as to the scope of legal services that a law student may provide. Section 47(m) of the Interpretation section of Part 2, under which Rule 81 falls, states that “provide legal services” means:

to engage in the practice of law

(i) physically in Alberta, except with respect to the law of a home jurisdiction, or

(ii) with respect to the law of Alberta physically in any jurisdiction,

and includes to provide legal services respecting federal jurisdiction in Alberta.

This section speaks to what providing legal services covers regarding where the services are carried out, but it does not delineate what a law student, not being an active member of the Law Society of Alberta, may carry out. Ostensibly the scope of services that a law student may provide is narrower than that of an active member of the Law Society.

Rules 52 and 53, which delineate what legal services a student-at-law may provide, also fall under Part 2 of the Rules of the Law Society of Alberta. A law student is not a student-at-law, but one could interpret rule 81 by referring to rules 52 and 53. This interpretation would assume that a law student could not have a scope of services broader than that of a student-at-law, and as such the legal services that a law student is permitted to provide would be no greater than those indicated in rule 53, although a law student’s services must be under the supervision of an active member of the Law Society. Accordingly, for example, a law student, like a student-at-law, cannot act as agent in the Court of Queen’s Bench during pre-trial conferences or in a judicial dispute resolution (rule 53(3)(a)). In Provincial Court, a student-at-law, and hence presumably a law student, may not act as agent in proceedings pertaining to an indictable offence unless a Provincial Court judge has absolute jurisdiction (Rule 53(5)(c). (See rule 53, Rules of the Law Society of Alberta, for a compete reference to the legal services a student-at-law may provide.) It would be preferable if the Rules would clarify the scope of legal services that a law student may provide, but since they do not, this post will assume that the scope is not greater than that of a student-at-law.

Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Conduct

The Law Society of Alberta’s Code of Conduct defines the manner in which legal services are to be provided and consequently guides the terms under which law students may provide legal services. The Code provides the how that accompanies the who stipulated by the Rules of the Law Society of Alberta.

Definitions: Lawyers, non-lawyers, law students, and students-at-law

The Code of Conduct differentiates between a lawyer and a non-lawyer. Lawyer, under the Code, is defined as:

an active member of the Society, an inactive member of the Society, a suspended member of the Society, a student-at-law and a lawyer entitled to practise law in another jurisdiction who is entitled to practise law in Alberta.

A law student is classified as a non-lawyer and must be supervised in accordance with rule 5.01(1) and the Commentary to the Code, discussed below.

Lawyer Delegation and Supervision of Law Students

Within the Code, there are two conditions that affect the ability of law students to provide legal services: rule 5.01(1) on the “specialized training, education, and competence of the non-lawyer” and rule 5.01(3) on “the extent of the supervision” of the non-lawyer. Further, there are specific tasks that a lawyer must not permit a non-lawyer to do.

The Commentary following rule 5.01(1) clarifies the extent of supervision required by a lawyer when delegating particular tasks and functions to a non-lawyer. Generally, a lawyer must maintain a direct relationship with the client; however, the extent of the supervision depends on [1] the type of legal matter – “degree of standardization and repetitiveness” and [2] the experience of the non-lawyer given the legal matter. It is the responsibility of the lawyer to both educate the non-lawyer about the task and to gauge the extent of the supervision required given the task as well as the experience and education of the non-lawyer. Independent work may only be delegated from a lawyer to a non-lawyer where the non-lawyer has received specialized training and education and is competent to do that work under the general supervision of the lawyer.

Further, rule 5.01(3) lists 14 tasks and functions that a lawyer must not permit a non-lawyer to do as well as some narrow exceptions to those specific tasks and functions. For instance, rule 5.01(3)(a) reads:

5.01 (3) A lawyer must not permit a non-lawyer to:

(a) accept cases on behalf of the lawyer, except that a non-lawyer may receive instructions from established clients if the supervising lawyer approves before any work commences; …

Other tasks and functions are complete prohibitions, for instance rule 5.01(3)(b), which provides that a lawyer must not permit a non-lawyer to give legal advice.

The Criminal Code

The Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 800(2) and 802.1, permit an agent (who could be a student) to appear for a defendant who on summary conviction may be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months. The agent may not, however, appear or examine or cross-examine witnesses if on summary conviction the defendant may be liable to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months. Exceptions are permitted where the defendant is a corporation or the Lieutenant Governor in Council of a province approves the agent.

To summarize, the Rules of the Law Society of Alberta, the Legal Profession Act, the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, and other laws that govern courtroom procedures generally must permit a task for it to be undertaken. Beyond that, the general tone of the Code of Conduct is that assuming a task assigned to the law student is not expressly prohibited in 5.01(3), a law student, if competent and supervision is appropriate, may perform that legal task.

Liberalizing the Rules

In my view, the current Rules of the Law Society of Alberta that apply to law students are out of date. The Rules came into force on August 15, 1994 and those rules applicable to law students have remained in their original form (see the Rules of the Law Society of Alberta Amendment History). As such, they fail to reflect the current state of the justice system and the influx of individuals who are forced to navigate the courts without counsel. I argue for a liberalization of the Rules so that they [1] better permit the legal community more generally to employ law students to provide legal services and [2] better permit law students to appear as agents for self-represented individuals on a wider array of matters and at more levels of court, both of which would increase law students’ ability to better effect access to justice.

The Law Society Rules in Practice

According to rule 81(1)(b) of the Rules of the Law Society of Alberta, Canadian law students must meet two criteria to provide legal services. They must be (i) an “employee of a society that provides legal services to indigent persons” and (ii) “be under the supervision of an active member.” The wording suggests that this rule was put in place either so that law students could assist poor Albertans by providing legal services through a society that provides legal services or, perhaps more broadly, so that law students could assist societies that provide legal services to “indigent persons,” thereby assisting both the society and “indigent persons.” Either reading would appear to come down to law students assisting “indigent persons.”

This rule stipulates a very narrow scope within which law students can provide legal services. They must be employees, rather than volunteers. The employer must be a society, rather than a firm or a sole practitioner. The society must provide legal services, rather than other types of services. The student must be helping “indigent” persons rather than non-indigent persons.

The Rules greatly limit the opportunities for law students to provide legal services and one may raise a number of questions regarding the restrictions set out in rule 81(1)(b). Why should a law student who volunteers with a society that provides legal services not be permitted to provide legal services to an “indigent” person? Why should a law student who is employed at a law firm not be permitted to provide legal services to an “indigent” person? Why should a law student employed by or volunteering with an organization that provides, instead of legal services, for example, housing services, not be permitted to provide legal services to an “indigent” person? If an active member of the law society supervises a law student, why should she not be permitted to provide legal services to “indigent” persons and thereby increase access to justice in all of these contexts.

Of particular concern is the fact that a law firm cannot employ a law student and have her provide legal services to “indigent” persons. The consequence is that if a law firm’s summer law student employees cannot fit within rule 81(1)(b), this rule arguably has the additional effect of stifling pro bono project innovations that are aimed at providing legal services to “indigent” persons, since engaging law firms in the promotion of access to justice is an ongoing objective for pro bono law organizations (see e.g. the work of Pro Bono Law Alberta).

Although it is significant that law students see their lawyer colleagues and mentors providing pro bono services and see that these activities are supported and encouraged by their law firms, it is also critical that law students have opportunities to fully participate in these activities. Beyond providing legal services for “indigent” persons who need assistance today, this is also about instilling the sense of a professional responsibility to provide pro bono legal services in the next generation of lawyers, an opportunity we cannot afford to miss given the abysmal state of access to our justice system.

The Rules should adapt to the current need to increase access to justice for many Albertans. Twenty years ago, the best estimates indicated that less than 5% of litigants were unrepresented. Today, that number ranges from 10% to 80% depending on the claim type and level of court. For instance, it is estimated that half of all family law litigants in Canada are self-represented (see the Canadian Bar Association, “Reaching equal justice: an invitation to envision and act,” The Canadian Bar Association, Access to Justice Committee (2013), p 42). It is likely that when these rules were implemented twenty years ago, one could not foresee the exponential growth of self-representation within the court system. However, in 2015 this growth is unmistakable and if law students were permitted to provide a greater range of legal services (with supervision), many individuals who would otherwise be forced to represent themselves could choose the option of having a law student appear on their behalf.

Impacts of Individuals Without Counsel on the Legal System and the Social System

A law student’s ability to provide legal services that increase access to justice not only benefits self-represented individuals during their legal proceedings but also the community more generally, since the effect of this assistance goes beyond the courtroom and the legal system. Within the courtroom there is a perception among judges and lawyers that self-represented individuals generally take up more court time and court services since proceedings take longer for self-represented individuals (see the Canadian Bar Association, “Reaching equal justice: an invitation to envision and act,” The Canadian Bar Association, Access to Justice Committee (2013), p 43). Further, foundational tenets of our legal system are affected by the influx of self-represented individuals. Although procedural fairness and judicial neutrality sit at the core of the legal system, studies have found that the increased number of self-represented individuals has altered this central judicial role. For instance, it has been found that judges find themselves in challenging positions where one side is represented by counsel and the other is not, and thus judicial intervention, such as providing procedural advice and coaching, has become an inevitable reality in many courtrooms (see Julie Macfarlane, (2013) The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants, Treasurer’s Advisory Group on Access to Justice Working Group Report, p 14). Hence, permitting law students to provide an expanded range of legal services in more courtrooms would have a positive impact on court resources. Additionally, through explaining court procedure and advocacy law, students can create a more balanced courtroom, thereby decreasing the pressures felt by many judges.

Outside of the courtroom, self-represented individuals may experience negative personal and economic outcomes as a result of their courtroom involvement. Personal savings are depleted and many find it difficult to maintain employment while managing their legal matters. In some cases, self-represented individuals struggle to preserve relationships with families and friends and experience emotional isolation (The National Self-Represented Litigants Project at p 14). Inevitably, what happens inside the courtroom affects lives beyond the courthouse, and therefore the increased assistance of law students can also positively impact communities more generally.

Risk Assessment: Law Student Delivery of Legal Services

Currently law students assist individuals in Provincial Court by providing legal services relating to a variety of legal matters. These legal matters have outcomes for those individuals that vary in risk and severity. It might well be argued that some legal matters have outcomes such that law students should not assist with them. A common position is that a law student should not act where an individual faces a risk of a custodial sanction. However, given the financial and systemic barriers and the lack of prohibitions on an individual representing herself at any level of court in Canada, the only option for many is to proceed without counsel. In this case, she will present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and perhaps testify, all unaided. Accordingly, she will be responsible for the outcome of her trial regardless of whether she understood court procedures, rules of evidence, or even the very offence for which she was tried. The reality of the current situation is that law student assistance may well be better than the alternative, which is nothing. In fact, where individuals properly understand the risks of their situation and provide informed consent to being assisted by a law student, to deny them this last remaining option and effectively force them to proceed without counsel only makes more unjust the inaccessibility of access to justice.

For some, there remains the worry that allowing a law student to provide legal services comes with ethical concerns. Of course, it is true that a law student is at risk of committing ethical transgressions in the provision of legal services. However, expanding the scope of legal services beyond what they currently are able to provide does not increase these risks. As it stands, in the work that law students currently do, law student’s conduct is not regulated by the law society and not subject to professional misconduct hearings. Consequently, an increase in the range of legal services that a law student could provide does not alter the status quo nor increase the risk that a law student will breach her ethical duties. The risk of a breach of confidentiality is not altered whether a law student is in Provincial Court or Queen’s Bench Court.

Another potential concern is that if law students are permitted to provide more services, this may preclude the exploration of other options – e.g. regulating paralegals (as explored in the White and Burton post) or expanding legal aid coverage – which might be better for self-represented litigants than having law students do the work. However, increasing the services that law students can provide can still usefully add to the overall range of service providers without detracting from conversations about the need for regulation or an expansion of legal aid coverage.

Additionally, this post is not advocating an expansion of the Rules beyond what a law student is competent to provide. It goes without saying that the student must be adequately supervised, just as is any law student who currently provides legal services in the province. Equally important, the student must be competent to perform the legal service required, just as any law student or any lawyer who provides any legal services must be. Accordingly, expansion of the Rules to increase the services that a law student may provide will require an increased involvement from the legal community. At a minimum, it will require increased supervision and guidance by lawyers and education, training, and structural support, as well as coordination between law schools and pro bono oriented student legal organizations. Essentially, expansion of the scope of legal services that law students may provide will require a community effort. This position echoes Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and the active role she has played in raising awareness of the state of access to justice in Canada. Specifically, the Chief Justice has repeatedly told Canadian lawyers that they have a responsibility to provide legal services to all Canadians (see Law Times, Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “Lawyers integral in making justice accessible” February 20, 2011). Changing the Rules of the Law Society of Alberta to increase the range of legal services law students may provide is one way to help meet this responsibility.

Lastly, I am not advocating that law students put more on their already busy plates, risk burning out, or sacrificing their academic performance. Nor am I advocating that law students necessarily do more work or take on more files. Rather, I would like to add to the conversation the idea that law students, in partnership with the greater legal community, have the ability, if given the resources, to take on a greater range of files and assist a greater range of Albertans needing legal services in our community.

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Announcing Oil and Gas Contracts: An ABlawg ebook

Tue, 06/30/2015 - 10:00am

Editor’s Note

ABlawg is pleased to announce the launch of the first in a series of ebooks which we will put together from time to time when we have a critical mass of posts in a particular area. Our first ebook, compiled by Nigel Bankes, concerns oil and gas contracts. Other ebooks that are currently planned will cover oil and gas leases, the Alberta Energy Regulator, Charter equality rights, standing, and carbon law and policy.

Our ebooks will be accessible from a new tab at the top of the ABlawg website, and each ebook will be introduced with a post that will go out by email, RSS feed and Twitter to our subscribers. Each ebook will have a table of contents with hyperlinks to the collected posts and will be fully searchable.

If readers have ideas for ebooks in particular areas or other feedback on this initiative we would be pleased to hear from you.

The introduction to our first ebook happens to be Nigel Bankes’ 200th post for ABlawg, and we congratulate him for being the first ABlawgger to reach this milestone. We also thank Evelyn Tang (JD 2016) for her hard work in producing the ebook.

Introduction: By Nigel Bankes

Oil & Gas Contracts Ebook

This ebook collects a set of ABlawg posts dealing with upstream oil and gas contracts between 2007 and June 2015.

Most of the posts in this collection deal with the standard form agreements of the Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen (CAPL) including the farmout agreement (EOG Resources v UCRC, Solara v Richmount), the operating agreement (Adeco v Hunt) and, the property transfer agreement (Nexxtep v Talisman). Other posts cover unitization arrangements (Signalta v Dominion), gas processing agreements, pooling agreements (Hunt v Shell) and agreements to construct, own and operate facilities (e.g. Talisman v Esprit). Most of the posts deal with lands in Alberta and decisions of the Alberta courts but there are also decisions from other provinces, one decision which deals with an AIPN (Association of International Petroleum Negotiators) form (BG International v Canadian Superior) and even one post which covers a decision of the High Court of Australia (EGC v Woodside).

Many of these posts deal with issues of contract interpretation, but many also shed light on particular terms and concepts used in the industry including independent operations, rights of first refusal (ROFR) (Bearspaw v Conoco, Blaze v Imperial), the operator’s lien, the obligations of the operator to non-operators, the gross negligence standard (Re Trident; Bernum v Birch Lake), fiduciary obligations, (Brookfield v Vanquish) and the removal or challenge of an operator (Diaz v Penn West).

I am not sure that I can identify common themes within these cases and perhaps it is more important that the reader be sensitive to the need to read and examine these cases in light of more general developments in contract law as well as the law on summary judgement. As for general contract law, two cases are of particular note: Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 and Sattva Capital Corp v Creston Moly Corp, 2014 SCC 53. Professor Watson Hamilton posted on the relevance of Sattva for arbitration award appeals here. Professor Girgis posted on the Alberta Court of Appeal’s arcane decision here but we have no post on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision overturning that of the Court of Appeal.

The Bhasin decision is important because it recognizes (at para 93) that “There is a general organizing principle of good faith that underlies many facets of contract law” and recognizes as a manifestation of that general principle “a new common law duty …. of honest performance which requires the parties to be honest with each other in relation to the performance of their contractual obligations.” In light of this it will be important to consider the implications of this decision for the implementation of discretionary obligations under oil and gas contracts. The Court does refer to one oil and gas case (a pooling case Mesa Operating Limited Partnership v Amoco Canada Resources Ltd (1994), 149 AR 187) (Alta CA)) in its decision but the case also has implications for inter alia the ROFR provisions of the operating agreement: see Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada v Sunoma Energy Corp., 2002 ABCA 286. A paper prepared by Neil Finkelstein, Brandon Kain, Craig Spurn, Seán C. O’Neill and Justin H. Nasseri for the Jasper Energy Law Foundation Conference (June 2015) provides an excellent discussion of Bhasin in the oil and gas contract context: “Honour Among Businesspeople: The Duty of Good Faith and Contracts in the Energy Sector”.

The Sattva decision is principally important, as Professor Watson Hamilton notes, for changing the law on the deference to be accorded to arbitrators and trial judges in the interpretation of contracts. The Court decided that, given the importance of the commercial and factual matrix within which a contract is negotiated, the interpretation of the resulting arrangements will give rise to mixed questions of law and fact. Consequently, the standard of review to be applied to such interpretations is likely to be reasonableness rather than correctness. It remains to be seen whether this deferential standard of review will be equally applicable to both bespoke and standard form contracts.

Developments in the law on summary judgement (the principal case here is Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7) will have profound implications for the way in which parties litigate all manner of commercial disputes. One interesting example in this ebook is provided by the post on Justice Jo’Anne Strekaf’s recent decision in SemCAMS ULC v Blaze Energy Ltd.

This ebook is organized chronologically by date of post (oldest first) except that we have grouped together trial and appellate decisions so that any appellate decisions are printed immediately after the trial or first instance decision. Where appropriate the text also includes any commentary and response received on the individual posts. There is no index to the volume but it should be readily searchable in this electronic form using key words and the “find” function in adobe acrobat or equivalent.

I am responsible for the selection of posts for this volume. Evelyn Tang (JD 2016) has been responsible for the hard work in knitting this all together.

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Prosecutors as Ministers of Justice?

Mon, 06/29/2015 - 10:00am

By: Alice Woolley

PDF Version: Prosecutors as Ministers of Justice?

Three recent cases have brought to light bad behaviour by criminal prosecutors.

In R v Suarez-Noa, 2015 ONSC 3823 Justice Reid ordered a mistrial after the prosecutor suggested “to the jury that the accused had behaved like an animal rather than a human being,” calling the characterization “highly improper” and incapable of being “erased from the minds of the jurors” (at paras 10-11).

According to the CBC, in the Nuttall/Korody bombing trial British Columbia Supreme Court Justice Catherine Bruce said the prosecutors “took my breath away” with the “impropriety” of their decision to show a video to the jury that contained “footage of an actual pressure-cooker explosion.” She further described the prosecutor’s decision to ignore her express instruction not to refer to defences of duress and entrapment as “unspeakable” and as something she had “never experienced… before. Ever.” The CBC reported that Justice Bruce “said she would have called a mistrial had the proceedings not been so protracted and difficult”.

In R v Delchev, 2015 ONCA 381,the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed Delchev’s appeal of his convictions on 16 counts of firearms and drug related offence and ordered a new trial. It did so on the basis that the trial judge had improperly failed to consider whether the prosecutor’s conduct in plea negotiations constituted an abuse of process warranting a stay of proceedings.

The prosecutor in Delchev made a settlement offer following a Charter motion for the exclusion of evidence. In that motion Delchev testified as to threats made against him by one John Ramsay. In its settlement offer the Crown said that it would “recommend a conditional sentence” if Delchev “would admit that his evidence up to that point in the proceeding regarding duress was false, and that his counsel knew it to be false” (Delchev, at para 11). As the Court of Appeal noted, this settlement offer had the “potential to negatively affect the relationship between the appellant and his lawyers” (at para 56). It also did not reflect the legal obligation of defence counsel to “call the accused to testify even if the lawyer’s private opinion is that the client will be disbelieved”, and to only refuse to call the accused as a witness where “the lawyer knows the testimony to be false or fraudulent or believes it to be false by reason of an admission made by the accused” (at para 61). The Crown’s settlement offer created the risk that a defence counsel would not offer evidence she ought to because of fear that the Crown will use that implausible or disbelieved evidence to attack defence counsel through a plea offer to that counsel’s client.

These three examples are notable but not surprising. While in most cases prosecutors act in accordance with their legal and ethical obligations, bad behaviour by prosecutors is not hard to discover when you look at the case law. Courts and regulators rarely sanction lawyers who engage in it, but examples are easy to find.

At the same time, however, in common law and in accordance with codes of conduct, the prosecutor is said to be a “minister of justice” and “as more a ‘part of the court’ than an ordinary advocate” (Delchev, at paras 64-65).  As the Supreme Court put it in Boucher v The Queen, [1955] SCR 16, at 23-24:

It cannot be over-emphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.

Which leads to this question (which I am exploring in a broader research project): why this gap between prosecutorial aspirations and reality (at least some of the time)? How can lawyers whose legal and ethical duty is to do justice act in ways that work real injustice?

Based on my research so far, my working thesis is that the “do justice” ethic for prosecutors is at best unhelpful in creating ethical conduct, and at worst is toxic for prosecutorial ethics. It does not increase the likelihood of ethical conduct and may in fact be one of the reasons why unethical conduct occurs.

In the first place, the “do justice” ethic lacks specific content. Does it mean that a prosecutor ought to temper his advocacy in the courtroom? If so, when, how and to what extent? Does it impose positive obligations on the prosecutor to, for example, redress injustices in the courtroom (as Fred Zacharias argued)? Does it require a prosecutor not to bring forward a case that is lawfully permitted but morally troubling (e.g., where there is a harsh mandatory minimum and mitigating facts that the law does not take into account)? As a consequence, it is not clear how the exhortation to “do justice” can meaningfully guide prosecutorial decision-making.

Relatedly, the do justice ethic does not necessarily give someone a deep internal commitment to justice from which they can develop sound moral intuitions (which, as I’ve discussed elsewhere, are important for ethical behaviour). As Abbe Smith has cogently argued, it tends instead to give someone an internal commitment to her power and obligation to create justice, i.e., the belief is in the prosecutor’s justice-seeking power, not in justice itself. Being told that she has the unique role to seek and protect justice creates an internal concept for the prosecutor as someone who has a particular capacity to understand what justice requires, and makes that person less inclined to doubt her perceptions or to see the role that ordinary cognitive biases may be playing in her perceptions. When you combine that internal concept with the adversarial nature of the criminal trial, and the ordinary human desire to “win” any particular contest, which competitively inclined lawyers probably have to an above average extent, you have ideal circumstances for poor intuitions about the best answer to an ethical dilemma. The prosecutor believes she has special insight into what justice requires, her desire to win makes anti-justice decisions particularly desirable, her belief in her justice-discerning abilities makes her unaware of the corrupting effect of her desire to win, and her bad decision follows.

Further, the do justice ethic does not easily connect to the prosecutor’s adversarial role in a courtroom. How can the Crown act “as a strong advocate within this adversarial process” who “vigorously pursue[s] a legitimate result to the best of its ability” (R v Cook, [1997] 1 SCR 1113 at para 21) while simultaneously excluding any idea of winning and losing from her assessments? That inconsistency may lead prosecutors simply to ignore the do justice imperative and to pursue ordinary advocacy without – at the same time – having a strong sense of the limits of that advocacy that apply to ordinary lawyers.

In addition, the do justice ethic arguably distorts the criminal justice system, providing prosecutors with a source of moral authority in the courtroom and in society – the ability to claim implicitly, as the Crown improperly did explicitly in R v Boucher, that action by a Crown is entitled to more respect because done by an actor pursuing justice. That may not create bad behaviour by prosecutors, but it may provide more opportunities for its occurrence – i.e., for prosecutors to take advantage of power differentials in an unjust way.

The do justice ethic comes from a high-minded and admirable place. It is designed to capture the indisputably unique and complex aspects of the prosecutorial function in a free and democratic society. The problem is that it does not do so with any degree of insight or sophistication, and it may have the tendency to undermine the ethical discharge of that function.

If there is anything to this argument, the next question to be considered is: how do we capture the special features of the prosecutorial function and articulate the legal and ethical duties attached to that function? Tucker Carrington, founding director of the Mississippi Innocence Project, suggested one answer to this question when he said in response to my critique that the most ethical prosecutors he deals with are those who are “really great lawyers”, advocating effectively within the bounds of the law, substantively and procedurally. My hunch is that that account of the prosecutor’s role, if coupled with consideration of unique prosecutorial challenges such as the absence of clients, provides a better and richer ethical account of the lawyer’s role than does an empty exhortation to do justice.

This post originally appeared on Slaw.

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Province of Alberta Announces a Two-step Process for Developing a New Climate Change Policy

Fri, 06/26/2015 - 10:00am

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Province of Alberta Announces a Two-step Process for Developing a New Climate Change Policy

Matter Commented On: Minister Shannon Phillips’ Press Conference on Alberta’s climate change strategy, June 25, 2015

A central element of Alberta’s climate change strategy is the Specified Gas Emitter Regulation (SGER), Alta Reg 139/2007. The SGER imposes greenhouse gas emissions intensity reduction obligations (ultimately 12%) on regulated emitters (facilities that emit in excess of 100,000 tonnes of CO2e per year). A facility may achieve compliance in one of four ways: (1) meeting its target by producing its product with lower carbon inputs, (2) Alberta based offset credits (emission reductions over a business as usual scenario achieved by a non-regulated entity in accordance with an approved protocol), (3) emission performance credits (credits achieved by a regulated facility which beats its compliance target), or, (4) contribution of $15 per tonne (for excess emissions over the compliance target) to the Climate Change and Emission Management Fund (the so-called compliance price).

The regulations came into force in 2007 and were originally set to sunset in September 2014. They were extended without change by the Progressive Conservative administration, first to December 31st and then to June 30, 2015. These last-minute extensions of this significant policy instrument were emblematic of the broken state of climate change policy under that administration. If a government is serious about changing behavior it needs to signal well in advance what its expectations are rather than waiting until the last moment. Instead, the government floated trial balloons (e.g. the double/double proposal – double the compliance price to $30/per tonne and double the intensity target to minus 24% of the baseline) but then did nothing.

And then the world moved and the NDP were elected in Alberta. As my colleague Shaun Fluker has pointed out the NDP did not have anything specific to say about the SGERs in its platform and instead put its position in the following terms:

(5.10) We will phase out coal-fired electricity generation to reduce smog and greenhouse gas emissions and expand cleaner, greener sources, including wind and solar and more industrial co-generation in the oil sands, all of which will improve both the environment and the health of Albertans.

(5.11)We will end the PCs’ costly and ineffective Carbon Capture and Storage experiment and reinvest the 2015/16 component of this project into construction of public transit, which will help reduce families’ transportation costs and reduce greenhouse gases and other air pollutants.

(5.13) We will take leadership on the issue of climate change and make sure Alberta is part of crafting solutions with stakeholders, other provinces and the federal government. First steps will include an energy efficiency strategy and a renewable energy strategy.

The election did not change the impending expiry of the regulations but it was clear that the new government was not positioned to put a new climate change strategy in place immediately —hence the two step approach announced June 25.

Step One

The province will extend the SGER but will change two of the three key variables embedded in the regulation. While the amendments to the regulation have yet to be gazetted it appears that the regulation will be extended until the end of 2017. The coverage of the regulation will not change, i.e. the regulation will continue to apply only to emitters emitting more than 100,000 tonnes CO2e. However, both the ambition (or stringency) of the regulation and the compliance price will change. Thus, regulated emitters will be required to make emission intensity improvements of 15% in 2016 and 20% in 2017, and the compliance price will change to $20 per tonne in 2016 and $30 per tonne in 2017. The Minister estimates that these initiatives will reduce emissions by 13 megatonnes per year by 2017.

Step Two

The province has appointed Professor Andrew Leach from the University of Alberta to head an advisory panel to examine Alberta’s options for developing a more ambitious climate change policy prior to the Paris meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in December 2015. Leach and his colleagues have been charged with preparing a discussion paper by the early fall with the intent that the paper will “inform the development of a comprehensive new provincial strategy that demonstrates to the world Alberta’s commitment to address climate change.” It seems clear that this will be a comprehensive review and that all options will be considered, including a carbon tax and a cap and trade scheme which will be able to link with other jurisdictions. It seems unlikely that Alberta’s idiosyncratic emissions intensity scheme will survive this review.

Carbon Capture and Storage

And finally a footnote reference to the Minister’s discussion of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in her speech. This was another important part of Alberta’s 2008 Climate Change Strategy and many previous posts on ABlawg have traced the implementation of this technology in Alberta (most recently here). Shell’s Quest project is scheduled to commence injection later this year and thus the NDP’s election platform (quoted above) must have raised concerns in some quarters. But thankfully, wisdom has prevailed and Minister Phillips in the discussion that followed the announcement stated clearly and unequivocally that Quest project contracts are in place and that the project will continue. I say thankfully for a couple of reasons. First, the Quest project is one of a handful of world class industrial scale CCS projects and it is crucial in global terms that we demonstrate the feasibility of this technology. Second, the Minister is correct. Alberta’s commitments to Shell (with the possible exception of double offset credits for CCS in the SGER) are tied up in contracts and Alberta would have been on the hook if there had been any attempt to back out of those arrangements – and with no corresponding discernible benefits. They key point here is that the province is affirming current commitments to CCS projects but will also be pursuing a number of other strategies including alternative energy sources and energy efficiency strategies to achieve GHG emission reductions. About time.

We will not become world leaders in greenhouse gas mitigation policy and action by the time of the Paris meeting later this year, but there is now at least a chance that we won’t be the target of derision and contempt.

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Worldwide Delisting from Google Search Results: The Significance of Equustek Solutions Inc. v Google Inc.

Thu, 06/25/2015 - 10:00am

By: Emily Laidlaw

PDF Version: Worldwide Delisting from Google Search Results: The Significance of Equustek Solutions Inc. v Google Inc.

Case Commented On: Equustek Solutions Inc. v Google Inc., 2015 BCCA 265

Last week the British Columbia Court of Appeal issued its much anticipated decision in Equustek Solutions Inc v Google Inc, 2015 BCCA 265, concerning an interlocutory injunction against Google requiring it to delist certain websites from its search results. There is much to analyze concerning this case. For the purposes of this post I will focus my discussion on why this case is of such significance, not only to Canada, but internationally, contextualizing the case within the wider international legal debates concerning the legal and social responsibilities of intermediaries such as Google.


Google is not a party to the underlying litigation. The defendants were distributors of the plaintiffs’ product, an industrial network interface hardware, which is what facilitates communication between the different pieces of complex industrial equipment. The plaintiffs allege the defendants violated their trade secrets and trade marks by using trade secrets of the plaintiffs to design their own competing product and then passing off their product as that of the plaintiffs in third party sales. The plaintiffs sued the defendants and obtained various orders requiring the defendants to cease advertising the plaintiffs’ products on their websites and redirect customers to the plaintiffs’ website, as well as disclose their customers to the plaintiffs. The defendants failed to comply with the orders and all three statements of defence were eventually struck. The defendants also moved their operations from Vancouver to an unknown location outside of Canada and continued to sell their products online.

Google’s Involvement

Google is embroiled in this lawsuit because the defendants’ websites were appearing in Google search results. While the plaintiffs had tried to track down the defendants and eliminate the websites on their own, they were unsuccessful. Google voluntarily removed 345 specific URLs from its search results. However, it declined to remove any further URLs, and to delist entire domains. Google also restricted the delisting to These two decisions are key. The desire of Google to avoid delisting entire domains (such as, preferring instead to delist specific web pages or URLs (such as, is widely seen, for internet matters, as a more narrowly tailored solution that better balances free speech concerns. This is because delisting from a search engine raises concerns over censorship, although note this simply removes the link from search results, it does not block access to the website itself.

While I generally agree that the most narrowly tailored solution is preferable, this does not mean delisting of an entire domain is always inappropriate. This was the case of Equustek. The plaintiffs rightly contended they faced a game of “whack-a-mole” – the defendants have effectively abandoned defence of their claim, but they continue to sell the allegedly counterfeit product on their websites, and every time that Google blocked access to a specific webpage, the defendants would move the content to a new webpage within their site. The defendants also sell their product to buyers outside of Canada and therefore delisting the URLs from alone is ineffective. The chambers judge ordered Google Inc. to cease indexing or referencing a list of websites in its search results worldwide (2014 BCSC 1063). This order is what was appealed to the BC Court of Appeal.

Court of Appeal Reasoning

The analysis here, for ABlawg purposes, will be necessarily focused on a few key issues, although I would encourage readers to read the entire judgment for more detail. The Court of Appeal addressed three issues to be discussed here: first, the territorial competence of the Supreme Court of BC over the injunction. The Court of Appeal disposed of this issue quickly, noting that since the underlying action is within the territorial competence of the Supreme Court, the injunction application was as well (at paras 29-45). Second, the Court examined whether Google is substantially connected with BC in a way that is sufficient for the Court to assume in personam jurisdiction over it. On this issue I will dwell.

Normally courts can assume in personam jurisdiction over a company by looking at the location of the behavior in dispute within a geographic area. This is more difficult, in some cases impossible, concerning online activities. Let us consider how we use Google. Is my search on Google from my office in Calgary the use of a passive website created by someone in another country? The Court of Appeal noted, in quoting from the lower court judgment (at para 52), that a passive website does not in itself give the court jurisdiction over the website creator. Nor does advertising by Google in Canada. It is understood that something more is needed, but how much more? The Court rightly notes the struggle in the global digital economy in addressing that line.

The Court pointed out three things that led it to conclude the BC Supreme Court had in personam jurisdiction (at para 52). First, Google’s site isn’t entirely passive. The auto-complete function (where you type in a search term and Google suggests completions) means Google is making suggestions to you based on your previous searches or those most commonly queried by other users. In other countries, such as Germany, Google has been held liable for defamation for auto-complete terms. Second, Google sold advertising to BC clients. While this was negotiated through Google Canada, the contract was with Google Inc. Additionally, the Court rightly noted that there is a difference between Google advertising its business in BC (no jurisdiction) and Google selling advertising space to BC companies, which was the situation here. The argument by Google that its advertising and search services were distinct was rejected by the Court. Indeed, the search results returned to us are determined by a bundle of factors, including advertising, our prior searches and other habits, our location, and searches of others. The Court of Appeal added a third, compelling reason (the first two points were made by the chambers judge) concerning our data, in effect making a property argument over personal data:

In my view, it can also be said that the gathering of information through proprietary web crawler software (“Googlebot”) takes place in British Columbia. This active process of obtaining data that resides in the Province or is the property of individuals in British Columbia is a key part of Google’s business (at para 54).

In its analysis, the Court noted that this collection of data was key to providing search results, and therefore the business conducted in BC was the same as was targeted in the injunction (at para 55). The Court also considered the extraterritorial effect of such an injunction, but rejected it was a bar to making the order. I comment more on this below.

The third issue was the power of the Court to grant injunctions against a non-party. The Court noted orders are routinely made against non-parties concerning, for example, garnishing orders or witness subpoenas (at para 64). The Court was particularly compelled by the analysis of a recent United Kingdom High Court decision, Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Limited, [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), wherein Justice Arnold issued an injunction against major internet service providers (ISPs) requiring blocking of access to sites that sold counterfeit goods. What is not mentioned in Equustek is that Justice Arnold has controversially issued an injunction against ISPs before in the context of illegal file sharing (concerning Newzbin2 and Pirate Bay). Applying Cartier to this case, the Court concluded that where there is a justiciable issue, the granting of injunctions against third parties is a well-established practice of the courts in preserving the rights of the parties (at paras 69-75, 80).

International Context

I have read commentaries about Equustek citing it as a disastrous overreach by a Canadian court seeking to impose its will across the world, and expressing fear that this will invite other, perhaps more socially repressive, countries to do the same (see e.g. here and here). The reality is that these courts can do this, have done it, and cases on this date back to the 1990s, which is generations ago in internet years. This can be seen in cases like LICRA et UEJF v Yahoo! Inc, Ordonnance Refere, TGI Paris, 20 November 2000, where Yahoo! was held liable for its French auction site selling Nazi memorabilia, something that is illegal in France but not in the USA (the case was also relevant as the attempt to enforce the judgment was in the USA). More recently, it can be seen in Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Marios Costeja Gonzalez (2014) Case C?131/12, known inaccurately as “the right to be forgotten” case, where the European Court of Justice held, based on data protection principles, that Google must delist links upon request that are inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant or excessive. Google has been delisting the links in Europe only, although the Article 29 Working Party, the expert advisor on European data protection matters, recommended worldwide delisting much as has been ordered in Equustek. As I write this post, the French Data Protection authority, tasked with effecting Google Spain for France, has ordered Google to delist certain sites worldwide, otherwise face a sanction. Court orders with extra-territorial reach are, for practical purposes, the new reality for regulating abuse and other illegality online, particularly as against companies with global reach such as Google. The final hurdle of enforcement of an order or judgment in a US court remains unresolved.

More generally, Equustek reflects Google’s anxiety over the growing attention it is receiving from governments, NGOs and courts concerning its central function in the digital economy. We are all googlefied to an extent. Anyone who has watched Hawaii 5.0 is amused at the alternate universe in which Steve McGarrett and his team try to solve their many vexing questions by declaring “let’s Bing it”. Google holds approximately 72% of the search market in Canada, almost 65% in the US and 90% in the United Kingdom. The fear in a case like Equustek is that it opens the door to a court ordering Google to delist entire domains from its search results for other reasons that rub closer to the constitutional anxiety at issue: free speech. The American First Amendment offers greater free speech protections than other countries, including other western countries such as Canada, with narrower limits concerning hate speech, defamation and offensive speech.

This carries over to intermediaries, such as hosts of blogs and websites, or search engines such as Google, which are immune from liability for the content posted by others under s 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 USC § 230. The host of a site such as was held not liable for unlawful content posted on its site (see here), but in Canada, the UK or continental Europe, it might face liability once it becomes aware of the unlawfulness of the content and refuses to remove it. A case such as Equustek goes to the core of questions concerning how to regulate illegality on the internet in a global setting with conflicting domestic laws. The intellectual property laws in this case were aligned, but the message of arguments by counsel for Google was that this might not be the situation in the next case. The next case might be about hate speech. Or revenge porn. Or threatening speech. In all of these areas, Canadian and American laws are different. These issues are complicated and beyond the scope of a blog post, but it is important to understand these wider legal debates underlie the narrow decision in this case.

I suggest this case does not need to be read that widely, although there is some truth to the fears. As the Court noted,

In the case before us, there is no realistic assertion that the judge’s order will offend the sensibilities of any other nation. It has not been suggested that the order prohibiting the defendants from advertising wares that violate the intellectual property rights of the plaintiffs offends the core values of any nation. The order made against Google is a very limited ancillary order designed to ensure that the plaintiffs’ core rights are respected (at para 93).

Indeed, the order is interlocutory in nature and can be varied by the Court. Therefore if the defendants suddenly re-purpose the site for non-infringing uses they can seek a court order removing the injunction from the prohibited list. The Court also noted the need in this area for judicial self-restraint (at paras 56, 60, 85-92). There is a rightful concern of extra territorial effect, but this can be addressed through judicial self-restraint rather than hiving off from judicial consideration any business with worldwide reach.

Certainly each case must be assessed in terms of the narrowness of the blocking measure. The initial position should be that any prior restraint of speech, or of being delisted from search results, offends free speech principles. Further, a minimally explored issue in this case was whether blocking the entire domain would even be effective. The defendants can simply register a new domain name and start selling the goods there. The Court noted this, and resolved it by noting the slower pace at which this would happen compared to moving content to a new webpage (at para 27). However, the pace is slowed by days, perhaps even hours, only. The game of whack-a-mole, therefore, continues.

For a longer discussion of the significance of Google concerning freedom of expression and other concerns, see chapter 5 of my book Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility.

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The Social Licence to Operate: Mind the Gap

Wed, 06/24/2015 - 10:00am

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: The Social Licence to Operate: Mind the Gap

This post is based on an invited presentation that I gave at the Canadian Energy Law Forum on May 14, 2015 in Lake Louise. I began my remarks by looking at the three elements of the social licence to operate and then offered a summary of a lecture given by Rowland Harrison at the University of Alberta on March 10, 2015 from his position as the TransCanada Chair in Administrative and Regulatory Law, entitled “Social Licence to Operate: The Good, the Bad and the Ominous.” Mr. Harrison is a former member of the National Energy Board. I concluded my remarks by reflecting on four issues: (1) the normative context for thinking about the social licence to operate, (2) why it is that industry itself uses the term “social licence to operate”, (3) the need to narrow the gap between the legal licence and the idea of the social licence, and (4) the implications of allowing the social licence to operate as a veto.

Elements of a Definition: Social Licence to Operate (SLO)

Let’s start with the word “social”, the adjective that qualifies the noun, which tells us that the source of the licence that we are referring to is not government or a regulator but society, or some subset of society, or some community or subset of that community (begging of course questions like which society, what community, but, typically in the literature, some local or affected community).

And as for the noun, the word “licence” to us as lawyers means consent or permission; the permission to do that which without the licence would be a trespass; carrying the connotation that the permission originates from some entity whose authorization is in some sense required. The holder or applicant for the licence is typically industry – a resource company, a pipeline company or perhaps equally a party seeking to develop a new aquaculture operation, a wind farm, or even a school board wanting to open a special needs school in suburban Calgary. And the licence that we are taking about is additive; it is in addition to any legal licences or permits that may be required from a formal governmental authority.

And as for the verb “to operate”, this signifies that the concept is concerned not just with the commencement of the project, but implies that the project should continue to have the support of the community throughout its life.

The concept then is a highly normative concept; you ought not to proceed or continue with this operation without the permission of the affected community. But it is an extra-legal norm.

Rowland Harrison on the Social Licence to Operate

Let me turn now to Rowland’s excellent paper. Rowland started with some general observations before using the headings of his title and I will follow that same order; I am paraphrasing and parsing throughout, so don’t lumber Rowland with my choice of words and terminology.

First, the preliminary observations.

The concept of SLO is generally attributed to Jim Cooney of Placer Dome who used the term in the late 1990s in the context of social and political risk assessment by mining companies operating in developing countries which lacked a commitment to the rule of law. It is now commonly used in a broader range of social and political contexts, including linear projects (pipelines and transmission lines) in western liberal democracies strongly committed to the rule of law and with sophisticated and well-resourced regulatory schemes.

While one would expect the concept to be enthusiastically endorsed by elements of civil society it is perhaps more surprising to see industry broadly endorsing the concept, including pipeline companies, industry associations (e.g. the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) and Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA)) and even some regulators.

Rowland suggests that to the extent that we are thinking about social licence and resource development projects it is useful to place this in the context of the more formal decision making procedures which, crucially in Rowland’s thinking, involve a public interest determination by a regulatory body, or even by cabinet, following a process that involves significant citizen engagement, typically through industry led consultation programs and perhaps supplemented by full public hearings. Such a public interest determination will always be contingent and contested but this is the mechanism, or some form of it, which western liberal democracies have chosen to make decisions about these types of projects.

Rowland deliberately distinguishes between the concept of social licence and the rights and obligations associated with the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate aboriginal peoples — principally on the grounds that the duty to consult and accommodate is a legal and indeed a constitutional doctrine; the social licence to operate (SLO) is, by definition, extra-legal. I also note, parenthetically, that other commentators have also distinguished between social licence to operate and the concept of free, prior informed consent (FPIC). Prno and Slocombe for example note the following: (1) FPIC is a duty of the state whereas a proponent may acquire SLO without state involvement; (2) FPIC focuses on obtaining consent before a project proceeds, SLO emphasizes maintaining community support; (3) FPIC focuses on the rights of indigenous communities, SLO applies more broadly. See “Exploring the origins of ‘social licence to operate’ in the mining sector: Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories” (2012), 37 Resources Policy 346 at 349.

We can now turn to the three headings of Rowland’s title.

The Good

The “good” for Rowland is that the concept of SLO serves as a reminder to us all and, perhaps especially to regulators, that any legitimate project approval process needs to consider affected interests, and especially local and community interests.

The Bad

The bad for Rowland largely turns on all of the uncertainties associated with the concept of SLO. Who must the licence be obtained from? How can we tell when the licence has been earned or obtained? When is it lost? If one thinks, for example, of the events on Burnaby Mountain in the fall of 2014 where protestors disrupted the efforts of TransMountain Pipelines to carry out surveying activities associated with the proposed expansion of the Kinder Morgan pipeline, who was the potential social licensor? Was it the City of Burnaby? Was it the protestors? (For a judicial account of those activities see Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC v Gold, 2014 BCSC 2133, 2014 BCSC 2403, 2015 BCSC 242).

The Ominous

Following on from the bad, Rowland’s argument on the ominous (and one sees similar arguments in the writings of Dwight Newman and Brian Crowley) is that the very uncertainties associated with the content of the concept of social licence make it inconsistent with the ideals of the rule of law. Rowland recognizes that that is in some sense an unfair criticism precisely because SLO exists outside the law and the formal legal system. His response is that to the extent that the SLO concept makes normative claims then it should play by the normative rules of the formal legal system, including the rule of law.

Equally ominous for Rowland are the signs that SLO is being used by some to justify the non-application of the formal rules of the legal system by actors within the legal system. Thus, it is one thing for protesters to exercise what in the 1960s we might have termed civil disobedience, but it is altogether different if the police, for example, fail to enforce the terms of a properly obtained court order because the protesters have clothed themselves in the rhetoric of social licence to operate. This again undermines the rule of law. Here Rowland refers to Justice Brown’s experiences in getting an injunction enforced in Canadian National Railway Company v John Doe, 2013 ONSC 115.

What Then Does the Future Hold?

Rowland concludes with three observations. First, we can retain the good underlying the SLO concept and reduce the bad and the ominous if we ditch the language of licence which is too redolent of the formal normative order. Other possible terms that are less freighted include acceptance or support. Second, industry and government need to be more careful in their choice of words and what they endorse. And third, perhaps one response to the social licence debate is, in my words, to build a bigger tent. Thus, if we recognize that there is some legitimacy to the concerns that underlie the development of the SLO, that is to say, if we recognize that in some ways and in some respects there is a gap between the formal licence of the law and acceptance of a project by an affected community or communities, then we might try to develop techniques within the formal legal system to help reduce or eliminate that gap or deficit. Sometimes that gap will be unbridgeable but in other cases perhaps we need to try to bridge it.

That concludes my summary of Rowland’s paper and I now turn to my own remarks.

SLO in its Normative Context

I said earlier that SLO is a highly normative concept. What do I mean by that? A norm for me is simply an expectation about behavior. It is a claim that in X circumstances Y ought to act in a particular way. We are all (as lawyers, family and community members, and citizens in society) familiar with different types of norms and normative orders. We frequently recognize a hierarchy of norms but we also recognize norms of different qualities and specificity.

A lawyer’s hierarchy will start with the constitution and move down through senior levels of government to the local level. We saw some of the interplay between these rules operating in the TransMountain Burnaby Mountain standoff and we have sophisticated techniques for resolving normative conflict within the legal system including the doctrines of applicability or interjurisdictional immunity (IJI) and paramountcy, all as nicely illustrated by the NEB’s very well-reasoned Ruling No. 40 in the TransMountain proceedings.

As for the quality of our norms, consider for example the distinction between constitutional law and constitutional conventions, or in international law the distinction between soft norms and hard norms. A norm may be hard if it is (a) law, (b) expressed with precision, and (c) enforceable. A norm may be soft if: (a) its status as law is contested, (b) it is drafted in hortatory or excessively general terms, or (c) there is no enforcement mechanism. A prescriptive treaty might establish a set of hard norms whereas the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development is generally considered to establish a softer set of norms; and some instruments such as United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) may encode both hard and soft norms. See generally Alan Boyle, “Some reflections on the relationship of treaties and soft law” (1990), 48 ICLQ 901.

And as for the specificity of our norms, consider the distinction between rules and principles. Ronald Dworkin famously said that law is more than a system of rules but includes principles as well as rules. Both are norms but they operate in different ways. Norms like the neighbor principle, the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, or even something like the “regulatory compact” have weight, they push us in particular directions without requiring a particular outcome. They do not apply in an all-or-nothing way and the status of such principles may be highly contested. For example, there is a famous and ongoing debate in international law as to whether the precautionary principle is actually just “an approach” or whether it represents customary international law or is a general principle of law. Examples from Canadian case law of the application of normative principles include the Baker case (‘best interests of the child’) and the Spraytech Case (precaution). Rules on the other hand apply in an all-or-nothing way and demand a particular outcome.

My point thus far is that we live in a normatively complex world where there is constant interaction between different normative claims and different normative orders. Part of that complexity is attributable to the globalized world in which we live. If we reflect on that picture we as lawyers are actually very familiar with normative complexity; sorting through that complexity is part of what we do both as academics and practitioners. But how does this relate to the topic of SLO? I think it prompts two contradictory observations. The first is that this discussion suggests that there is nothing particularly unusual about SLO; it is simply part of, or another example of, this normative complexity and that we should not be too worried about it. A second observation is that this extended reflection on the different types of norms suggests that there is something really quite unusual about SLO which is that while it is a soft norm in the sense that it is clearly not law (it is a social licence and not a legal licence) the fact that it is presented in the form of a rule rather than that of a principle causes it to appear harder and more demanding than it actually is. Indeed on its face it is more demanding than the constitutional concept of the duty to consult and accommodate which, as the Supreme Court reminds us, does not amount to a veto. These reflections also suggest that the concept might be more useful to us, and indeed less threatening, if we could (re)frame it as a principle. As an aspirational goal or principle it is far more attractive than as a rule.

Why Might Industry Embrace the Social Licence to Operate?

Rowland suggests that the alacrity with which industry has latched on to the concept of social licence is perhaps surprising. I think that this enthusiasm can perhaps best be explained by recognizing the different ways in which we use the term, and appreciate that it is in fact used descriptively as well as normatively. To this point I have been emphasizing the normative usage i.e. you cannot operate unless you have a social licence. A more descriptive use is simply the claim “I have a social licence to operate”. (And we might observe as well that one usage is ex ante, while this second is ex post). Of course, as soon as I make the ex post claim that I have a SLO the attractiveness of the term to industry is obvious. It may help industry fast track the legal approval process (as where an oil sands proponent reaches an impact and benefit agreement with an affected First Nation community with the result that a scheduled hearing is cancelled because there is no party left with standing who can insist on a hearing); it may enhance the reputation of that industry player and meet its corporate social responsibility policies; and it may help that party improve or maintain market access for its products. All of these qualities make the endorsement of a social licence very valuable in managing project risks and timelines.

Narrowing the Gap

If we accept that in some cases there may be a gap between the legal licence and community expectations what measures can we take to help us narrow that gap? The first step of course is that government, and in particular responsible ministers, should be cautious not to widen the gap by undermining the credibility of the regulatory system. In my view (see my post here), Minister Oliver’s open letter to Canadians attacking “environmental activities” on the eve of the opening of the Northern Gateway hearings was one such misstep. Other more positive measures to be taken might include: broader adoption of strategic environmental assessments; landscape level planning approaches (e.g. Alberta’s planning process under the Alberta Land Stewardship Act (although clearly there has to be full implementation of plans as well, and here, for example we have yet to see the development and implementation of the biodiversity framework called for by the Lower Athabasca Regional Plan); and broader adoption of public interest standing rules (while also exercising some control over process) rather than limiting standing to recognized private interests. I also think that the public needs a forum in which to address broad public policy issues such as climate change and greenhouse gas emissions. Thus while it might be reasonable to conclude that a pipeline application before the National Energy Board is not the best place to assess upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions (see Forest Ethics Advocacy Association and Donna Sinclair v National Energy Board, 2014 FCA 245 and discussion here) these are legitimate concerns, as is the absence of a coherent federal climate change policy, and it is important to provide some forum within which these issues can be discussed. And finally, we should not underestimate the importance of reasons as a means of supporting the legitimacy of the legal licensing process. In this respect, I think that the NEB has been doing a good job in providing reasons for its decisions (see the reference above to its Ruling No. 40) whereas with the single exception of its decision in Forest Ethics (above), the Federal Court of Appeal’s habit of not providing reasons to support denial of applications for leave when serious legal issues are at stake does nothing to enhance the legitimacy of the regulatory scheme.

The Implications of Social Licence as a Veto

One of the concerns that I have with the concept of social licence is that it has the potential to undermine what we mean by living in a society or community. We live in societies because we are more than just individuals and we crave the benefits that living in a society offers including cultural benefits as well as material benefits such as schools, airports, hospitals, roads and energy services and infrastructure. While the market may help us make decisions about some of these projects, holdout problems and settlement and transaction costs cause us to acknowledge that contract and consent alone will not get those projects built. We need a regulatory system that allows us to assess that societally we are better off with these projects than without, we need to ensure that environmental values are properly protected at both the landscape level and the project level, we need to ensure full protection of indigenous rights (including in some cases the right to withhold consent), and we need a compensation mechanism to ensure that those who are inordinately affected are appropriately compensated. But if we also grant all of those who are detrimentally affected by such projects the power to act as a social licensor (or the power to withhold such licence), then we can pretty much guarantee that these projects will not be built, to the ultimate impoverishment of what we mean by living in a society.

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Keep It To Yourself: The Private Use Exception for Child Pornography Offences

Tue, 06/23/2015 - 10:00am

By: Joshua Sealy-Harrington and Ashton Menuz

PDF Version: Keep It To Yourself: The Private Use Exception for Child Pornography Offences

Case Commented On: R v Barabash, 2015 SCC 29

Last month, the Supreme Court of Canada revisited the Private Use Exception – a defence to the possession and creation of child pornography – in R v Barabash, 2015 SCC 29. The unanimous judgment, authored by Karakatsanis J, clarified the analytical framework relating to the Private Use Exception and elaborated on how courts should assess exploitative relationships in which child pornography may be made. This post explains the Private Use Exception, describes its evolution in the jurisprudence, and explores questions left unanswered by the Court’s decision in Barabash.

The Facts in Barabash

In 2008, two 14 year-old girls, K and D, ran away from an adolescent treatment centre in High Prairie, Alberta to stay with 60 year-old Donald Barabash. Both girls had “difficult pasts”, including drug addiction, criminal history, family issues, and in K’s case, a history of sex work (at para 4). During their stay with Barabash, K and D engaged in sexual activities with each other and 41 year-old Shane Rollison. These activities were generally recorded by Barabash, though K and D operated the camera at times as well.

The police began investigating Barabash and Rollison after receiving complaints about a photo posted to Nexopia, a Canadian social networking site. The photo depicted K and D, with one of them topless. As a result, the police searched the Barabash residence, where they found a number of materials they identified as child pornography.

Following the investigation, Barabash and Rollison were both charged with offences under the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. Specifically, both were charged with making child pornography (Criminal Code, s 163.1(2)) while Barabash alone was charged with possessing child pornography (Criminal Code, s 163.1(4)). In response, both Barabash and Rollison argued that their making and possession of child pornography was legal because it fell within the scope of the Private Use Exception. The “core issue” at trial (and on appeal) was the availability of the Private Use Exception as a defence to the charges above (at paras 1, 9, and 11).

Explaining the Private Use Exception

It may come as a surprise to some that it is legal to create and possess child pornography as long as it is held for private use (an oversimplification, to be fair). But the Private Use Exception is a logical extension of the legal framework surrounding sexual activity involving minors.

Child pornography is media that depicts sexual activity with, or that displays the sexual regions of, a person under the age of 18 (Criminal Code, s 163.1(1)). But there is no blanket prohibition on persons under the age of 18 engaging in sexual activity. Indeed, the Criminal Code permits certain minors to engage in sexual activities subject to numerous protections seeking to protect them from harm.

First, the Criminal Code incrementally increases the capacity for a minor to consent to sexual activity as they increase in age. A minor under 12 years old is incapable of giving consent to sexual activity (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(1)-(2.1); Barabash at para 20). In contrast, a minor that is 12-15 years old can consent to sexual activity with a partner that is close in age or, if the minor is 14 or 15, with a partner who is their spouse (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(2)-(2.1); Barabash at para 22). While there is no upper age limit on the person a 16 year old minor can consent to sexual activity with (Criminal Code, s 150.1(1)), all minors benefit from the limits placed on legal consent that adults benefit from. For example, at any age, consent is vitiated if it is obtained by force, threats, fraud, or the exercise of authority (Criminal Code, s 265(3)) or if it is obtained in other problematic circumstances, such as where the complainant is incapacitated (Criminal Code, s 273.1(2); Barabash at para 21).

Second, the Criminal Code‘s provisions relating to sexual exploitation provide further protection to minors. Specifically, a person who is sexually active with a minor (even with the minor’s consent) will still be convicted of an offense if their relationship with the minor is exploitative (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(2)-(2.1) and 153; Barabash at para 34). This provides residual protection to minors from ages 16 to 17 who are too old to benefit from the limits on consent described above.

In sum, minors can, in certain circumstances, legally engage in sexual activity, even with adults – but can they record it? Minors aged 13-17 can engage in legal sexual activity, but the Criminal Code ostensibly criminalizes making recordings of such sexual activity. This is where the Private Use Exception steps in. There would be some contradiction in letting minors engage in sexual activity while criminalizing the recording of it for private use. In consequence, the Private Use Exception acts as a defence to various child pornography-related offences to permit the making and creation of child pornography that meets certain criteria (Barabash at para 16). For example, the Private Use Exception could apply to prevent the conviction of two 17 year old partners who innocently take nude photographs of each other. However, the Private Use Exception could also apply to prevent convictions in less benign circumstances, as the cases discussed below demonstrate.

To avoid confusion, we note that there were material amendments made to the Criminal Code between the time when the facts in Barabash occurred and when the Court’s decision in Barabash was released. In particular, during this intervening time the age of consent was raised from 14 to 16 (Criminal Code, s 150.1(1), Barabash at para 7). As a consequence, the current legal framework governing a minor’s consent described above did not apply to Barabash or Rollison whose impugned acts predated the amendments resulting in the current legal framework. Indeed, if the facts in Barabash were to occur in the present day, Barabash and Rollison would be precluded from arguing the Private Use Exception as a defence because 14 year old minors (like K and D) can now only consent to sexual activity with partners who are close in age or who are their spouse.

Evolution of the Private Use Exception in the Jurisprudence

A preliminary overview of how the Private Use Exception has evolved in the jurisprudence facilitates an analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Barabash.

The evolution of the Private Use Exception, in respect of Alberta courts, can be distilled to three key stages, namely:

  1. the origin of the Private Use Exception in R v Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2;
  2. the extension of the Private Use Exception in R v Cockell, 2013 ABCA 112; and
  3. the return to the original Private Use Exception in Barabash.

In Sharpe (2001), a majority of the Supreme Court held that the offences of possessing and making child pornography, while largely justified under section 1 of the Charter, captured two categories of privately held material which did not strike the proper balance between preventing harm to children and protecting freedom of expression (at paras 103-105). In respect of one of those categories – private recordings – the Supreme Court created the Private Use Exception, which is a defence to child-pornography offences if three criteria are satisfied:

  1. lawfulness e. any sexual activities depicted in the recording must be lawful;
  2. consent to recording e. all parties must consent to the recording; and
  3. privacy e. the recordings must be kept in strict privacy and intended for private use exclusively by:
    1. the creator; and/or
    2. those depicted in the recordings.

(Sharpe at paras 116 and 128; the “Original Private Use Exception”).

Next, in Cockell (2013), the Alberta Court of Appeal extended the Original Private Use Exception by reading in two additional “standalone” criteria, namely:

  1. absence of factual exploitation e. the circumstances must show that the minor’s consent was not obtained through exploitation or abuse in fact, regardless of whether any exploitation offences are made out in law; and
  2. mutuality of benefit e. the parties must intend for the recordings to be used by all those involved in its creation.

(Cockell at paras 36-41; the “Extended Private Use Exception”).

Sharpe and Cockell set the stage for Barabash (2015). At the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (2012 ABQB 99) both Barabash and Rollison were acquitted because the court held that the Original Private Use Exception was the governing law and that both men satisfied its criteria (at paras 275-78). However, both men were convicted at the Alberta Court of Appeal (2014 ABCA 126) which held that the Extended Private Use Exception was the governing law and that both men failed to meet its additional criterion of lack of factual exploitation (at paras 28 and 35-37). Reconciling these differing approaches was at the heart of the Supreme Court’s decision in Barabash.

The Supreme Court’s Decision in Barabash

In Barabash, the Court was asked to clarify the elements of the Private Use Exception, and in particular where the concept of exploitation fits into the Private Use Exception’s analytical framework (at para 2).

The Court situates the concept of exploitation under the lawfulness criterion from Sharpe, and in consequence, rejects “absence of factual exploitation” as an additional standalone criterion for the Private Use Exception (at para 31). The Court also rejects the standalone criterion of “mutuality of benefit” (at para 52). As a result, the Court reaffirms the analytical framework of the Original Private Use Exception provided in Sharpe (at para 18). Specifically, the Court reaffirms that when a person possesses a visual recording created by or depicting that person (see para 16), the three part conjunctive test for the Original Private Use Exception – lawfulness, consent to recording, and privacy – still applies (at paras 18 and 53).

A summary of the Court’s observations in respect of each of the three criteria follows.

Criterion 1: Lawfulness

First, the Court holds that the Private Use Exception can only apply to private recordings if the sexual activity recorded is itself lawful (at para 20). It follows that a minor:

  1. must consent to sexual activity, if any, depicted in the recording (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(2)-(2.1), 265(3), and 1); and
  2. cannot be sexually exploited (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(1)-(2.1) and 153).

(Barabash at paras 20-24).

As discussed above, Criminal Code provisions relating to consent and sexual exploitation operate to protect minors from harm. The consent of minors aged 12-15 is subject to various limits (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(2)-(2.1)), while minors aged 12-17 are protected from sexual exploitation (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(1)-(2.1) and 153).

Specifically in respect of sexual exploitation of a minor aged 16-17 (a “young person”; Criminal Code, s 153(2)), sexual activity, or an invitation of sexual activity, can only be lawful if the relationship with the young person does not involve:

  1. a position of trust or authority;
  2. dependency; or
  3. exploitation.

(Criminal Code, s 153(1); Barabash at para 34).

Moreover, in assessing exploitation, the Court looks at “the nature and circumstances of the relationship”, including the following “non-exhaustive list of indicia”:

  1. the age of the young person;
  2. the age difference between the accused and young person;
  3. the evolution of the relationship; and
  4. the degree of control or influence that the accused has over the child.

(Criminal Code, s 153(1.2); Barabash at para 36).

The legislative limits above restrict the circumstances in which sexual activity with a minor is lawful, and in turn narrow the scope of the Private Use Exception (Barabash at para 23). In particular, the Criminal Code offences relating to exploitation of minors restrict the availability of the Private Use Exception, even in circumstances where a minor legally consents to the sexual activity depicted (Barabash at para 35).

Given the above, the Court rejects the Extended Private Use Exception’s additional “absence of factual exploitation” criterion because it is largely “redundant” with the lawfulness criterion, which takes sexual exploitation into account (at para 43). In effect, the Court subsumes the “absence of factual exploitation” criterion from the Extended Private Use Exception into the lawfulness criterion of the Original Private Use Exception.

In our view, the Court’s rejection of a standalone “absence of factual exploitation” criterion is sound. If such a criterion were to exist, it would result in the absurd consequence of it being legal to ‘factually exploit’ a minor for sexual activity, but illegal to factually exploit a minor for sexual recordings. There are already multiple provisions in the Criminal Code devoted to preventing the sexual exploitation of minors (Criminal Code, ss 150.1(1)-(2.1) and 153) and if any of those provisions are violated, recordings relating to that exploitation will not be protected by the Private Use Exception – an already “robust analysis” (Barabash at para 43). Further, as Professor Peter Sankoff observes, tying lawfulness under the Private Use Exception to an established body of jurisprudence addressing sexual exploitation is a “richer”, “broader”, and “clearer” approach to applying the Private Use Exception than the creation of a new absence of factual exploitation criterion (see Ten Minutes on R v Barabash, Child Pornography and the Private Use Exception, at 8:40 (“Ten Minutes on Barabash”)).

Criterion 2: Consent to Recording

Second, in addition to consenting to the sexual activity, the minor must also consent to that activity being recorded (Barabash at para 25).

As “exploitation” is addressed under the lawfulness criterion of the Original Private Use Exception, the Court holds that there is no consideration of exploitation in respect of the minor’s consent to the recording (at paras 48-49). However, the Court concedes that there may be instances in which consent to the recording is itself acquired through exploitation (at paras 45-47); a potential blind spot in the Original Private Use Exception (the first point discussed below under “Commentary”).

Criterion 3: Privacy

Third, the Original Private Use Exception will only apply if the recording is kept in strict privacy and intended for private use only by the creator and/or persons depicted in the recording (Barabash at para 26). Interestingly, by restricting access to those who either (1) created the recording or (2) are depicted in the recording, the Court seemingly prohibits a minor from taking a sexually explicit photo of themselves and sharing it with a partner (the second point discussed below under “Commentary”).

While the Court restricted legal disclosure of child pornography to those involved in its recording, the Court did not go as far as the Alberta Court of Appeal in Cockell and insist on the minor using the recordings – the “mutuality of benefit” criterion. Rather, the Court held that the element of privacy requires only that the benefits derived from the recording are restricted to the individuals involved (Barabash at para 52). What these benefits consist of and which of the parties involved receive these benefits is for the determination of the individuals themselves (at para 52). In consequence, the Original Private Use Exception dismisses the added mutuality of benefit criterion found in the Extended Private Use Exception.

In our view, the Court’s rejection of the mutuality of benefit criterion is, like its rejection of the absence of factual exploitation criterion, sound. While the Court held that such a criterion would “unnecessarily complicate the private use exception test while providing little benefit” (at para 52) we would add that such a criterion would contradict the principles in Sharpe seeking to promote sexual exploration by minors (see Sharpe at para 109). Dictating to a minor that they can only meaningfully explore their sexuality by jointly possessing and viewing explicit photos with their partner is unnecessarily restrictive. Indeed, Joshua addressed, in a previous article, how ostensibly one-sided sexual activities can nonetheless reflect the meaningful sexual autonomy of both partners involved (see Tied Hands? A Doctrinal and Policy Argument for the Validity of Advance Consent at 145-46).

We note that the Court, in obiter, suggests that the element of privacy imports continued control over the recording in question such that the minor may be able to demand the destruction of the recording at a later date (at paras 27-30; the third topic discussed below under “Commentary”).


Applying the three part Original Private Use Exception test above, the Court allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial (at para 63).

The Court found that the trial judge erred in law in his analysis of lawfulness, and in particular, in his analysis of whether or not the relationships in question were sexually exploitative. Specifically, in respect of sexual exploitation, the trial judge’s analysis improperly focussed on “the voluntariness of the particular activities, instead of on the nature of the relationship between the parties” as required by the Criminal Code (Barabash at para 56; emphasis in original). While the trial judge did consider factors relevant to exploitation (such as age disparity), he erroneously considered those factors “one at a time” rather than assessing “whether they cumulatively resulted in an exploitative relationship” (at para 55; emphasis added).

The Court ordered a new trial (rather than making its own ruling on the evidence) because the trial judge’s error had a material bearing on the acquittals (see para 62). Specifically, the Court held that the trial judge’s factual findings did not inevitably lead to a lack of exploitation in this case because the evidence was equivocal in respect of exploitation (at paras 58-61). On one hand, multiple factors raised the risk of sexual exploitation, including K and D’s homelessness, addictions, and need for shelter from Barabash and Rollison (see para 60). On the other hand, K and D were lucid enough to consent, initiated and directed many of the sexual activities, and willingly consented to the making of the recordings (see para 59). As a consequence, a new trial, at which a judge can properly address whether the sexual activity was lawful under the Private Use Exception (i.e. non-exploitative), was necessary (see para 62).

Commentary: Unanswered Questions from Barabash

Barabash brings significant analytical clarity to the Private Use Exception. Still, it leaves some questions unanswered, including:

  1. Can a minor be lawfully exploited for sexually explicit photographs?
  2. Can a minor share sexually explicit “selfies” with their partner? And
  3. Can a party later retract consent to recording?

1. Can a Minor be Lawfully Exploited for Sexually Explicit Photographs?

First, how should courts deal with child pornography lawfully obtained through exploitation? As described above, the Original Private Use Exception rejects the additional “absence of factual exploitation” criterion included in the Extended Private Use Exception. It follows that the second criterion under the Original Private Use Exception – consent to recording – does not take exploitation into account (Barabash at para 49). But what if child pornography is obtained through “lawful” exploitation (i.e. exploitation that falls short of sexual exploitation under the Criminal Code, s 153)?

For example, if an adult, in an exploitative relationship, takes nude photographs of a minor, but never touches the minor or invites the minor to touch them, then the offence of sexual exploitation is arguably not made out. As a consequence, such an adult could benefit from the Private Use Exception despite exploiting a minor to obtain child pornography – an apparent loophole (albeit narrow) around the Court’s primary objective in Barabash of preventing the exploitation of minors. On this point, the Court observes that consent to recording is typically intertwined with consent to sexual activity, which would leave the minor with protection under the Criminal Code. But the Court also concedes that this may not always be the case (at paras 46-47). Indeed, the Crown’s factum in Barabash (at para 124) makes this very point, referring to R v Hewlett, 2002 ABCA 179, where three teenagers responded to a modeling advertisement in which they were offered drugs and alcohol in exchange for their consent to taking explicit pictures. Without analyzing exploitation in such a case, “a predator need only manipulate his or her victim to the point of obtaining consent to be free from criminal sanction” (Cockell at para 37).

In the end, the Court refrains from opining on this issue, stating that it will be dealt with when such facts are brought before it (at para 48). At that time, it will be interesting to see how the Court responds. While permitting the exploitation of children to obtain child pornography appears to be something that ought to be criminalized, such a view runs contrary to the offence of sexual exploitation under the Criminal Code (which would not apply to procuring photographs through exploitation without touching or an invitation thereof). It likewise runs contrary to the Court’s exclusion of exploitation from the consent to recording criterion under the Original Private Use Exception. In consequence, to criminalize possession of child pornography lawfully obtained through exploitation would either require a revision to the Original Private Use Exception or the expanding of sexual exploitation beyond its prescribed requirements under the Criminal Code. As the Court has just recently reaffirmed the Original Private Use Exception and as it is well-established that Criminal Code offences should be interpreted in favour of the accused when multiple interpretations are available (R v CD, 2005 SCC 78 at para 50) it is unclear how a court could convict someone merely for obtaining nude photographs of a minor through exploitation.

In any event, we tend to support the Court’s decision to remain silent on this issue. The Court correctly observes that it may be misguided to opine on the issue of consent to recording when it was not an issue in the facts of Barabash (at para 32), when the common law of consent was “not fully argued” before it or the courts below (at para 32), and when the implications of altering the common law of consent “may be far reaching” (at para 48).

2. Can A Minor Share Sexually Explicit “Selfies” With Their Partner?

Second, it is unclear how the courts will deal with a minor taking a sexually explicit photo or video of themselves (a “Selfie”) and sending it to a partner (which, if sent by text message, is known as “Sexting”). While the concept of Sexting a Selfie is not addressed in either the reasoning or facts in Barabash, it is an example worthy of discussion, particularly given the increasing use by minors of technology that involves the private sharing of photographs and videos, such as Instagram and Snapchat. Indeed, the police were tipped off about Barabash in this very case because of photos posted to a social media platform, Nexopia (see para 7).

The discussion above addressed only private recordings because that is the type of child pornography at issue in Barabash. But Sharpe actually read in two exceptions to child-pornography offences under the Criminal Code, namely, exceptions applying to:

  1. self-created expressive material (the “Personal Use Exception”); and
  2. private recordings of lawful sexual activity (the Private Use Exception, discussed above).

(Collectively, the “Sharpe Exceptions”; Sharpe¸ at para 128).

Despite the documented frequency of minors Sexting Selfies, it appears as though such recordings would not qualify under either of the Sharpe Exceptions.

The inapplicability of the Personal Use Exception to Sexting Selfies is clear. The Court’s summary of the Personal Use Exception in Sharpe (at para 128), which was not at issue in Barabash (see para 16)¸ states that the Personal Use Exception applies only to “expressive material created through the efforts of a single person and held by that person alone, exclusively for his or her own personal use.” It follows that when a minor sends a sexually explicit Selfie to their partner, neither can benefit from the Personal Use Exception because it would apply, at most, to Selfies that are held exclusively by the minor who took the Selfie.

Indeed, the Court’s elaboration on the Sharpe Exceptions suggests that the Personal Use Exception does not apply to Selfies in any circumstance, even those held privately by the person who took the Selfie. Admittedly, the Court states that the Personal Use Exception applies to “visual expressions […] created through the efforts of a single individual and held by that person for his or her eyes alone” (at para 115). This passage suggests that the Personal Use Exception applies to Selfies held exclusively by the person who took the Selfie. But the Court later states that the Private Use Exception applies to “auto-depictions, such as photographs taken by a child or adolescent of him- or herself alone, kept in strict privacy and intended for personal use only” (at para 116). As this passage expressly deals with Selfies, it appears that the Court intended the Personal Use Exception to be limited to “visual expressions” like drawings, not actual recordings, like photographs.

In contrast, the Private Use Exception appears to apply to Selfies, but arguably not when they are shared with a partner. The Court’s summary of the Private Use Exception in Sharpe (at para 128) which it reaffirms in Barabash (at para 16) states that the Private Use Exception applies only to “a person’s possession of visual recordings created by or depicting that person.” In consequence, when a minor sends a sexually explicit Selfie to their partner, arguably neither can benefit from the Private Use Exception because the recipient neither participated in the creation of, nor is depicted in, the recording.

The Court’s elaboration on the Private Use Exception provides further support to the inapplicability of the Private Use Exception to Sexting Selfies. As stated above, the Court appears to limit the application of the Private Use Exception to Selfies “intended for personal use only” (at para 115). Similarly, the Court, in elaborating on the Private Use Exception, reiterates that “the person possessing the recording must have personally recorded or participated in the sexual activity in question” (at para 39) and that the recording must be “intended exclusively for private use by the creator and the persons depicted therein” (at para 26). Indeed, the Court specifically discusses the example of minors exchanging sexually explicit photos, and that discussion seems to suggest that Selfies would not fall within the Private Use Exception:

[F]or example, a teenage couple would not fall within the law’s purview for creating and keeping sexually explicit pictures featuring each other alone, or together engaged in lawful sexual activity, provided these pictures were created together and shared only with one another (at para 116; emphasis added).

Similarly, the Court in Barabash states that “private use is limited to use by the creator and the persons depicted, and nobody else” (at para 52).

In sum, the Court in Sharpe and in Barabash appears to hold that if a minor takes a sexually explicit Selfie and sends it to their partner, both partners will be criminally liable.

That said, neither Sharpe nor Barabash, in respect of their facts, dealt specifically with minors exchanging sexually explicit Selfies. Further, the broader principles described in Sharpe arguably apply to minors exchanging sexually explicit Selfies. The majority in Sharpe read in the Private Use Exception because of the significance of private recordings to “adolescent self-fulfilment, self-actualization and sexual exploration and identity” (at para 109). Surely a partner need not press the button on the camera for the exchange of sexually explicit photos to engage with adolescent sexual exploration.

In our view, whether the exchange of Selfies should be protected by the Sharpe Exceptions is legitimately controversial. On one hand, we would guess that most sexually explicit photos exchanged by minors are Selfies (though Canada seems to lack studies in this regard). As a consequence, excluding what could be the most common way minors choose to explore their sexuality with their partners through photographs from protection intended to preserve that exploration seems misguided. Insisting that a minor’s partner literally take the photo, when that minor may only be comfortable with sending an explicit photo which they have taken (and retaken, and possibly edited) themselves, significantly depreciates the sexual autonomy of minors which the Private Use Exception seeks to preserve. Indeed, requiring that the photo be taken by a minor’s partner may pressure minors to be in sexually compromising positions earlier than they are comfortable with since some minors may be comfortable with sharing nude photos but uncomfortable with being nude in the presence of their partner (where the pressure for sexual activity may be more intimidating). On the other hand, permitting a minor to take sexually explicit Selfies and send them to others may raise concerns about proliferating child pornography and facilitating the manipulation of minors by sexual predators. In particular, if Sexting Selfies can qualify under the Private Use Exception, then adults will be able to convince minors through online exchanges to send them sexually explicit photos that could be protected by the Private Use Exception. While insisting that the adult take the photo may seem misplaced, a minor may very well be comfortable sending a photo of themselves, but uncomfortable being physically present with the adult when the photo is taken, which could indirectly result in fewer minors being manipulated by adults since there will be no legal means (that they are comfortable with) of sharing sexually explicit photos with those adults.

Regardless of whether Sexting Selfies should be included within the scope of the Sharpe Exceptions, greater clarity in respect of how the law should address such materials will be a welcome addition to the Supreme Court’s next foray into child pornography laws.

We note, parenthetically, that Cockell involved sexually explicit Selfies (see para 42). Interestingly, the Court of Appeal did not reason that the accused could not benefit from the Private Use Exception in respect of those Selfies because he was neither depicted in them nor created them (pursuant to para 116 of Sharpe). Instead, the Court of Appeal merely mentioned that some of the recordings at issue were Selfies in passing while discussing the (now defunct) mutuality of benefit criterion (at para 42).

3. Can A Party Later Retract Consent To Recording?

Third, how should courts deal with the situation when a party to a recording later retracts their consent to the recording (either by demanding its return or destruction)? While this issue is clearly in obiter as retracting consent was not at issue in Barabash (at para 27) it nonetheless raises interesting questions to explore.

According to the Court, a party’s right to later retract consent to recording follows from how applying the Private Use Exception depends on the “ongoing nature of the possession” (at para 29). For example, privately-held recordings that are protected by the Private Use Exception are no longer protected by the Private Use Exception the moment they are shared with third parties, even if that sharing occurs decades later. And that sharing may not only make the current possession of that child pornography illegal; it may reach back in time to make its creation illegal as well (see Sharpe at para 118). In this way, the Private Use Exception is a ‘living defense’ that must be tested against the entire history of the recording, not just the moment the recording is created. As a consequence, the Court reasons that the minor’s ongoing consent to the recording could, likewise, be a ‘living’ requirement of the Private Use Exception which, if retracted, may vitiate the protection of the Private Use Exception (Barabash at para 29).

To be clear, the Court, even after acknowledging that this issue is in obiter, uses equivocal language regarding the right for a minor to retract consent to recording and vitiate the Private Use Exception (e.g. “[i]t may well be” and “Sharpe suggests” that a minor has such a right; at para 30). Indeed, the Court expressly states that it “would not make any final pronouncement” on this issue (at para 30).

Still, the Court outlines persuasive obiter commentary in favour of minors retaining the right to retract consent to recording. Specifically, the Court describes how providing such a right would further the principles underlying the Court’s decision in Sharpe and balance the right to freedom of expression with protecting children from harm, such as the anxiety or stress they may feel about having such a recording in the possession of another person (at para 30). But as the Court provides only limited obiter commentary on this issue, the Court provides no guidance as to the process or implications of a child requesting that the recording be destroyed. How long would the person possessing the recording have to delete it before being subject to criminal liability? If the person refrained from deleting it, under what offence would they be charged? Can the adult demand that the recording be destroyed even if the minor wishes to preserve it? What if the recording contains two minors, one who later demands that it be destroyed, and another who insists on its preservation? All of these questions will require further clarification from the Court when facts engaging those questions ultimately arise.

In particular, it is relatively unique for a private citizen to have the power to transform legal conduct into criminal conduct at their sole discretion and possibly years after the initially non-criminal activity took place. However, in Ten Minutes on Barabash, Professor Sankoff notes (at 11:07) that this unconventional application of the criminal law follows from the unique ongoing operation of the Private Use Exception. Any material showing a minor engaged in sexual activity is “frozen in time” (at 12:19) and would be child pornography, even many years later, but for the presence of the Private Use Exception (which requires the consent of all parties to the recording). As a consequence, according to Professor Sankoff, the Private Use Exception no longer applies when a minor retracts their consent to the recording. While we agree with Professor Sankoff that a recording will likely transform into illegal child pornography “at [the] very moment” a party later retracts their consent (at 12:35), clearer guidelines in respect of how that retraction must be communicated to the individual possessing the recording and reasonable parameters for destroying the recording (e.g. how it should be destroyed, how much time you have to destroy it) are important to ensure that such an offence does not cast too broad a net of criminal liability.


Barabash brings greater clarity to the analytical framework for the Private Use Exception. At a minimum, this clarity should result in courts applying the Private Use Exception with greater precision and consistency. At best, with effective outreach to minors, this clarity may help provide young people with clearer parameters in respect of exploring their sexuality while being secure from abuse and exploitation. Still, even with the greater clarity brought by Barabash, many questions remain unanswered. Hopefully, with the clear foundation provided in Barabash, courts will be better-equipped to grapple with these new questions as they arise.

It is understandable for the Court to refrain from providing specific legal guidance on the unanswered questions discussed above given that none were present on the facts in Barabash. Indeed, the many nuances described above demonstrate how factually complex these issues can be and how attempting to address them without the benefit of specific facts and arguments may be premature. That said, clarity in the criminal law is fundamental to a just society (R v Levkovic, 2013 SCC 25 at paras 33-34). With these questions left unanswered, there is significant ambiguity in what conduct is legal and how courts should treat it, particularly the conduct of minors exchanging sexually explicit Selfies. Only time will tell how these issues will be addressed in future cases. For now, it may be best for minors to keep things to themselves.

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Entering the Fray for Self-Represented Litigants

Mon, 06/22/2015 - 10:50am

By: Ian Pillai

PDF Version: Entering the Fray for Self-Represented Litigants

Case Commented On: R v Crawford, 2015 ABCA 175

Judicial interventions are common in trials involving self-represented litigants, especially in family and civil courts. According to a report authored by Dr. Julie Macfarlane in 2013, self-represented litigants face a range of negative consequences as a result of representing themselves, including “descriptions of negative experiences with judges, some of which suggest basic incivility and rudeness.” However some judicial interventions are more positive, such as advice on court procedure or coaching on presentation. (The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants at 13) Judges find themselves in a difficult position when one party is represented by counsel, and the other is not. Some interventions are necessary.

Although the accused in Her Majesty the Queen v Kimani Gavin Crawford, 2015 ABCA 175, was not a self-represented litigant, the case is interesting because the Alberta Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge’s numerous interruptions rendered the trial unfair. The multiple interventions by the court led to the appearance that the trial judge had entered the fray and left judicial impartiality behind (at para 7).


The appellant, Kimani Crawford, was convicted of theft of an automobile and being a party to a robbery committed with the use of a firearm. Crawford appealed his conviction on two grounds: first, that the trial judge interfered too often in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and thus compromised the fairness of the trial, and second, that the judge erred in finding that the pellet gun used in commission of the offence was a firearm for the purpose of s 344(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.

The Court of Appeal Decision

The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on both grounds and ordered a new trial. Martin J.A., writing for the majority, referred to several inappropriate judicial interventions that undermined the appearance of a fair trial.

Martin J.A. considered the appropriate level of judicial advocacy during a trial. He noted that the judicial process is not compromised by interventions from the court to clarify an unclear answer, to resolve a misunderstanding of testimony or to correct inappropriate conduct by counsel or witnesses (at para 17). Nor is the appearance of impartiality undermined when a judge asks questions that should have been asked by counsel (at para 8). Yet such situations are rare, and as the Court pointed out, the task of posing questions to a witness that counsel should have asked must be approached with care (at para 13).

Martin J.A. relied (at para 12) on the decision of Lamer J (as he then was) in R v Brouillard, [1985] 1 SCR 39 at 42-43, 16 DLR (4th) 447, for instructions on when a trial judge descends into the arena of counsel:

When this happens, [that a judge steps down from the bench and assume the role of counsel] and, a fortiori, when this happens to the detriment of an accused, it is important that a new trial be ordered, even when the verdict of guilty is not unreasonable having regard to the evidence, and the judge has not erred with respect to the law applicable to the case and has not incorrectly assessed the facts.

The Court of Appeal, after reviewing the transcript, indicated concern both with the number and the nature of the interventions throughout the trial. The trial judge’s interventions in leading Crown witnesses during cross-examination were found to be inappropriate. Of particular concern to the Court of Appeal was the trial judge’s cross-examination of the Appellant on his involvement in an unrelated robbery, on which the Crown and defence declined to examine the appellant (at para 22). The Court also referred (at para 18) to R v Stewart (1991), 62 CCC (3d) 289, 43 OAC 109 (ONCA), suggesting that the cumulative effect of the trial judge’s interventions combined to create an overall appearance of unfairness.

The Court of Appeal followed (at para 16) the test respecting the fairness of the trial process, as is outlined in R v Valley (1986), 13 OAC 89, 26 CCC (3d) 207 (ONCA). The question to ask is not whether the accused was in fact prejudiced but “whether he might reasonably consider that he had not had a fair trial or whether a reasonably minded person who had been present throughout the trial would consider that the accused had not had a fair trial.”

In reply to the Respondent’s argument, the Court gave little weight to the fact that defence counsel did not object to the interventions at trial. As Martin J.A. pointed out (at para 20), “[o]bjecting to questions put by a trial judge whose responsibility it is to decide the appellant’s fate, is a delicate task at best, and counsel may be forgiven for not rising to the challenge.”

Martin J.A. added that any harm caused by the trial judge’s questioning could not be cured by the judge asking counsel whether they had any questions arising. An invitation to ask further questions, on a topic that should not have arisen, does not restore the apparent loss of neutrality by the trial judge (at para 22).

Finally, the second ground of appeal, whether the pellet gun was a “firearm” for the purpose of s 344(1)(a.1) of the Criminal Code, was also allowed (at paras 24-37). The case, however, is more notable for its instructions to trial judges on inappropriate court interventions.

Application to Self-Represented Litigants

A judge’s role within a trial is primarily to ensure a fair trial. To do this, a trial judge often has to interrupt court proceedings. At times this will be to the benefit of the self-represented accused, for example, when the accused does not have the skills to question a witness properly. Other times, interventions will benefit the interests of the Crown, so as to prevent the accused from derailing the trial.

In Crawford (at para 23), Martin J.A. wrote “I wish to emphasize that this was a trial where the accused was represented by counsel; a judge may have a somewhat greater latitude to question witnesses when the accused is unrepresented by counsel.”

When allowing a trial judge “a somewhat greater latitude”, Martin J.A. meant more leeway should be afforded to a trial judge when questioning a witness for the benefit of a self-represented accused. But the Court of Appeal’s paucity of instructions to judges when handling self-represented litigants is troubling. Ideally, the Court of Appeal could have provided a protocol, or a step-by-step process, to guide a judge in their treatment of self-represented accused. Certainly, such a process would not only help future self-represented litigants, but also legal counsel and poverty law clinics such as Student Legal Assistance. The Court had an opportunity to provide more direction to lower courts regarding self-represented litigants but failed to take it.

Perhaps the Court did not want to articulate a protocol because it believes there should be no unique treatment for self-represented litigants in a trial process. In the case of K(P.E.) v K(B.W.), 2004 ABCA 135, Wittman J.A. (as he then was) expressed the Court’s view on a separate set of procedures for self-represented litigants (at para 7):

First, the mother urges us to take into consideration that she was self-represented when this matter was heard before the chambers judge. While we are sympathetic to her position, there are not two sets of procedures, that is, one for lawyers and one for self-represented parties. In the absence of special provisions, our courts will apply the same legal principles, rules of evidence, and standards of procedure regardless of whether litigants are represented by counsel or are self-represented.

Similarly, Rule 1.1(2) of the Alberta Rules of Court does not allow for lenience to a self-represented litigant, as it states:

These rules also govern all persons who come to the Court for resolution of a claim, whether the person is a self-represented litigant or is represented by a lawyer.

In 2006, the Canadian Judicial Council adopted a Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons. The Statement is advisory in nature and not intended to be a code of conduct. Higher courts from provinces across the country have adopted the advice from the Statement in part or in whole (see e.g. Cole v British Columbia Nurses’ Union, 2014 BCCA 2 at para 36; Cicciarella v Cicciarella, 2009 CanLII 34988 (ON SCDC) at para 45; Deschênes c. Valeurs mobilieres Banque Laurentienne, 2010 QCCA 2137 at para 37), yet Alberta has not explicitly done so. The Statement outlines principles for those who are participants in litigation with a self-represented litigant, including the judiciary. Of particular importance are principles 3 and 4 under the heading “Promoting Equal Justice”:

  1. Where appropriate, a judge should consider engaging in such case management activities as are required to protect the right and interests of self-represented persons. Such case management should begin as early in the court process as possible.
  1. When one or both the parties are proceeding without representation, non-prejudicial and engaged case and courtroom management may be needed to protect the litigants’ equal right to be heard. Depending on the circumstances and nature of the case, the presiding judge may:

(a) explain the process;

(b) inquire whether both parties understand the process and the procedure;

(c) make referrals to agencies able to assist the litigant in the preparation of the case;

(d) provide information about the law and evidentiary requirement;

(e) modify the traditional order of taking evidence; and`

(f) question witnesses.

Lord Chancellor Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in Essays, Civil and Moral, observed that “Patience and gravity of hearing, is an essential part of justice; and an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.” The phrase is most applicable to situations when both parties are represented by counsel. Yet often there are times, such as when one party is self-represented, that a judge needs to over speak, for the purposes of promoting equal justice and access to justice.

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Why We Should Care About Magna Carta

Fri, 06/19/2015 - 10:00am

By: Ian Holloway

PDF Version: Why We Should Care About Magna Carta

I write this just as I’m returning to Canada from Runnymede, England. The Queen was there, as were the Duke of Edinburgh, the Princess Royal, and Prince William. The five of us — along with a thousand others from all over the world — were gathered to commemorate, and to celebrate, the 800th anniversary of the sealing of Magna Carta by King John on June 15, 1215.

So what’s the big deal? Why is it that a document that, as a British civil servant once described it, is nothing more than an archaic piece of paper with no intrinsic value, should attract such attention?

After all, while bits of it continue to have the force of law, the majority of Magna Carta’s provisions reflect little more than an incoherent jumble of individual grievances from King John’s nobles. Moreover, John himself showed his disdain by reneging on the deal a mere nine weeks later. And the Pope formally nullified it as soon as he became aware of its terms.

Oliver Cromwell — someone not normally known for his sense of humour — called it “Magna Farta.”

So why were a thousand of us assembled in an English country meadow this morning?

It’s because Magna Carta has come to stand for much more than it actually was. Magna Carta the reality was simply one more tawdry nail in the coffin of the disastrous reign of the man who was perhaps the worst king in English history. Magna Carta the illusion is one of the most important events in the evolution of our constitutional system.

What gave Magna Carta its enduring life was not the events of 1215, but rather the constitutional tumult that beset England 400 years later, during the jockeying between the King, Parliament, and the courts for power in the aftermath of the end of the Tudors and the ascension to the English throne of the Scottish house of Stuart.

The Tudors — chiefly Henry VIII and Elizabeth I — had overseen a significant decentralization of state power. When the Scottish King James assumed the English throne and tried to assert absolute authority, the institutions of government pushed back. And the tool they chose to justify their resistance was Magna Carta.

The hero of the story — assuming that one likes our current vision of the rule of law — was the jurist Sir Edward Coke, who served as chief justice between 1606-16. During that time, he almost single-handedly brought Magna Carta back to life.

Magna Carta’s language was feudal. Coke translated it for a post-feudal world. It was he who declared that Magna Carta “hath no fellow,” and it was he who held conclusively that because of Magna Carta, the king himself was under the law. It was Coke who gave legal meaning to the hapless John’s capitulation to the barons.

Coke rewrote history in a way that suited his political ends, and in so doing, he made Magna Carta seem relevant to a society that by now had developed a concept of constitutionalism.

Magna Carta is an icon. Few can fail to be stirred by clause 40, for example, which provided that: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny right or justice.” Or by clause 39, which talked about judgment by one’s equals.

But the fact is in the 300 years following John’s reign, Magna Carta was not considered particularly important. Measured against its own text in its own time, Magna Carta was a failure. But what it became in the Stuart period was a tool; a tool to legitimize judicial review of royal action. And a very successful tool it proved to be.

In law as in comedy, timing is everything. And Coke’s time on the bench had the good fortune to coincide with the beginning of British colonization of the New World. As the first colonists left England in search of greater freedom, and as they later nurtured a full slate of grievances against the Crown, Coke’s formulation that the king was under the law proved to be a useful justification both for declaring independence and for enshrining a Bill of Rights a few years afterwards.

That’s why Americans today revere Magna Carta more even than the English. Indeed, the monument to Magna Carta at Runnymede was actually paid for and dedicated by the American Bar Association.

Typically for Canada, our history with Magna Carta has been more subdued. Americans like to wear their iconography on their sleeves. We generally don’t. But even unacknowledged, Magna Carta was — and is — an important tool in Canada, too. For without the tradition of judicial assertiveness it gave rise to in the United States, it is difficult to imagine that our own Charter of Rights and Freedoms would have taken on the life it has.

That’s why we should be conscious of Magna Carta. When we adopted our own Charter in 1982, we enshrined Coke’s picture of Magna Carta. How can we not make sure that we actually understand it?

This post originally appeared on Legal Feeds, the Blog of Canadian Lawyer and Law Times.

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Court of Appeal Confirms ISO Rule on the Allocation of Intertie Capacity

Thu, 06/18/2015 - 10:00am

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Court of Appeal Confirms ISO Rule on the Allocation of Intertie Capacity

Case Commented On: Saskatchewan Power Corporation v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 183

With the commissioning of the Montana/Alberta intertie – a transmission line for electric energy connecting neighbouring transmission systems and allowing the transfer of electricity between jurisdictions – the Independent System Operator (ISO), operating under the name of the Alberta Electric System Operator (AESO), concluded that its existing last-in-first-out rule for the allocation of available transfer capability (ATC) on interties operated unfairly. It therefore engaged in a rule-making exercise as provided for under ss.20 – 20.4 of the Electric Utilities Act, SA 2003, c E-5.1 (EUA) resulting in the adoption of a proposed new ISO Rule on Available Transfer Capability and Transfer Path Management. The new Rule adopts a pro-rata methodology for allocating ATC. Section 20.2(1) of the EUA requires the ISO to file the proposed rule with the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) so as to give market participants (MPs) the opportunity to object in s.20.4(1):

20.4(1) A market participant may object to an ISO rule that is filed under section 20.2 on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) that the Independent System Operator, in making the ISO rule, did not comply with Commission rules made under section 20.9;

(b) that the ISO rule is technically deficient;

(c) that the ISO rule does not support the fair, efficient and openly competitive operation of the market;

(d) that the ISO rule is not in the public interest.

Several MPs availed themselves of this opportunity but the AUC ultimately concluded in AUC Decision 2013-025 that (at para 1) it had “not been persuaded that the rule is against the public interest or the fair, efficient and openly competitive operation of the electricity market in Alberta or that the rule is technically deficient.” Several MPs thereupon sought and were granted leave to appeal the AUC’s decision on two grounds: (1) did the AUC err in law in its interpretation of s.29 of the EUA by finding that the Operator was required by statute to provide system access service to intertie operators; and (2) did it err in law in its interpretation of s.16 and/or s.27 of the Transmission Regulation, Alta Reg 86/2007 (TReg)? In this decision the Court of Appeal dismissed those appeals thereby confirming both the AUC Decision and the ISO Rule. Both grounds of appeal seem to have been argued under s.20.4(d) of the EUA and on the basis that an unreasonable interpretation of any of the above provisions would necessarily result in a conclusion that was not in the public interest. There was also a more general public interest argument which is discussed in the final paragraphs of this post.

Statement of the Problem

In order to understand what the issue was it is useful to know a little bit about just what available transfer capacity (ATC) is. An intertie, like any other transmission line, will have a “path rating” which “is generally determined by the physical characteristics of the line or lines, such as the type of material in the wiring, the line capacity, transformer capacity, and other factors” (AUC at para 18). However, the amount of energy than can be safely and reliably transmitted on an intertie will typically be less than the path rating, principally for system reliability reasons in each of the interconnected jurisdictions. As a result the Total Transfer Capacity (TTC) will be less than the path rating. The TTC may be further reduced by a transmission reliability margin (TRM) which is “the amount of transfer capability necessary to ensure the reliably operation taking into account uncertainties in system conditions and the need for operating flexibility” (AUC at para 19). Thus available transfer capacity (ATC) is TTC minus the TRM (AUC, id).

Prior to the construction of the Alberta/Montana intertie Alberta was only connected to British Columbia and Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan intertie differs from the BC and Montana interties in one significant way. Whereas BC, Montana and Alberta are all part of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WEEC) and operate synchronously, Saskatchewan is part of the Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO) and operates synchronously with its MRO partners rather than with the WEEC.

The problem that arises when adding new intertie capacity is that the new capacity will not itself resolve underlying system reliability concerns; these system reliability concerns continue to limit the full deployment of the rated capacity of all interconnections which operate synchronously, with the result that the ATC will not increase in a linear way with the rated capacity of additional new intertie capacity. The addition of a new player in the intertie market therefore tends to increase competition for the available transmission capacity. Thus the ability to make full use of the rated capacity of interties depends upon the qualities of each of the neighbouring interconnected systems. The AUC put it this way in a crucial passage which clearly informs how one thinks about the ATC “resource”; the last sentence is particularly telling:

It is clear to the Commission that ATC is a measure of the ability of an interconnected electric system to transfer electric energy from one jurisdiction to another and is the result of the conditions within each of the interconnected electric systems. The Commission concludes that interties do not in and of themselves create ATC, but rather they enable (up to the path rating of the intertie) the transfer of electric energy between neighbouring interconnected electric systems (up to the transfer capability of each of those interconnected electric systems). The Commission concludes that ATC should be treated as a system resource which does not inure to the benefit of any particular market participant or facility owner (AUC at para 69, emphasis added).

The dispute in this case was therefore between the incumbents who argued for preferential access to ATC and those who argued that there could be no vested rights in ATC. One final fact is worth emphasizing. With the exception of the Montana/Alberta intertie (MATL), all transmission in Alberta, while privately owned, is subject to rate regulation by the AUC. This is not the case for MATL, which is a so-called merchant transmission line. This led to the argument that existing ATC capacity had effectively been funded by Alberta ratepayers and therefore should not be shared (for free) with MATL.

It has been well known for years that overall system reliability issues on the Alberta Interconnected Electric System had reduced ATC on the existing interties. The province recognized this when it adopted its Transmission Development Policy in 2003 (at 10). The problem is also recognized in the text of s.16 of the TReg which, as originally adopted in 2007, provided as follows:

16 (1) In making rules under section 20 of the Act, and in exercising its duties under section 17 of the Act, the ISO must prepare a plan and make arrangements to restore each intertie that existed on August 12, 2004 to, or near to, its path rating.

(2) The plan to restore interties to their path ratings must specify how the ISO intends to restore and maintain each intertie to, or near to, its path rating without the mandatory operation of generating units.

(3) The plan to restore and maintain interties must be incorporated into and form part of the transmission system plan as soon as practicable.

Crucially however, s.16 was amended in 2010 to add a new subsection (4):

(4) This section shall not be interpreted as meaning that priority should be given to interties that existed on August 12, 2004 over interties existing after that date in respect of the allocation of available transfer capability.

As noted above, there were two grounds of appeal. The first ground dealt with s.29 of the EUA and the ISO’s duty to provide system access service. The second set of grounds of appeal dealt with issues relating to priority of access and the responsibility for the costs associated with increasing available transfer capacity. All parties agreed (at paras 2 – 23) that the standard of review for all of these questions was reasonableness.

Section 29 of the EUA and the Duty to Provide System Access Service

Section 29 of the EUA provides that the ISO “must provide system access service on the transmission system in a manner that gives all market participants wishing to exchange electric energy and ancillary services a reasonable opportunity to do so.” In interpreting this section and in particular the meaning of “reasonable opportunity”, the AUC also took into account the purposes of the EUA including s 5(b) which states that access to the power pool should be available on a non-discriminatory basis to all persons wishing to exchange electric energy. This allowed the AUC to conclude (at para 92) that “a reasonable opportunity for system access service constitutes non-discriminatory access and equal treatment of market participants, subject to any … requirements for maintaining safety and reliability of the AIES where there may be insufficient transmission available. The Commission considers this reasonable opportunity for system access applies equally to generators and interties.”

The Court of Appeal was clearly of the view that this was a reasonable interpretation and one that was not inconsistent with previous AUC decisions (CA at paras 34 – 47).

Section 16 of the Transmission Regulation and Priority of Access

I have quoted s.16 above and referred to the evolution of the section. The Commission’s interpretation of s.16(4) is crucial. The AUC took the view that the office of s.16(4) was to prevent “sections 16(1) through (3) being taken as the basis for giving the interties existing on August 12, 2004 priority in respect of ATC allocation” (AUC at para 226). This interpretation was not inconsistent with the goal of the previous subsections but it meant that “the AESO is required to allocate ATC on a non-priority basis between interties.” The Commission recognized that “In certain circumstances this allocation may diminish ATC on the existing interties, but the AESO is in no way relieved of its legislated obligation to eventually restore those existing interties as set out in Section 16(1)” (AUC at para 228). In other words, the duty to restore the capacity of existing interties could not be used as a means of establishing a priority of access of those interties to the ATC.

Once again the Court of Appeal was not persuaded that the AUC’s decision was an unreasonable interpretation of these apparently conflicting policy objectives (restoring path capacity and no vested rights). The Court put it this way (at para 59):

Although some of the appellants’ suggested interpretations are not outside the realm of “possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir), none of their arguments persuade us that the Commission’s interpretation of section 16 was unreasonable. – sec16subsec4_smoothSection 16(4) was enacted when knowledge of the Montana intertie can be inferred. The Legislature stated that the restoration requirements should not be read so as to confer a priority on the existing interties. The Supreme Court’s decision in McLean makes it clear that we are not to interfere with the decisions of an expert tribunal when it interprets its home statute unless the interpretation is one the statutory language cannot bear. That has not been demonstrated here.

Section 27 of the Transmission Regulation and the Duty to Cover Intertie Costs

Section 27 of the TReg deals with the duty of proponents to cover the amounts associated with the cost of planning, designing, constructing, operating and interconnecting an intertie. In particular, s.27(4) provides that:

27(4) The cost of planning, designing, constructing, operating and interconnecting an intertie to which this section applies must be paid by

(a) the person proposing the intertie, and

(b) other persons to the extent that they directly benefit from the intertie, based on the use described in the needs identification document approved by the Board, and then only to the extent permitted by the ISO tariff.

Several MPs argued that the proposed ATC rule was inconsistent with s.27 and therefore not in the public interest insofar as it effectively reallocated ATC from incumbents to the Montana/Alberta intertie which was a merchant proposal. This would require ratepayers to fund the cost of grid reinforcements that the ISO would be required to undertake in order to restore capacity as required by s.16 of the TReg (AUC at paras 231 – 243). The AUC’s response was really two-fold. First, it concluded that “there is no evidence persuading it that the costs described in [s.27(4)] ….. have not been paid by the operator of the MATL intertie” (AUC at para 244). The Court of Appeal noted that this finding was not disputed on appeal (at para 65). Second, the Commission was of the view that since ATC was a system resource the cost of increasing ATC should be a system cost rather than a cost allocated to any particular intertie proponent (AUC at paras 246 – 248). This too was not an unreasonable conclusion in the opinion of the Court of Appeal (at para 70).

General Public Interest Considerations

In addition to the more specific statutory interpretation arguments examined above there was also a more general public interest argument to the effect that a scheme that shared rate-payer funded ATC with a merchant line could not possibly be in the public interest. The Court of Appeal summarized the argument as follows (at para 73):

The appellants assert that given the undisputed facts, it cannot be in the public interest (i.e., in the interest of Alberta ratepayers) to allocate ATC to the privately owned and for-profit Montana intertie as proposed by the ATC Rule. Doing so would unfairly deprive Alberta ratepayers of the benefit of ATC, which their rates indirectly funded. Linked to this submission is that the decisions approving the Montana intertie mandated that it not have an adverse financial impact on Alberta ratepayers and any incremental costs associated with it were required to be borne by its owner, Montana Alberta Tie Ltd. They say the ATC Rule will have an adverse financial impact on ratepayers, which is inconsistent with previous Commission decisions. A further submission is that the Commission did not squarely address the public interest consideration until after it concluded that section 29 obligated it to give the Montana intertie equal treatment. This, the appellants submit, is backwards. In summary, the appellants argue that ATC is a public good, paid for by Alberta ratepayers, and should not be shared with or allocated to a private, for-profit entity on the same terms as it is allocated to the existing ratepayer-funded intertie operators.

It is not clear to me that the issue was expressly framed this way before the AUC but the Court dismissed the argument summarily (CA at para 74) largely, I think (and to some extent reading between the lines), on the basis that this was simply a different (and perhaps rhetorically more powerful way) of putting the earlier arguments based on a vested entitlement. That argument had already been disposed of largely on the basis of the ISO’s overriding duty of non-discriminatory access.

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Eligibility for Nomination under the Local Authorities Election Act (Alberta)

Wed, 06/17/2015 - 10:00am

By: Shaun Fluker

PDF Version: Eligibility for Nomination under the Local Authorities Election Act (Alberta)

Case Commented On: Mueller v Oko, 2015 ABCA 194

This short decision from the Court of Appeal considers the challenge by Mueller to the eligibility of Oko to be nominated as school board trustee in September 2013 for the Evergreen School Division under the Local Authorities Election Act, RSA 2000 c L-21. Mueller alleges that Oko was ineligible to be nominated because he was employed with the Pembina School Division at the time of his nomination and failed to take a leave of absence as required by section 22 of the Act. Justice Hillier dismissed Mueller’s application for judicial review in January 2014 and this post concerns the appeal of Justice Hillier’s decision.

The Local Authorities Election Act governs election procedures for municipalities and school districts in Alberta. Section 22 governs eligibility for nomination to elected office. Among other grounds of ineligibility, section 22 states that a person is not eligible to be nominated for elected office in a municipality if that person is employed by the municipality or is indebted to it (e.g. property taxes owed for a previous taxation year). Similarly section 22 states that a person is not eligible to be nominated for election as a school board trustee if that person is employed by any school district in Alberta. A distinction of note here with respect to school districts is that the section 22 employment ineligibility applies to all districts in the province, not just the one in which the candidate seeks to be nominated. The broader scope of ineligibility for school districts (as compared to municipalities) was enacted by legislative amendment in 2004. In its 2007 decision in Baier v Alberta, 2007 SCC 31, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that this broader restriction for school districts does not violate sections 2(b) or 15(1) of the Charter.

In this case, Mueller claims that Oko was ineligible to be nominated for election to the Board of Trustees for the Evergreen School Division because at the time of his nomination he was employed by the Pembina School Division. The facts of the case indicate that Oko had a contract to provide marking services for the Alberta Distance Learning Centre administered through the Pembina School Division at the time of his nomination. The legal issue before the Court is the meaning of “employed” as found in section 22 of the Act and whether by virtue of the marking contract Oko was employed by the Pembina School District and thus ineligible to be nominated for the Evergreen trustee position because he failed to obtain a leave of absence from his position with Pembina.

The Court’s reasons provide a straightforward run through on the principles of statutory interpretation in Canada (at paras 13 to 19). The Act does not provide a definition of “employed” and the Court of Appeal observes that a word in a statute takes its ordinary meaning unless altered by the legislature. Likewise, the legislature is presumed not to alter the common law meaning of a word unless it does so expressly. In the absence of any legislated definition here the Court finds that the common law defines employment as a master-servant relationship. The Court also notes the context in section 22 supports this meaning with the use of phrases such as “leave of absence” and “return to work”. The Court also observes that the School Act, RSA 2000 c S-3, allows trustees to maintain certain contractual relations with their Board so long as they comply with conflict of interest rules, and thus these provisions would be redundant if nominees were precluded from holding contractual provisions such the one held by Oko. The legislature does not draft gratuitously. The Court agrees with the earlier finding by Justice Hillier that Oko was an independent contractor with Pembina. The Court rules that this contractual relationship is not within the meaning of “employed” as found in the Act (at paras 20 – 24).

The case is dealt with by statutory interpretation, however the Court also notes that Mueller raised certain legal arguments for the first time on appeal (at para 21). Generally speaking, appellate courts are reluctant to hear a new argument on appeal. This reluctance is in part because of concerns over whether there was a sufficient factual or evidentiary record in the lower proceedings to support the new argument.

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A Trap for the Unwary: Assuming High Ratio Mortgages

Tue, 06/16/2015 - 10:00am

By: Jonnette Watson Hamilton

PDF Version: A Trap for the Unwary: Assuming High Ratio Mortgages

Case Commented On: CIBC Mortgages Inc v Abdallah, 2015 ABQB 363 (CanLII); Bank of Montreal v Hoehn, 2010 ABQB 405 (CanLII)

Five years ago, in Bank of Montreal v Hoehn, Master Jodi L. Mason decided that one small piece of consumer protection legislation was not properly created by Alberta lawmakers in 2003. As a result, a law that should have required a prominent warning to borrowers on high ratio residential mortgages was not available to protect individuals who unknowingly assumed these types of mortgages. The problem Master Mason identified could have been easily remedied by the legislature — but it was not. One of the consequences of the legislature’s failure to act can be seen in CIBC Mortgages Inc v Abdallah. As Madam Justice Barbara Romaine notes in this decision, the absence of mandatory warnings about assuming high ratio mortgages “creates a high-risk scenario for unwary transferees and creates hard cases like this one” (at para 33).


A “high ratio” mortgage is defined by section 1(2) of the Law of Property Regulation, Alta Reg 89/2004 as “a mortgage of land given to secure a loan under which the specific principal sum of the mortgage, together with the specific principal sum of any existing encumbrance on or mortgage of the same land, exceeds 75% of the market value of the land at the time the mortgage is given.” Borrowers who have less than 20% for a down payment for a home can only get a high-ratio mortgage. And in order to get a high ratio mortgage, these borrowers must qualify for mortgage default insurance through the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), Genworth or Canada Guaranty (see Part I of the National Housing Act, RSC 1985, c N-11).

Most borrowers who need a high ratio mortgage are, of course, first-time home buyers. They may have only a five or ten percent down payment. After they buy, if real estate prices tumble or interest rates skyrocket or borrowers lose their jobs, then they may not be able to make their mortgage payments. They may even end up owing more than their home is worth. Although borrowers make large premium payments on mortgage default insurance, the insurance protects lenders, not borrowers, in the event of borrowers’ default. Section 8(2) of the National Housing Act explicitly states: “For lenders, the purpose of insuring housing loans is to indemnify lenders in the event of default by borrowers. The obligations of borrowers or other persons are not released or discharged by that insurance or indemnification” (emphasis added).

However, in Alberta, it is not these risks — risks that any Canadian mortgagor with a high ratio mortgage faces — that explain why adding a prominent warning about high ratio mortgages was considered a good idea in 2003. The real issue in Alberta is deficiency judgments, i.e., if the property foreclosed upon is worth less than the amount owed on the mortgage, who makes up the shortfall?

At common law, lenders had the right to sue borrowers on their personal covenant to pay in mortgages, as well as a right of to recover against the mortgaged property by foreclosing and selling that property. In order words, if mortgaged properties were sold by the lenders for less than was owed on the mortgages, lenders could sue the borrowers and get the difference in a deficiency judgment against borrowers.

In 1939, Alberta’s Social Credit government limited lenders’ remedies to recovery from the land: The Judicature Amendment Act, SA 1939, c 85, s 2. This was originally temporary legislation that reflected the idea that deficiencies based on “distressed” market values were inequitable and contributed to the severity of the Great Depression (Lawrence D Jones, “Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise of the Default Option in Home Mortgage Loans” (1993) 36 JL & Econ 115 at note 6.) Thus, since 1939, lenders who foreclose on residential mortgages given by individual Albertans (not corporations) have been prevented from taking any action against those borrowers beyond taking the property — even if that property is worth less than the amount owing on the mortgage. This is what is known in Alberta as a “conventional mortgage.” And although the anti-deficiency law was originally intended to be only temporary relief, during the 1980s the prohibition on deficiency judgments was strongly defended by the then Progressive Conservative government in legislative debates about one dollar home sales and foreclosures (Alberta Hansard, 20th Legislative, 2d Session, April 3, 1984, 273-381).)

The 1939 anti-deficiency law was modified shortly after because of the enactment of federal legislation — the National Housing Act — to exclude loans made under that Act. As Master Mason explained in Bank of Montreal v. Hoehn, 2010 ABQB 405 (CanLII) at para 11:

In 1945, the right to sue on the covenant was restored for mortgage loans made under the National Housing Act, S.C. 1944, c. 46: The National Housing Loans Act (Alberta), S.A. 1945, c. 6, s. 2. These loans were for a larger percentage of the value of the property secured than allowed in a conventional mortgage. This was part of a federal policy to stimulate the economy and allow greater home ownership. Loans made under the current NHA [National Housing Act, RSC 1985, c N-11] are a permitted exception to section 418 of the Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46, which precludes banks from making mortgage loans that exceed 80% of the value of the property at the time of the loan.

Loans made under the National Housing Act were insured by a federal Crown corporation, the CMHC: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act, RSC 1985, c C-7. The incentive for financial institutions to lend money to borrowers who would not otherwise qualify for mortgages was for CMHC to insure the loans made. Lenders were put into a “no lose” position, recovering from CMHC if borrowers defaulted.

The result of the 1945 amendment was that, even in Alberta, CMHC was not restricted to recovery from the sale of the land when borrowers defaulted. Borrowers and subsequent buyers who assumed these mortgages were also liable on the covenant to pay in the mortgage. (See Marguerite J Trussler, “Foreclosure of Corporate Mortgages: Update 1984” (1985) 23 Alta L Rev 332 for a review of this legislative history.)

The current version of the ban on deficiency judgments is found in section 40(1) of the Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c L-7. And it is now section 43(4) of the Law of Property Act that exempts National Housing Act loans insured by CMHC from the anti-deficiency provisions.

The latest change, effective in 2004, put “high-ratio mortgages” insured by private insurers in the same position as those ensured by CMHC. In 1945, CMHC was the only entity in Canada providing mortgage default insurance, but private entities have recently entered the market. This amendment is found in section 43(4.1) of the Law of Property Act. It allows all high ratio mortgage lenders to sue borrowers on covenants to pay, and not just CMHC. On second reading of Bill 29, which introduced this change, the Bill’s sponsor, the then Member for Calgary-Lougheed, explained that “[t]he exemption for CMHC gives CMHC a competitive advantage over its private-sector competitor, the previously mentioned GE Capital Mortgage Insurance Canada, and of course any other private company that may want to enter the mortgage default insurance business in this province” (Alberta Hansard, 25th Legislature, 3rd session, March 27, 2003, 802). Thus, since August 1, 2004, there are more types of mortgages that do not afford borrowers in Alberta protection from being sued for any deficiency.

The government deliberately left out the definition of a “high ratio mortgage” from the amendment to the Law of Property Act. Instead, they left the definition to regulations to be made later “to allow further input on how the term should be defined and whether or not it should reflect the definition of high-ratio mortgage in the federal Bank Act” (Alberta Hansard, 25th Legislature, 3rd session, March 27, 2003, 803). Why the government felt the need to proceed so quickly is not revealed in the Alberta Hansard debates on the amendment, although opposition members’ discomfort with the lack of a definition is. Section 50.1was added to the Law of Property Act by the Legislature to provide that “[t]he Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations defining “high-ratio mortgages” for the purposes of sections 43(4.1) and (4.2) and 44(4.1) and (4.2)” (emphasis added).

Under section 1(2) of the Law of Property Act Regulation, “high ratio mortgage” is defined to mean “a mortgage of land given to secure a loan under which the specific principal sum of the mortgage, together with the specific principal sum of any existing encumbrance on or mortgage of the same land, exceeds 75% of the market value of the land at the time the mortgage is given.” In defining what a “high ratio mortgage” is, the Lieutenant Governor in Council (i.e., the executive branch of government, Cabinet) did exactly what the Legislature’s amendment to the Law of Property Act said they could do.

However, the Lieutenant Governor in Council did more than simply define high ratio mortgages. In section 2 of the Law of Property Regulation, Cabinet also demanded lenders add what Justice Romaine refers to as the “High Ratio Warning Statement” to each such mortgage:

2(1) A high ratio mortgage for the purposes of sections 43(4.1) and (4.2) and 44(4.1) and (4.2) of the Law of Property Act must also contain the following statement:

This mortgage is a high ratio mortgage to which sections 43(4.1) and (4.2) and 44(4.1) and (4.2) of the Law of Property Act apply. You and anyone who, expressly or impliedly, assumes this mortgage from you, could be sued for any obligations under this mortgage if there is a default by you or by a person who assumes this mortgage.

(2) The statement referred to in subsection (1) must be published prominently on the mortgage document. (emphasis added)

This “High Ratio Warning Statement” provision came into effect on August 1, 2006. However, it did not last long.

Bank of Montreal v Hoehn

Bank of Montreal v Hoehn, 2010 ABQB 405 (CanLII) involved five test cases brought by two lenders and heard by Master Jodi L. Mason. In each of the five cases, the lenders wanted a deficiency judgment on a high ratio mortgage. In each case, the high ratio mortgage being foreclosed upon did not contain the High Ratio Warning Statement required by section 2(1) of the Law of Property Regulation. The absence of the warning was the only defence the borrowers raised. In answer to that defence, the lenders sought and were granted leave on notice to the Attorney General to argue that section 2 of the Law of Property Regulation was ultra vires the Lieutenant Governor in Council.

By insisting that mortgage lenders add a prominent warning about the high ratio mortgage to every such mortgage, the lenders argued that the Lieutenant Governor in Council had overstepped its authority. Section 50.1 of the enabling statute, the Law of Property Act, merely allowed the regulation to define “high ratio mortgage” and that power was not broad enough to allow cabinet to require a High Ratio Warning Statement on those mortgages. The Master accepted the lenders’ position in a comprehensive judgment that appears to have benefited from thorough arguments by the Attorney General.

It is well established that subordinate legislation must be authorized by the empowering statute (Hoehm at para 25, citing BCPL Holdings Inc. v. Alberta, 2008 ABCA 153 at para 9). The test for determining whether regulations are unlawful because they do not conform to the regulation-making powers of the Governor in Council (if federal) or the Lieutenant Governor in Council (if provincial) were recently considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Katz Group Canada v Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care), 2013 SCC 64 (CanLII), at paras 24-28, the Supreme Court summarized how the vires of a regulation is tested:

(1) Is the impugned regulation consistent with the objective of its parent statute – in order to demonstrate invalidity a person must establish that the regulation is not consistent with such objective or that it addresses a matter which is not set out in the regulation-making provision of the parent statute;

(2) There is a presumption of validity such that the onus or burden is on the challenger to demonstrate that the regulation is ultra vires – so where possible a regulation will be read in a ‘broad and purposive’ manner to be consistent with its parent statute;

(3) The inquiry into the vires of a regulation does not involve assessing the policy merits of the regulation, nor does the reviewing court assess whether the regulation will successfully meet its objective. (See Shaun Fluker, “Syncrude v Canada: Where is the gatekeeper when you need one?”)

Master Mason, deciding the matter before her prior to that Supreme Court decision, concluded (at para 61):

The requirement of the High Ratio Statement in section 2 of the LPA does not form part of the definition of “high ratio mortgage” and thus exceeds the scope of power granted by section 50.1 of the LPA. It adds a new substantive requirement that is outside the scope of the LPA. The requirement of the High Ratio Statement has been adopted for a purpose beyond providing a definition, namely to provide a warning of the potential legal consequences of entering into a high ratio mortgage. While this may be a worthy exercise, it is not encompassed by the defining power granted by section 50.1. Section 2 of the LPA Regulation is therefore ultra vires (emphasis added).

In her decision, Master Mason focused on the objectives of the relevant Part of the Law of Property Act, as well as on the regulation-making provision of section 50.1 of the Law of Property Act Regulation, and she also properly ignored the policy merits of the challenged provision of the regulation. Thus it seems likely that the same decision would be reached today using the test in Katz Group Canada v Ontario (Health and Long-Term Care).

Despite the fact that the Attorney General appeared before Master Mason and addressed the vires issue, the government of the day seemed content to do nothing after the provision was found ultra vires. The provision still sits on the books as though it had some legal force. And there does not appear to have been any attempt by either the legislature or cabinet to implement a lawful requirement for a warning about high ratio mortgages. If cabinet thought it was good policy in 2003, why did they not act to implement it lawfully after 2010?

That obfuscating lack of reaction on the government’s part is what brings us to the June 5, 2015 decision of Madam Justice Barbara Romaine in CIBC Mortgages Inc v Abdallah.

CIBC Mortgages Inc v Abdallah

Justice Romaine was hearing an appeal from a decision of a Master, coincidently Master Mason. The appellant, Mr. Abdallah, assumed a mortgage when he bought a condominium. When he defaulted on the mortgage and the lender foreclosed, the Master found him liable for a deficiency judgment under the covenant to pay in the mortgage and section 58 of the Land Titles Act, RSA 2000 Chapter L-4. This Land Titles Act provision codifies a covenant of indemnity between a buyer and seller of land and creates privity of contract between the buyer and the seller’s lender, so that the lender can sue the buyer who assumed the mortgage directly (at paras 18-26).

On the appeal, Mr. Abdallah argued that he thought he assumed a conventional, as opposed to a high-ratio, mortgage. He thought this because, when he assumed the mortgage, there was nothing in the mortgage to indicate that it was granted under the National Housing Act or that it was high-ratio. Neither was he advised of his potential liability prior to his assuming the mortgage. Indeed, at the time he assumed it, the mortgage was not in fact high-ratio to the value of the property; Mr. Abdallah bought the property for $199,000 and assumed a $144,000 mortgage.

Nevertheless, Justice Romaine dismissed Mr. Abdallah’s appeal. There was no duty on the seller to tell Mr. Abdallah that the mortgage was a high ratio one and the time to meet the definition of a high ratio mortgage is at the time the mortgage is given, and not when it is assumed: s. 1(2) of the Law of Property Act Regulation. She found that “Mr. Abdallah was caught by the trap for the unwary created by the failure of the legislature to provide an enforceable method of identifying a mortgage as a high-ratio mortgage to a subsequent transferee who may assume such a mortgage without such notice” (at para 3, emphasis added).

The “trap for the unwary” that Justice Romaine refers to was set because the assumed mortgage did not indicate on its face that it was granted under the National Housing Act or that it was CMHC-insured or a high-ratio mortgage. It did not have the High Ratio Warning Statement that had been required by the Law of Property Act Regulation that was struck down in Hoehn as ultra vires. There was nothing in Mr. Abdallah’s now deceased lawyer’s file to indicate that Mr. Abdallah was advised that the mortgage was a high-ratio CMHC insured mortgage. The “Statement of Mortgage Account for Assumption Purposes” sent to Mr. Abdallah’s lawyer by CIBC Mortgages did refer to a CMHC number, but it was dated almost a year after Mr. Abdallah assumed the mortgage. Justice Romaine summarized the situation as follows (at paras 32-33):

[T]he uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Abdallah purchased a property subject to a mortgage that appeared to be conventional, at a purchase price that would indicate that it was conventional. There was nothing on the face of the mortgage to indicate otherwise, and it was not until Mr. Abdallah’s lawyer received the assumption statement, many months later, that there was anything that would indicate the status of the mortgage as high-risk.

Since the High-Ratio Warning Statement required by LPA Regulation was struck down in 2010 in Bank of Montreal v Hoehn, there exists nothing that would compel mortgagees to make it clear on the mortgage itself, as opposed to collateral documentation, that the mortgage is high-ratio.

Going Forward?

The legislature and cabinet were sloppy on the enactment of the High Ratio Warning Statement bit of consumer protection legislation in 2003. A statute was amended without a definition of the only topic of the amendment. The High Ratio Warning Statement was added by cabinet to the new regulation for no known reason; it was not the topic of debates in the legislature. No consequences were specified by the lawmakers for non-compliance with the requirement for the warning. Master Mason in Hoehn was therefore required to discuss, at considerable length, the consequences of non-compliance with the High Ratio Warning Statement provision (at paras 63-109). Was it mandatory or directory? Could the purpose of the statement be fulfilled by other methods?

There is good reason to want substantive requirements in statutes, and not regulations. This seems to be particularly the case when the provisions are consumer protection provisions.

Although proposals for legislation, drafting of bills, consultations, and other steps leading up to the introduction of a proposed statute in the federal Parliament or a provincial Legislature do not necessarily take place in public, the actual legislative process is a public and transparent one. Individuals can attend Parliament and Legislatures and see and hear statutes being debated, they can read a transcript of the debates about legislation in Hansard (see the Alberta Hansard website here), and they can read about controversial bills in the media.

Of course there is a need for subordinate legislation such as regulations and rules. Most statutes include a provision authorizing the federal Governor in Council or provincial Lieutenant Governor in Council to make subordinate legislation that sets out the operational details that make statutes work.

But the making of regulations is a much less transparent and public process. Cabinet discussions do not take place in public. There is no publically available record of their regulation making process. True, the final regulation must be published and registered. The Alberta Regulations Act, RSA 2000, c R-14 section 3(1), for example, requires publication in The Alberta Gazette.

The Alberta Gazette Part II, published by Alberta Queen’s Printer twice each month, contains new regulations as well as amendments to regulations filed with the Registrar of Regulations. But how many borrowers are readers of the Alberta Gazette Part II? It is an obscure publication.

Requiring lenders to warn of high ratio mortgages could be beneficial to borrowers and, especially, to those who assume such mortgages. The result of prominently publishing a provision like the ultra vires High Ratio Warning Statement may illuminate the potential legal consequences of entering into a high ratio mortgage. It should eliminate the “trap for the unwary” that Mr. Abdallah was caught in.

It would be easy enough for the Legislature to fix this problem. If the Legislature thinks warning borrowers of the possible perils of assuming high ratio mortgages is a good idea, then it could expressly provide for a warning statement in the Law of Property Act itself or authorize the Lieutenant Governor in Council to do so in a regulation in clear and express language.

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Agent Regulation: The Case of Emmerson Brando (AKA Arturo Nuosci, AKA Maverick Austin Maveric, AKA Landon Emmerson Brando)

Mon, 06/15/2015 - 11:51am

By: Heather White & Sarah Burton

PDF Version: Agent Regulation: The Case of Emmerson Brando (AKA Arturo Nuosci, AKA Maverick Austin Maveric, AKA Landon Emmerson Brando)

Case Commented On: R v Hansen, 2015 ABPC 118

On May 12, 2015, CBC news reported that Emmerson Brando – a well-known Calgary-based court agent – had an extensive criminal history (Meghan Grant, “Emmerson Brando’s criminal past outlined in Calgary court memo” CBC News (12 May 2015) (“CBC News”). This was of great interest to the Calgary Bar owing to his regular appearances in court. Mr. Brando had served 90 days in Canadian jail and 33 months in U.S. prison for offences including fabricating evidence, fraud, identity theft, misuse of a social security number, and making a false statement in a passport application (CBC News). Upon completing his sentence in the United States, Mr. Brando was deported back to Canada, where he set up practice as an agent in Ontario. A few years ago, Mr. Brando moved his practice to Alberta where paralegals are not regulated (CBC News).

Once Mr. Brando’s criminal history was uncovered, Chief Crown counsel Lloyd Robertson, Q.C., brought an objection to Mr. Brando being given leave to represent a client at an upcoming trial. The resulting decision, R v Hansen, 2015 ABPC 118, written by Judge Gaschler, provides a thorough analysis of Brando’s criminal history and the way in which it affects the Court’s willingness to grant him leave to appear as an agent. After a careful review of the circumstances, Judge Gaschler held that Mr. Brando’s appearance would undermine the integrity of the justice system, and denied him leave to appear as an agent (at para 29).

This decision raises the question of agent regulation. In Alberta, court agents operate in a vaguely defined territory. The Criminal Code of Canada, RSC 1985, c C-46, authorizes defendants to appear via an agent on summary conviction matters (at ss 800 and 802). Unlike Ontario, however, Alberta court agents are not regulated. Given that agents are authorized to appear in Alberta courts, should the Law Society (or some other entity) be regulating who gets to call themselves a court agent? Doing so has obvious benefits, but some object that regulation creates unintended barriers to justice. This post examines the Hansen decision and considers the role of agent regulation in the future.

The Decision

Judge Gaschler’s decision was guided by reference to the Ontario Court of Appeal decision R v Romanowicz, (1999) 45 OR (3d) 506. Romanowicz considered whether a trial judge can refuse to permit an agent to represent an accused in summary conviction proceedings for concerns over competency or otherwise. The Court of Appeal held that a trial court can deny leave to an agent when participation in the proceedings “would either damage the fairness of those proceedings, impair the ability of the tribunal to perform its function or otherwise undermine the integrity of the process” (Romanowicz at para 61). Furthermore, that power “must be invoked whenever it is necessary to do so to protect the proper administration of justice” (Romanowicz at para 73).

While not an exhaustive list, the Court of Appeal found that the “administration of justice would suffer irreparable harm if an agent were allowed to appear [in situations involving] representation by an agent facing criminal charges involving interference with the administration of justice and representation by an agent whose background demonstrates pervasive dishonesty or blatant disrespect for the law” (Romanowicz at para 74).

However, the Court of Appeal emphasized that a criminal record or discreditable conduct does not automatically disqualify someone from representing an accused. Disqualification will only occur if the conduct pertains to situations in which “the agent’s criminal record or other discreditable acts are such as to permit the conclusion that the agent cannot be relied upon to conduct a trial ethically and honourably” (Romanowicz at para 74).

In light of the Romanowicz ruling, it is clear that there are some concerns surrounding the types of offences on Mr. Brando’s criminal record. In the Hansen decision, Judge Gaschler provided an overview of Mr. Brando’s prior convictions (at paras 8-9). They are as follows:

  • 1990 – Ontario: forgery and uttering a forged document
    • Six months on each charge concurrent
  • 1995 – Ontario: fabricating evidence
    • 90 days intermittent and probation
  • 1996 – Ontario: two counts of fraud over $1,000
    • Suspended sentence, probation for two years and restitution of $30,000
  • 1998 – Ontario: two counts of fraud over $5,000
    • Two years less a day, conditional sentence order, three years probation, restitution on the first count of $40,183.73, and restitution on the second count of $15,228.21
  • 1999 – Ontario: uttering threats
    • Suspended sentence and one year probation
  • 2006 – United States: mail fraud, identity theft, false statement in an application for a US passport, three counts of bank fraud, and misuse of social security number
    • Global sentence of 60 months in prison, five years of supervision upon release, $800 special assessment, and $200,000 in restitution.

While reviewing Mr. Brando’s criminal past, Judge Gaschler drew attention to a much more recent deception. On his website, Mr. Brando stated that he had served with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for 25 years (at para 21). In reality, Mr. Brando had only served as a special constable for a few months (at para 22). Furthermore, this misleading information had only been removed from Mr. Brando’s website one week earlier when the Crown informed him that it would be objecting to his appearance as a court agent (at para 22). With respect to this point, Judge Gaschler stated “[t]hat particular falsehood, it is clear, is a significant and material falsehood in the present. This demonstrates that Mr. Brando’s dishonesty and falsehoods are not only in the past. Rehabilitation, which Mr. Brando claims, cannot in these circumstances be claimed to be complete” (at para 22).

Mr. Brando’s recent falsehood and past offences led Judge Gaschler to find that the “total record of criminal convictions and disreputable conduct is of such a kind and character that pervasive dishonesty and blatant disregard for the law and the rights of others is abundantly demonstrated” (at para 25). As a result, he concluded that “[n]o representation by Mr. Brando could be heard without the overwhelming distraction and concern over Mr. Brando’s veracity and reliability”, and denied Mr. Brando leave to appear as an agent on behalf of his client (at para 29).


According to ss 800 and 802 of the Criminal Code, an accused can appear by agent on summary conviction charges carrying a maximum sentence of six months. In Ontario, those who provide paralegal services are subject to regulation by the Law Society of Upper Canada (see Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L8). Among those regulations is the requirement that the court agent be of good character (The Law Society of Upper Canada, Licensing and Accreditation, Toronto: LSUC, 2014). In order to determine whether a person is of good character, the Law Society has set out thirteen guidelines, and has indicated that other information may also be considered. The guidelines consider whether the person:

  • has been found guilty of, or convicted of, any offence under any statute;
  • is the subject of criminal proceedings;
  • has had judgment rendered against him or her in an action involving fraud;
  • has ever disobeyed any order of any court requiring the person to do any act or to abstain from doing any act; and
  • has been sanctioned or had a penalty imposed upon him or her by a court, an administrative tribunal or a regulatory body (The Law Society of Upper Canada, Licensing Process Policies – Paralegal, Toronto: LSUC, 2014)

Clearly, Mr. Brando would have difficulties meeting the “good character” requirement in Ontario.

Court agents remain unregulated in Alberta. In 2012, the Law Society of Alberta issued a report regarding the Alternate Delivery of Legal Services as part of a provincial initiative to enhance access to justice (The Law Society of Alberta, Alternate Delivery of Legal Services Final Report (Alberta: Law Society of Alberta, February 2012)). That report concluded that agent regulation was unnecessary despite the fact that it may expose some Albertans to a risk of harm (at 21). In its view, there was insufficient evidence indicating that regulation would increase the availability of services (at 22), and may pose some barriers to justice. Persons dissatisfied with their agent operate in a “buyer beware” marketplace and may rely on the Criminal Code and consumer protection legislation (at 23). Admittedly, the Report had difficultly collecting data on the harms caused to Albertans through a lack of regulation (at 16).

Mr. Brando’s case forces us to revisit important questions about this regulatory gap. There are arguments to be made both for and against the regulation of agents in Alberta.

As the Report notes, agent regulation will likely increase the amount of money it costs to be an agent, and thus, erect a barrier to justice. The resulting increase in fees may diminish the agent’s ability to serve the lower income clientele that relies on their services. The potential financial requirements to become an agent can be estimated from those in Ontario. In Ontario, paralegals must write the Paralegal Licensing Examination and be of good character before they can become licensed (The Law Society of Upper Canada, Licensing and Accreditation, Toronto: LSUC, 2014). The fee to write the paralegal exam in 2015 was $1,075.00, plus a $160.00 application fee, and a $165.00 fee for an application for a license (The Law Society of Upper Canada, Become a Paralegal: 2015-16 Fees Schedule, Toronto: LSUC, 2014). Financial assistance is not offered to offset the costs of writing the exam, and there are no bursaries, government loans, or grants available. Paralegals must also carry professional liability insurance (LSUC By-laws, By-law 6, Part II, section 12(1)), and pay annual fees set out in the Law Society By-Law 5. At the moment, the 2015 annual fee is up to $1,125.48 (The Law Society of Upper Canada, Paying Your Law Society Fees, Toronto: LSUC, 2014).

If Alberta were to implement regulation similar to that in Ontario, paralegals would also have to pay into the same compensation fund as lawyers. In Ontario, regulations dictate that an agent’s clients have access to the Law Society’s Compensation Fund if they lose money because of a paralegal’s dishonesty. The compensation fund is paid for “exclusively by the lawyers and paralegals of Ontario, out of their own pockets”, and has “paid out millions of dollars to help clients” since 1953, though paralegals have only been included since 2008 (The Law Society of Upper Canada, Compensation Fund, Toronto: LSUC, 2014). If paying out of their own pockets, it is likely agents will pass this expense along to the consumer through increased fees. However, is it not fair that clients should have access to a compensation fund, regardless of whether they are represented by a lawyer or agent? And is it not fair that, if agents are providing legal services, they be required to contribute to such a fund?

These increased costs will likely result in a fee increase for agent representation. As finances are one of the key reasons behind hiring an agent, this could negatively impact access to justice.

Access to justice concerns guided the conclusions in the Law Society of Alberta’s Report. The Report found no evidence that regulation would increase availability of legal services, but did find evidence suggesting that regulation discouraged or reduced independent legal services activity (at 23).

However, while regulation may raise barriers to justice, it also has obvious benefits. The arguments in favour of agent regulation are focused on facilitating the proper administration of justice. Agent regulation could decrease costs associated with administering justice through a reduction of appeals, and mitigate the onerous burden placed on judges to perform their own method of agent regulation to ensure the rights of the accused are protected.

In considering the proper administration of justice, Judge Gaschler’s decision was guided by his concern that an unscrupulous agent’s statements and questionable evidence could lead to flimsy, or even incorrect, judicial decisions. These concerns, if borne out, could lead to false convictions and a wave of appeals. False convictions are the antithesis of the proper administration of justice. Aside from compromising this pillar of the justice system, these appeals would be costly, and would result in added strain to an already overloaded court system.

The lack of regulation also shifts the burden of ensuring the quality of agents onto judges. Judges who are faced with a court agent are placed in an awkward position – the accused has elected to appear via agent, but the competence and quality of that agent is unverified. In order to ensure the proper administration of justice, the rights of an accused must be protected. Those rights are protected by defense lawyers and the courts, and as a representative of the accused, an agent must also bear that responsibility. Without regulation, even apparently competent agents must be treated with caution. These extra precautions mean that judges are essentially required to act as though they are dealing with a self-represented litigant.

When dealing with agents, judges must be able to proceed under the basic premise that the agent is competent and trustworthy. Regulation can provide the foundation for this belief.

Regulation gives judges more certainty that the agents appearing before them are competent and trustworthy. Judges will face less of a burden ensuring that the rights of the accused are protected. However, this line of reasoning also raises an important question. If regulation diminishes some of the responsibility of the courts, who is ultimately responsible for protecting the rights of an accused: the agent, the regulatory authority or the court?

Concluding Thoughts

Despite potential costs concerns, we are of the view that Alberta ought to be regulating its agents in some way. Low and middle income Albertans are desperate for affordable legal assistance, and agents are increasingly filling this need. Given this reality, it is in the Law Society of Alberta’s interest to make sure that agents meet certain criteria of integrity and competence.

Amongst many other concerns, the Law Society seeks to protect the public from the unauthorized or unethical practice of law. In failing to regulate agents, we are ignoring an area where these concerns are most prominent. Failing to regulate agents does not dissuade agents from advertising their services, or clients from seeking them out. It merely makes a client’s choice of agent a hazardous occasion fraught with uncertainty.

The Law Society’s Report was understandably concerned about access to justice. There is little doubt that access to justice is a significant concern, and if regulating agents, every opportunity should be taken to keep expenses low to keep them accessible to those who rely on agents. However, we disagree that the need to keep costs low justifies a complete void in regulation or oversight. Legal proceedings significantly impact people’s lives. In choosing a representative, members of the public ought to have some measure of comfort that their agent is ethical and competent.

The Report took the view that disserved clients of non-lawyers have protection, because they can rely on consumer protection laws and Criminal Code provisions (at 16). This view proliferates one of the most serious problems identified in contemporary access to justice research – that of clustering legal problems (Ab Currie, The Legal Problems of Everyday Life: The Nature, Extent and Consequences of Justiciable Problems Experienced by Canadians (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 2007) at 1; The Canadian Bar Association, Reaching Equal Justice: An Invitation to Envision and Act (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar Association, November 2013) at 16). By forcing the burden of policing unscrupulous agents on the (often low-income) clients they serve, we are effectively snowballing one legal problem into several. In our view, it seems more reasonable to try and prevent the practice of unscrupulous agents in the first place, before problems develop.

We note that authors of the Report had difficulty collecting data on harms caused by independent non-lawyer service delivery (at 16). In other words, the Report’s conclusions were rendered without considering evidence of the harms caused by that failure. Based on that gap, we view its conclusions with caution.

Ensuring that agents have good character and have had enough training to pass an exam will help reduce the disparity between the quality of justice for the wealthy and the quality of justice for those with a lower income. Serious consideration should be given to implementing agent regulation in Alberta, and as it stands, the Alberta Law Society is the only feasible regulatory body.

The website of the Law Society of Alberta states that the objective of their Strategic Plan for 2010-2013 is “promoting access to high quality legal services” (The Law Society of Alberta, Access to Justice – Alternate Delivery of Legal Services, Alberta: Law Society of Alberta, 2010). We are concerned that the Report unduly focused on the access portion of this equation, with very little emphasis on the “high quality” requirement. With any luck, Judge Gaschler’s decision will facilitate a conversation surrounding the regulation of agents in Alberta. While there are strong reasons to implement a regulatory system such as the one already in place in Ontario, the issues of access to justice must play a key role in any regulation considerations that may take place.

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Landowners Can’t Use the Surface Rights Board to Mount a Collateral Attack on the Approval of a Transmission Line

Fri, 06/12/2015 - 10:00am

By: Nigel Bankes

PDF Version: Landowners Can’t Use the Surface Rights Board to Mount a Collateral Attack on the Approval of a Transmission Line

Case Commented On: Togstad v Alberta (Surface Rights Board), 2015 ABCA 192

In a completely predictable decision the Court of Appeal has applied the doctrine of collateral attack to dismiss the efforts of landowners to have a second kick at the can by seeking to question the constitutional basis for provincial regulation of a proposed transmission line before the Surface Rights Board.

This case, in fact, two cases, Togstad on appeal from 2014 ABQB 485 and an appeal from Kure v Alberta (Surface Rights Board) 2014 ABQB 572, involves the longstanding efforts of the provincial government to strengthen the transmission grid in the province through the construction of two new major transmission lines known as WATL and EATL – Western Alberta Transmission Line and the Eastern Alberta Transmission Line. These projects have been, to say the least, controversial. Along the way the Energy and Utilities Board bumped into its spy scandal and was subsequently dissolved; the province introduced the so-called critical infrastructure legislation to definitively and authoritatively resolve the question of “need” (SA 2009, c.44); and there was litigation, lots of it, on everything from allegations of bias (Lavesta Area Group v Alberta (Energy and Utilities Board), 2011 ABCA 108) to valiant efforts to argue that the Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) still had to establish need as part of its assessment of public interest and notwithstanding the critical infrastructure legislation: Shaw v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2012 ABCA 378, albeit involving the Heartland project rather than WATL or EATL. And then, in the hearings on the merits in WATL, the AUC carefully examined (and dismissed, AUC Decision 2012-327) landowner arguments to the effect that the lines were interprovincial undertakings that should be subject to federal regulation.

Alberta’s legislative scheme is such that once an intraprovincial transmission line has been approved for construction by the AUC under the terms of the Hydro and Electric Energy Act, RSA 2000, c. H-6, the transmission line operator (in this case AltaLink) must acquire the necessary rights of way either by way of private agreements with the relevant landowners, or by way of a right of entry order under the Surface Rights Act, RSA 2000, c. S-24 (SRA). AltaLink engaged in that process and the applicants in this case took advantage of this new forum, the Surface Rights Board (SRB) to raise, once again, provincial jurisdictional authority to licence the construction of WATL. In doing so, counsel for the landowners in these cases faced at last two hurdles: (1) the province has not included the SRB in the list of provincial regulatory tribunals authorized by the Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, RSA 2000, c. A-3 (APJA) and Designation of Constitutional Decision Makers Regulation, Alta Reg 69\2006 to consider constitutional questions; and (2) the doctrine of collateral attack.

As to the first issue, the Board itself in both the Togstad (2013 ASRB 576) and Kruse (2014 ASRB 263) matters concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider the constitutional question because it was not on the APJA list. The landowners in both cases brought applications for judicial review (an appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench only being available on compensation questions (see SRA, s.26)). Both Queen’s Bench justices (McCarthy and Sisson) agreed with that conclusion (Togstad at para 7; Kruse at para 22). The Court of Appeal concurred (at paras 3 – 5):

[3] Togstad says his objection was not constitutional in nature. He says it was based on the statutory limit to the Board’s jurisdiction created by the phrase “wholly in Alberta”, and only required the Board to determine the nature of the transmission line as a question of fact.

[4] The standard of review has no impact on our determination of this issue. It is clear that the Togstad objection raised a constitutional question. It was framed in constitutional terms and accompanied by a Notice of Constitutional Question. An inquiry into whether a transmission line is extraprovincial necessarily involves constitutional considerations. No doubt the legislative provisions limiting jurisdiction to lines wholly in Alberta were enacted to ensure that the legislation and its application are consistent with constitutional imperatives.

[5] Having raised the objection as a constitutional question before the Board, Togstad cannot now argue that the Board erred in treating it as such. The Queen’s Bench judge correctly concluded that the Board did not err in declining to consider a question which it clearly had no jurisdiction to decide.

All three Courts also found that the landowners’ applications constituted an impermissible collateral attack. Justice McCarthy put the point particularly well in the Togstad decision at para 16:

Mr. Togstad’s counsel argued that there are two complementary processes in respect of transmission lines, one before the AUC and another before the SRB, and that Mr. Togstad can attack either or both. That is true to some extent, but it does not mean that Mr. Togstad can make the same arguments on the same question before both boards in the hope of getting the answer he wants from one of them. The AUC is the body charged with issuing permits for the construction and operation of transmission lines. It is also the body designated by the Legislature to address constitutional questions arising in this context. If Mr. Togstad was unhappy with the AUC’s decision, his remedy was to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Counsel for Mr. Togstad argued that this Court should not prevent a litigant from challenging WATL because no court has dealt with the question of whether WATL is an interprovincial line. But Mr. Togstad had the right to appeal the AUC’s decision to the Court of Appeal and to raise the issue there. He did not. The SRB’s role is limited to granting right of entry orders that are consistent with the permit previously granted by the AUC. While its decisions with respect to compensation or conditions attached to rights of entry may be subject to attack, its deference to the AUC’s permit is unassailable. Mr. Togstad’s contention that the SRB should make a decision that is entirely inconsistent with the prior decision of the AUC is the essence of collateral attack. I disagree with counsel for Mr. Togstad that collateral attack is limited to situations in which there is a mandatory order issued against a party.

Justice Sisson in the Kure case based his analysis on the factors developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v Consolidated Maybrun Mines, 1998 CanLII 820 (SCC) (at para 45), [1998] 1 SCR 706, and R. v Al Klippert Ltd., 1998 CanLII 821 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 737: (1) the wording of the statute under the authority of which the order was issued; (2) the purpose of the legislation; (3) the existence of a right of appeal; (4) the kind of collateral attack in light of the expertise or raison d’être of the administrative appeal tribunal; and (5) the penalty on a conviction for failing to comply with the order. Having carefully examined each of these factors, Justice Sisson too concluded that this was an impermissible collateral attack (at paras 27 – 62). The Court of Appeal agreed (at paras 8 – 9):

[8] All of this leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants’ objections were collateral attacks on the Commission’s decision. By seeking to raise the question again before the Board, the appellants were attempting to circumvent the Commission’s order and were forum shopping for a different and inconsistent result. This is precisely the approach that the rule is designed to prevent.

[9] The legislative scheme does not support the appellants’ contention that the rule against collateral attacks should be relaxed in these cases. Indeed, it suggests the opposite, that the rule should be strictly applied so as to maintain the integrity of the integrated and interrelated regulatory regime. A direction that the Board must consider this question would turn the legislative scheme upside down. The Board and the Queen’s Bench judges did not err in concluding that the objections were prohibited collateral attacks. Even if this was not a collateral attack, it clearly falls within the doctrine of abuse of process.

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